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CHAPTER ONE 
RATIONALITY, BELIEF, AND FAITH 
Job 
The ancient Hebrew epic poem Job, written perhaps in the tenth century 
BCE, tells of Job's suffering and lamentations during the testing of his faith.1 
Early in the story, Job loses assets, family members, and his own health.2 As the 
plot unfolds, Job exchanges several verbal volleys with three of his friends, each 
of whom attempts to explain why God would allow such devastation to befall 
Job.3 Yet none gives an answer that Job finds satisfactory. Job expresses the 
locus of his frustration with the explanations of his friends. 
Surely there is a mine for silver, 
and a place where gold is refined. 
Iron is taken from the ground, 
and rock is poured out as copper. 
Man puts an end to the darkness; 
he searches the farthest recesses 
for the ore in the deepest darkness. 
Far from where people live he sinks a shaft 
in places travelers have long forgotten, 
far from other people he dangles and sways.... 
He has cut out channels through the rocks; 
                                            
1
 For possible dates, and the myriad complications in accurately dating the book of Job, see 
Norman C. Habel's The Book of Job, 40-42. 
2
 Job 1:13-2:10.  All biblical quotations are from the New English Translation (NET) Bible, 1st 
Edition. 
3
 Elihu, the fourth friend, has not yet appeared by chapter 28. Elihu's first speech is in chapter 32. 
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his eyes have spotted every precious thing. 
He has searched the sources of the rivers 
and what was hidden he has brought into the light. 
But wisdom—where can it be found? 
Where is the place of understanding? 
Mankind does not know its place; 
it cannot be found in the land of the living.4 
 
Mining is Job's chosen image of seeking what is precious. In this poem he 
lists several techniques for locating and extracting precious gems and minerals. 
Look at the extent, says Job, to which humankind has developed a technology 
for finding hidden things of value. Yet wisdom and understanding, whose value is 
immeasurable, remain elusive. Job wants insight into his present circumstances. 
When God speaks to Job, enlightenment is not on the agenda.5 
 To the fideist, Job may be seen as a sort of epic hero.6 Here is the fideist's 
take on the story: Job confronts the quandary of understanding the divine. 
Humankind, notes Job in his rumination on mining, has made laudable progress 
in the realms of science and industry. Much has been learned, much has been 
gained. But when confronting the problems of a divine nature, human capabilities 
have fallen short. There is a lacuna, a mandatory lacuna, that cannot be bridged 
                                            
4
 Job 28:1-4, 12-13. 
5
 Steven M. Cahn points out that the odd thing about the story is that the reader does have insight 
into the reason for Job's suffering—the explanation is found in Job 1 (Cahn 2006, 31-33). The 
point of Job, argues Cahn, clearly is not that humans cannot understand God's motivations, for 
we are told his motivations. 
6
 For more on Job as an epic hero in the tradition of Sumerian, Hebrew, and Babylonian folklore, 
see Habel 1985, 35-40. 
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by human understanding.7 The fideist extracts the following moral from the story 
of Job: The solution is to overcome this limitation with faith. One has faith in God, 
or at least faith that certain propositions about God obtain. And this faith 
overcomes any shortage of evidence or reasons. 
 Viewed correctly, the Job poem is not exactly an endorsement of or an 
argument for fideism. Job and the fideist are after two very different things. Job is 
not interested in the justificatory status of propositions such as “there is a God.” 
He is not investigating whether non-propositional belief content is adequate to 
support religious beliefs. Neither is he questioning the existence of God or the 
soundness of certain religious doctrines. Rather, he is inquiring into the 
motivations behind God's actions.8 The fideist, on the other hand, is interested in 
precisely those places where human reason runs up against religious beliefs and 
finds itself at an explanatory impasse. And the fideist's answer is that, in at least 
some cases, “having faith” can forge the link between our limited cognitive 
capacities and the truths we seek so desperately to grasp. But is the fideist 
correct in this assertion? Can one remain rational, yet hold a position “by faith”? 
And what exactly is meant by “having faith”? 
                                            
7
 Lev Shestov argues this in his essay “The Theory of Knowledge,” in which he alludes numerous 
times to Job (Shestov 1966b). Job, for him, represents the man who has correctly forsaken the 
quest for knowledge, and has embraced incommunicable truth via faith (cf. Mai Neto 1995, 98, 
Evans 1998, 133-134, and Monas 1966, xiv). 
8
 Even if the message here is that Job should have (more) faith in God, this does not immediately 
conceded the point to the fideist. C. Stephen Evans suggests that the Biblical accounts of faith 
should be understood as something different than the fideist account suggests (Evans 1998, 4-7). 
Faith, in the present context, seems to be fiducial, not belief-oriented. 
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Introduction 
The focus of this dissertation is a theory, typically offered in a religious 
context, that certain propositions can be held (and in some cases ought or even 
must be held) by faith without regard for evidence.9 Deriving its name from the 
Latin word for faith (fides), this theory is called fideism. Just as it is not possible 
to talk of metaphysical dualism, moral deontology, or epistemic externalism as 
unified theories, fideism is not so much a single theory as a family of related 
theories—related in the sense that all focus on the important role of faith, and the 
unimportance of evidence, in accepting a particular religious position.10 Nowhere 
does this appear more clearly than by taking a glance at the variety of ways in 
which theorists have attempted to capture the essence of fideism in a sentence 
or two. 
• Speaking of the possibility of religious knowledge, Pierre Bayle makes the 
famous remark that, “The powers of reason and philosophical examination 
go no further than to keep us in suspense and in fear of error, whether we 
                                            
9
 Some fideists offer fideism as a solution to evidential ambiguity or insufficiency, while others 
take a stronger stance and suggest that evidence ought to be disregarded when it comes to faith 
propositions. Thus, “without regard” is not intended to suggest strictly that evidence is ignored, 
but only that evidence is not a determining factor for the fideist. I revisit this point at the end of the 
chapter, after sufficient groundwork has been provided. 
10
 Here I use the term acceptance loosely. Clarifications of this and other related terms are made 
throughout this chapter. 
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affirm or whether we deny.”11 Bayle suggests that the “grace of God or 
childhood education” must fill in where reason falls short.12 
• Barbara Sher Tinsley attempts to capture Bayle's fideism with this quip: 
“[H]e insisted that, in the last analysis, faith had to be accepted by faith, and 
could not be proved by reason.”13 
• Michel de Montaigne offers his own succinct statement of the fideist 
position, saying that “Christians wrong themselves in desiring to support 
their belief by human reasons, since it is conceived only by faith and by a 
special inspiration of divine favour.”14  
• Richard H. Popkin offers this as an historical observation: “Fideism is the 
thesis that religious belief is based on faith and not either evidence or 
reasoning.”15 
• Terence Penelhum defines fideism as the “insistence that faith needs no 
justification from reason, but is the judge of reason and its pretensions.”16  
                                            
11
 Bayle 1999, 21. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Tinsley 2001, 21. Later in the chapter I examine various models of faith. 
14
 Montaigne 1999, 162. 
15
 Popkin 2000, 200. 
16
 Pebnelhum 1983, 1. 
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• In a similar vein, C. Stephen Evans calls fideism the idea that “faith should 
not be governed or regulated by reason, where reason is understood to be 
an autonomous, relatively competent human faculty.”17  
• Peter Kreeft and Ronald K. Tacelli offer this definition in their Handbook of 
Christian Apologetics: “Fideism contends that the only knowledge, or at 
least the only certain knowledge, we can have is by faith.”18  
• Drawing on Luther's rally cry of “Faith alone,” John R. Shook characterizes 
fideism as the “contrary principle” that “where one cannot know, one should 
faithfully believe, at least where Christianity is concerned.”19 
• John Bishop, defending a form of fideism markedly different from those 
above, provides his own generic characterization: “[P]eople may be justified 
in holding and acting on religious beliefs even though those beliefs lack 
sufficient evidential support, whether direct or inferential.”20. Bishop explains 
his own fideism as the thesis that doxastic or sub-doxastic faith ventures are 
sometimes morally and epistemically permissible.21 
Beginning from such characterizations, what conclusions can be drawn about 
“fideism in general”? All of these characterizations deal with doxastic or sub-
                                            
17
 Evans 1998, 9. 
18
 Kreeft and Tacelli 1994, 35. 
19
 Shook 2010, 20. 
20
 Bishop 2007, 2. 
21
 Ibid., 22. More will be said on doxastic and sub-doxastic faith ventures in the section on Faith in 
this chapter. 
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doxastic states—usually belief.22 And they likewise rely on a notion of faith. As 
we shall see, though, these accounts have nuanced views of faith. Some of the 
characterizations above seem to focus broadly on reason and rationality in 
general, while others take an epistemic tenor. Some of these characterizations 
make surprisingly strong claims. The only certain knowledge we can have is by 
faith? Others are more tempered. Bishop, for example, offers fideism as a 
solution in cases where evidence is insufficient. The relative strength of these 
claims not withstanding, all of these fideists (Bayle included, though the quote 
doesn’t make this evident) offer faith as a remedy for a purported inadequacy in 
(epistemic) rationality.23 Rationality (epistemic and otherwise), belief, and faith 
are all topics in need of some clarification before we can meaningfully and 
consistently discuss them, and this chapter deals with all three topics. 
Just as dualism, deontology, and externalism have general tenets shared 
among adherents, so too does fideism. One such claim is that propositions that 
are important—propositions that serve as framing principles—can be held or 
taken fideistically.24 The classic example of fideism illustrates this: By faith, one 
                                            
22
 This assumes that faith has a doxastic component. This question is covered more in the 
section on Faith in this chapter. 
23
 All seem to suggest problems with epistemic rationality. Not all suggest, though, broad issues 
with rationality in general. This point is discussed further in the section on rationality later in this 
chapter. 
24
 A framing principle is a high-order principle providing support for a broad array of other beliefs. 
Bishop (2007, 2010) uses this term to describe foundational religious propositions. As the name 
implies, framing principles are propositional in nature. Both framing principles and non-
propositional content will be discussed later in the chapter as well as in chapter 3. 
8 
 
may hold that God exists. Many prominent fideists, from Montaigne and Bayle to 
contemporary fideists such as Stephen Evans and John Bishop, have sought to 
defend variations of the claim that certain propositions can (and perhaps even 
ought to) be accepted by faith.25 And in the theories elaborated by these and 
other fideists, the acceptance of such a proposition plays an important role in 
reasoning. Does fideism (in any of its forms) offer a compelling theory that a 
rational agent ought to, or even can, accept? Can one remain rational while also 
being a fideist? Is fideism, as its proponents suggest, the best contender for 
answering questions about religious propositions? 
Overview 
In this dissertation I argue that fideism is not the best theory for accepting a 
particular position (religious or otherwise). It does not offer the best explanation 
about how one ought to hold important propositions while maintaining a 
commitment to rationality. Thus, I argue, a person concerned with holding 
epistemically rational beliefs ought not accept fideism. Further, I argue that the 
Kantian move of accepting a proposition on moral (or prudential) grounds does 
not make fideism the best rational position, all things considered. Instead, I argue 
that propositions, including the sort of propositions touted by fideists as 
candidates for fideistic support, are best held by evidential support. 
                                            
25
 Again, acceptance here is used loosely. The “ought” here implies an ethics of belief, but that 
subject will not be broached until the discussion of rationality later in this chapter. 
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The argument proceeds as follows. In what remains of this chapter, I 
examine several key notions relevant to our examination. I discuss a model of 
rationality, following the traditional distinction of moral, prudential, and epistemic 
rationality. I also discuss a strategy for addressing so-called “rational conflict” 
wherein different types of rationality seem to be in conflict. Given the centrality of 
belief to the topic, I suggest a particular notion of belief, and then address 
concerns about doxastic voluntarism. I also examine the common distinction 
between faith in and faith that. From there, I turn to faith, examining several 
models. The important concept of (epistemic) entitlement arises during the 
examination of models of faith, and I point out how that pertains to fideist 
theories. I conclude the chapter with a general account of fideism, in light of what 
has been said about rationality, belief, faith, and entitlement. 
In the second chapter I examine C. Stephen Evans’s “responsible fideism,” 
which claims that individuals can claim to know certain propositions by faith. 
Evans provides an epistemological theory purporting to link a notion of defeasibly 
held faith propositions to Plantinga’s notion of “properly basic beliefs” and arrive 
at the claim that fideist believers attain knowledge. This, claims Evans, stands 
against evidentialist notions of justification, which, on his account, fail to provide 
grounds for believing certain faith-oriented propositions. Against this theory, I 
argue that the Evans has confused several epistemic notions, and that while he 
has done well in showing the limits of reason, he ultimately points the way toward 
evidentialism, not away from it. Several problems arise in Evans’s account, 
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largely stemming from Evans’s treatment of epistemic reason as untrustworthy 
while faith remains a proper guide. In the second chapter, I explore some of the 
problems. 
In the third chapter, I turn from epistemologically oriented theories to 
moral/prudential fideism. This fideism, finding its roots in Kant and James, 
suggests that it is rational for humans to hold certain beliefs on moral or 
prudential grounds (in absence of, or even contrary to evidence), and that such 
beliefs may also play the foundational role of “framing beliefs” in one’s overall 
belief system. John Bishop has recently provided a sustained defense of this 
position, and it is on his work that I focus. I argue that Bishop’s account relies 
upon a notion of evidential ambiguity that is flawed in crucial ways. Further, I 
suggest that the venture model of faith does not best address the concerns of the 
religious seeker committed to epistemic rationality. Finally, I examine to what 
extent Bishop’s model addresses the rational goals of an agent, asking whether 
or not fideism is the most rational approach (all things considered). 
I close the dissertation in the fourth chapter where I suggest that 
evidentialism remains a better candidate for supporting religious beliefs. I begin 
by returning to fideism’s inability to address the concerns of the skeptic. From 
there, I sketch a theory of evidentialism that addresses the concerns raised by 
Evans and Bishop. I also return to the “evidential ambiguity” hypothesis of 
Bishop, suggesting that with a better notion of evidence, evidentialism does not 
suffer from the problems identified by Bishop. This leads to a notion of evidence 
11 
 
more robust than the ones offered by Evans and Bishop. Building a broadly 
abductive argument, I claim that fideism faces critical challenges when 
confronting the goals of a rational agent. Instead, evidentialism becomes the 
more compelling theory. 
Rationality 
Why is there a theory of fideism? What problem does fideism purport to 
solve? Fideism is positioned as a solution to a problem of epistemic justification. 
Particular beliefs—notoriously, particular religious beliefs—seem to be resistant 
to traditional epistemic justification.26 This resistance seems to be either a result 
of certain explanatory gaps or of evidential ambiguity or insufficiency. Either it is 
unclear how such beliefs could be justified or, given epistemic norms, it is unclear 
that the beliefs are (or can be) justified. 
Does this lacuna suggest that one ought not believe, or ought to suspend 
judgment? In at least some cases, the fideist suggests otherwise: One can 
(ought to?) accept certain propositions, evidence (or lack thereof) 
notwithstanding.27 One need not suspend judgment on important matters (e.g. 
the existence of God) merely because of an explanatory or evidential gap. 
Instead, the fideist proposes that we look elsewhere—somewhere other than 
                                            
26
 Penelhum 1989, 1. 
27
 Note that here we must transition from “believing” to “accepting propositions” because not all 
fideists suggest that belief is the correct response. Some, like Bishop (2007, 2010) and F.R. 
Tennant (1989), suggest taking a proposition to be true (without necessarily believing it). Later in 
the chapter, I replace “acceptance” with more suitable notions of belief, assent, holding, and 
taking (to be true). 
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traditional epistemic justification—for a reason to accept such propositions. As 
we shall see, the fideist contends that in at least some circumstances, one ought 
to (or at east may) hold a proposition by faith.28 
(For the moment, I use the term accept to mean assenting to proposition P 
at time t. This does not necessarily entail a long-term disposition toward P, and 
consequently does not entail belief. These notions will be refined later in the 
chapter.) 
It is sometimes held that fideism is a variety of irrationalism, but the 
existence of well-developed theories of fideism, often held by people claiming to 
not be irrationalists, suggests that merely dismissing fideism as such is 
unwarranted.29 It seems that fideism’s raison d’etre is to show that one might 
accept certain unsupported propositions, yet do so in a generally rational way.30 
That is, most fideists do not seem to take an “anything goes” attitude when it 
comes to evaluating and accepting propositions. 
But how could believing against evidence (or when acknowledging the 
insufficiency of evidence) ever be rational? One answer grants such beliefs a 
certain degree of irrationality while also suggesting that the position is, on the 
                                            
28
 Some varieties of fideism emphasizes faith in something, while others emphasize faith that. I 
return to this distinction in the section on Faith below. 
29
 cf. Evans 1998, chapters 1 and 2. Evans spends much time examining the claims about fideism 
and irrationalism. 
30
 I use the term “unsupported propositions” to include both propositions that do not have 
sufficient (epistemic) support and propositions which are purported to not need or be capable of 
support. In this way, I intend to capture the claims of a wide variety of fideists. Also, a notion of 
rationality will be sketched later in this chapter. 
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whole, still rational. It might be epistemically irrational to believe an unsupported 
proposition—particularly one of importance, as religious propositions seem to be. 
But this does not rule out the possibility that, all things considered, accepting the 
proposition is generally rational.31 In that sense, fideism may turn out to be a 
rational theory even while eschewing the application of traditional notions of 
epistemic justification to a certain class of propositions. 
To suggest such a line of argument, though, one must also suggest an 
appropriate model of rationality. 
A Model of Rationality 
For our line of questioning, the rationality of (accepting) a belief is of deep 
concern. And the present focus on religious beliefs makes this point even more 
salient, as the rationality of religious belief is a popular topic in philosophy of 
religion.32 The varieties of fideism considered in this work are those that maintain, 
either explicitly or implicitly, that fideism is a rational position.33 
A common approach in contemporary philosophy is to recognize at least 
three distinct kinds of rationality: epistemic, prudential, and moral rationality.34 
                                            
31
 For a sustained discussion of rationality as a broad notion, and epistemic rationality as a more 
specific concept, see Foley 1993 or Foley 2002. 
32
 For a broad example, Paul Helm’s Faith and Reason (1999) is an anthology of both historical 
and contemporary perspectives on faith and reason. 
33
 Evans’s “supra-rational” fideism maintains a commitment to rationality. Evans, 1998. 
34
 The model of rationality proposed here is derived largely from Moser 1985, particularly 
chapters I and VI, as well as from Foley 2002 and Foley 1993. Moser follows the tripartite division 
here (though he does so qualifying that there are or may be other types of rationality). Foley 
distinguishes primarily between epistemic and prudential, but also discusses moral and 
economical rationality. 
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Epistemic rationality has to do with truth. If S is epistemically rational, S has 
preferences best served by acquiring true beliefs while avoiding false beliefs.35 
Moral rationality is concerned with whether a belief is moral. S is morally rational 
only if S has preferences best served by acquiring morally advantageous beliefs. 
Prudential rationality is concerned with whether having a particular belief is in an 
individual’s best interest. If S is prudentially rational, S has a preference best 
served by acquiring beliefs supporting S’s well-being. Such beliefs would be 
prudentially advantageous beliefs. It is not necessary that a given belief be 
morally, prudentially, and epistemically rational at once for a given individual. P 
may be epistemically rational while being morally and prudentially neutral. Or on 
occasion, rational conflicts may arise. It may seem epistemically rational to hold 
B, while seeming morally rational to hold not-B. The account sketched below 
addresses this possibility. 
Evaluating the rationality of belief requires a general notion of justification. A 
basic characterization of justification suggests that S is justified in holding a belief 
B when B correctly relates to a relevant end for S.36 An account of justification, 
then, is an account of what it means for B to correctly relate to a given end. This 
characterization is worked out differently in each of the three domains introduced 
above. 
                                            
35
 This is a rough sketch. A more complete statement would include preferences for important 
epistemic propositions over against less important propositions. See Moser 1985, 214. 
36
 Moser 1985, 1. Foley’s characterization of justification is different than this (Foley 2002, 196). 
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In epistemology, justification can be explained as S’s having sufficient 
undefeated evidence in support of a proposition.37 If S has sufficient evidence for 
P (in the absence of undefeated defeaters), then S is epistemically justified in 
believing that P.38 Of critical importance, here, the evidence we speak of is 
evidence that indicates the truth of P.39 In this sense, it is epistemically oriented. 
Phrased according to our previous characterization of justification, we can say 
that sufficient undefeated evidence in support of B correctly relates one’s belief 
that B to the epistemic end of acquiring true beliefs while avoiding false beliefs.40 
This can be contrasted with moral justification. 
S is morally justified in holding belief B when it is right or good for S to 
believe B. When S’s belief B is morally advantageous—promoting S’s moral 
goodness—then S is morally justified in holding B.41 In contrast to epistemic 
justification, no truth requirement is immediately necessary when explaining 
                                            
37
 This is in no way a full treatment of epistemic justification. It is just an introductory sketch. 
Likewise, my explanations of moral and prudential justification are merely sketches. In chapter 4 I 
offer a more detailed characterization of epistemic justification. 
38
 This is by no means an analysis of justification. It is a rough sketch intending to capture the 
basic idea of evidentialism. For more complete formulations of evidential notions of justification, 
see Moser 1989 and Conee and Feldman 2004a. Again, justification is treated in more detail in 
the fourth chapter. 
39
 As I have here defined justification, it is clearly an internalist, evidentialist approach. Many 
contemporary epistemologies would take issue with my characterization of justification as 
internal. However, as will become clear in the section on faith, the internalist construal of 
justification is clearly the most pertinent when it comes to fideism. In the next chapter I discuss an 
externalist theory of justification, showing how one theory of fideism attempts to leverage it. In the 
final chapter, I discuss internalist justification and evidence in more detail. 
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moral justification, as it is goodness (not truth) that is the relevant end for moral 
rationality. 
Finally, S may be prudentially justified in holding a belief B. S is prudentially 
justified in believing B when S’s belief promotes S’s own well-being. In his 
discussion of prudential obligation, Paul K. Moser characterizes the scope of 
prudential interests as follows: “Among our most valued prudential interests 
are… the interests to have psychological, physiological, social, and financial well-
being.”42 These are interests of the non-moral, non-epistemic variety. To say that 
S has adequate prudential reasons for believing B is to say that believing B is 
most conducive to S’s well-being (compared to the options of not believing B and 
withholding judgment on B).  
These are three forms of justification. Satisfaction of a justification condition 
indicates that it is rationally permissible for S to hold B. Notice, however, that 
there is nothing above that tells us whether one ought to hold justified beliefs. 
Questions about obligation are typically captured under the heading of the ethics 
of belief. 
Just as we sketched three types of justification above, I will sketch three 
types of obligation here: Epistemic, moral, and prudential.43 Epistemic concerns 
are concerns over the truth of a belief. Thus, when we talk of epistemic 
obligations, we are talking about one’s obligation to both maximize one’s true 
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beliefs and minimize one’s false beliefs.44 One’s moral obligation, in contrast, is 
to hold beliefs that, on balance, are morally advantageous to the denial (or 
suspension of judgment) of such beliefs. That is, one morally ought to hold the 
beliefs most likely to be morally conducive. And a similar description can be 
given of prudential obligation: S is prudentially obligated to believe P when S’s 
belief that P is better suited to S’s wellbeing than the denial of or suspension of 
judgment regarding P.  
For each of our types of rationality, we now have a sense of being justified 
in a belief, and also a sense of being obligated to believe. Before looking at 
broader questions of rationality in general, it also makes sense to talk about what 
it means, for each of these three types of reasoning, to rationally seek to fulfill 
these obligations. 
For S to be rational in fulfilling these obligations, S must have “a preference 
whose satisfaction is evidently best provided for by his fulfilling his relevant 
epistemic, moral, or prudential obligation. For it is a preference of this sort that 
typically makes such obligations rational obligations for S.”45 Rationality, in this 
case, is pragmatic in the sense that it reflects the agent’s commitment to 
preference—an epistemic preference for accumulating true (and only true) 
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 Some beliefs are more important than others. Because of this, the simple dictum above would 
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relative importance of beliefs. Similar points can be made for moral and prudential obligation. See 
Moser 1985, pp. 212-236. 
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beliefs, a moral preference toward beliefs conducive to goodness, and a 
prudential preference toward beliefs that foster one’s well-being. Given this, one 
is acting irrationally only if one does not have a preference best satisfied by these 
obligations.46 
In this sense, the radical fideist Lev Shestov is indeed (as he claims) an 
epistemic irrationalist, for he eschews the very foundations of epistemic 
obligation: 
Then, then―and this is most important of all―you will at last be 
convinced that truth does not depend on logic, that there are no logical 
truths at all, that you therefore have the right to search for what you 
like, how you like, without argument, and that if something results from 
your search, it will not be a formula, not a law, not a principle, not even 
an idea!47  
Shestov refuses, in this quote, to countenance any proffered normative 
epistemology.48 Since Shestov is not interested in fulfilling any epistemic 
obligation, failing to see it as meeting his epistemic objectives, he seems clearly 
to be an irrationalist at least in the realm of epistemic reasoning. Shestov’s 
epistemic irrationalist does not, by that fact, make him a moral or prudential 
irrationalist as well. From our definitions above, it would be possible for Shestov 
                                            
46
 Foley suggests that if it is possible to hold contradicting preferences, that, too, may be 
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47
 Shestov 1966a, 141. It is unclear whether Shestov is employing gross hyperbole, or is just 
offering an incoherent argument. 
48
 C. Stephen Evans offers a brief and decisive counterargument against Shestov’s irrationalism. 
Evans 1998, 20-22. For our purposes, there is no reason to dwell on the flaws of Shestov’s 
epistemic irrationalism. 
19 
 
to hold a belief on moral grounds, and do so rationally, for the requirement for 
moral rationality does not presuppose that an agent is epistemically rational. 
So far I have sketched an account of rationality for each of the three kinds of 
rationality discussed: epistemic, moral, and prudential. The difficulty with such an 
account of rationality is that it does not, as it stands, provide a method for 
resolving problems where rational conclusions conflict. For example, it is 
perfectly conceivable that for some person S it is morally rational to hold that P, 
while it is prudentially rational to hold that not-P. And we need not restrict the 
possibilities to a dilemma, but a trilemma can also arise. It may be morally 
rational to believe P, prudentially rational to believe not-P, and epistemically 
rational to suspend judgment on P. 
As we shall see over the course of the dissertation, this particular issue is 
pertinent to the question of fideism, where one may claim that whereas epistemic 
rationality suggests suspension of judgment regarding a faith-proposition, moral 
rationality suggests that one ought to accept that same faith-proposition.49 How 
can such problems be addressed? One approach is to claim that one particular 
form of rationality (e.g. moral rationality) should always be considered most 
important.50 Such an account of rationality puts external conditions on an agent’s 
rationality. The account offered here, though, suggests a person-relative solution 
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to the problem: Instead of assigning (by fiat) a precedence to the different forms 
of rationality, we can instead suggest that the individual’s preferences may 
determine the resolution of a rational conflict.51 
Such a solution can be found in an account of a broader form of rationality. 
Moser provides such an account in Empirical Justification, and I offer here an 
abbreviated account of what he terms “All Things Considered” (ATC) rationality.52 
Moser suggests that when a rational conflict arises, one may ask what is best for 
one, all things considered. On this account, one ought to be able to decide (at 
that time, given the context) on a superior preference—a preference favoring one 
type of rationality over the others. Clarifying this, Moser says: 
Let us understand a preference to be a desire related either to a goal or 
a means to a goal. Thus, let us say that S prefers, for instance, to 
resolve a rational conflict by fulfilling [epistemic obligation] Oe rather 
than [moral obligation] Om if and only if S desires to fulfill Oe rather than 
Om. S’s desiring to fulfill Oe rather than Om, as I understand it, is just 
S’s desiring to make true the proposition that he will fulfill Oe rather 
than Om.
53 
Essentially, ATC rationality requires that the agent have preferences in cases 
where rational conflict arises. As Moser develops his account of ATC rationality, 
he provides this concluding description of what it means for one to be ATC 
rational: 
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In a case of rational conflict of any sort, S has an ATC rational 
obligation to fulfill a particular obligation, Oi, if and only if (i) the 
fulfillment of Oi is likely (i.e., more likely than not), on S’s total evidence, 
to satisfy his superior evaluative preference, which does not depend on 
an epistemically unjustified belief of S’s, and (ii) S is capable of coming 
to recognize the truth of (i) from reflection on his evidence. 
There are a few notes to make on this account. First, a protective clause 
stipulates that S be epistemically justified in his or her belief that a particular 
obligation is indeed correctly related to his or her chosen superior preference. 
Second, a cognizability clause requires that the agent is actually capable of 
reflecting on evidence and thereby recognizing the truth. Third, this account 
suggests that immoral people—even, perhaps, moral monsters—may in fact be 
ATC rational even when engaging in morally irrational acts.54 
Later in the dissertation (chapters 3 and 4), we shall see how Bishop 
attempts to solve rational conflict by situating one form of rationality (epistemic 
rationality) over others. And others have made similar attempts to resolve 
conflicts by appeal to one form of rationality as authoritative.55 But what this ATC 
account acknowledges is the role of an agent, and that agent’s preferences, in 
sorting out rational conflicts in a rational way. By this model, one may opt to act, 
say, epistemically rationally but not prudentially rationally at one time, yet at 
another opt for the reverse. And it is possible that in both cases the agent may be 
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acting generally (ATC) rational. I find such an account to be compelling for this 
reason. It avoids a (question-begging) hierarchy of sorts of rationality, and it does 
this will granting (or acknowledging) agents a freedom to have and express 
preferences. 
While my characterization has not been an attempt to provide any sort of 
analysis or even a thorough examination of the concept of rationality, I have 
provided a sketch that will provide an adequate foundation for the subsequent 
discussion of fideism. Pertinently, I have suggested that we observe a difference 
between moral, prudential, and epistemic rationality. Following Moser’s 
discussion of rationality56, I have suggested notions of justification, obligation and 
of rational obligation that provide a model of rational obligation, as well as a basic 
distinction between an agent’s acting rationally (in accordance with rational 
obligation) and irrationally (against one’s rational obligation). Finally, I have 
introduced Moser’s All Things Considered (ATC) approach to resolving rational 
conflicts—conflicts an individual faces when one rational obligation comes into 
conflict with another such obligation. 
I have introduced all of this with a purpose, for fideism is a theory (or a 
family of theories) about rationality and belief. It cannot be confined to purely 
epistemic construals any more than it can be confined to purely moral or 
prudential domains. And for this reason, a theory of general rationality will assist 
us in untangling the complexities of various forms of fideism. 
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Given an agent who is ATC-rational (that is, who is interested in fulfilling 
rational obligations in accordance, when necessary, with a superior rational 
preference), we can turn an evaluative lens toward various forms of fideism, 
asking which, if any, provide such an agent with the necessary equipment for 
judging the rationality of (primarily religious) beliefs. For at the core, what I take 
the fideist to be suggesting is that one can continue to hold an ethics of belief 
while at the same time having beliefs that are not based upon evidence. 
Obligation 
The fideist is suggesting that sometimes a proposition P does not have 
adequate epistemic support (either because S does not posses sufficient 
evidence, or because such a proposition cannot be supported epistemically), yet 
in such cases, it is okay for S to believe P. The fideist wants to suggest that P is 
still in some way “certified.” Above, I characterized rationality as coming in 
different forms, including a general All Things Considered (ATC) rationality. In 
this account, I suggest an ethics of belief that requires that if S is interested in 
achieving certain goals (epistemic, moral, or prudential), S must abide by certain 
obligations. 
Is the satisfaction of a rational goals or obligations (either in a specific 
sense, as in epistemic rationality, or in the general ATC sense) what the fideist is 
after? I think it is fair to answer this question in the affirmative. I think that what 
the fideist wants to claim is that S is justified (again, using the broad notion of the 
term) in holding B even if S is not epistemically justified in believing B. But it goes 
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beyond merely being rational. The fideist seems to also want to be able to use 
fideistically held propositions in epistemic context with what Bishop calls “full 
epistemic weight.”57 
There seem to be several strategies for making such an argument. Some 
fideists approach the matter as skeptics about epistemology. They suggest that 
we cannot be epistemically justified in holding any beliefs, and suggest a 
Pyrrhonian route toward accepting or not accepting religious beliefs.58 Also there 
is a group of fideists who claim that while certain faith propositions cannot be 
epistemically justified according to traditional means, there remains a sense in 
which one can be epistemically rational in holding such beliefs. These I cover in 
chapter 2. Finally, some have suggested, following Kant and William James, that 
at least in certain cases, when it is morally or prudentially rational to hold a belief, 
it may also be admissible in epistemic contexts. In other words, even without 
adequate evidence, one might be able to assert that God exists, and thereby 
treat this as a “framing principle” in one’s epistemic framework. This is the 
subject of chapter 3, where I focus on John Bishop’s account of fideism. 
One might claim to be an irrationalist in all regards—opposed to moral 
rationality, prudential rationality, and epistemic rationality—yet still claim to hold 
certain beliefs fideistically. It is unclear to me what “fideism” would be in such a 
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context, for if one’s overarching strategy is “anything goes,” ones beliefs need no 
methodological rigor at all. Neither justification nor obligation is necessary. 
Consequently, there seems to be no practical role for “fideism” to play. In 
contrast, there seems to be a place for non-global forms of irrationalism; for 
example, Lev Shestov’s irrationalism seems to be limited to epistemic 
irrationalism. Shestov might be construed as interested in achieving moral and 
prudential rationalism, but not at all favoring epistemic rationality. Whenever 
there is an appearance of a conflict between epistemic and moral rationality, for 
example, moral rationality wins out. The details of Shestov’s account may be 
bizarre and internally inconsistent, but we can still understand Shestov (at this 
high level) as having particular preferences in regards to moral, epistemic, and 
prudential questions. 
At this point, we can revise the initial characterization of fideism to reflect 
two things: first, the fideist does seem to have a commitment to adhering to 
general rationality, and second, the fideist is not simply interested in being (ATC) 
rational, but also has an epistemic interest. Namely, the fidiest wants to suggest 
that, S can hold or take some faith-propositions with full epistemic weight. Next 
we will look at a notion of belief. 
Belief 
While it is not a prima facie logical necessity that fideism apply only to 
religious propositions, we have seen already that many avowed fideists are 
fideists concerning (primarily) religious propositions. Thus, there is much 
26 
 
discussion of religious beliefs. Faith, as we shall see shortly, is a notion often 
coupled with belief. And already, we have talked about belief in the context of 
rationality. In the familiar account of knowledge, one must not only be justified, 
but also believe a true proposition before one has knowledge. Thus, it is clear 
that belief will be an important notion for the present discussion. 
In this section I first discuss belief itself, providing a definition along with a 
few crucial clarifications.59 I focus first on belief in the sense of believing that. 
Then I turn toward a puzzle about belief that could be particularly vexing to many 
accounts of fideism. That is the problem of doxastic voluntarism. Finally, I turn to 
the differentiation commonly made between believing that and believing in. 
Belief is a state. It is always dispositional, and also sometimes occurrent; 
that is, one may be in a long-term doxastic state regarding P, but needn’t always 
be actively contemplating P to maintain this state. A belief has content (S 
believes (that) C). Of interest to us are propositional beliefs—beliefs whose 
content is a truth-bearing statement.60 A belief may also have non-propositional 
content, such as the object of belief. Take my belief that there is a table before 
me: Obviously, this belief has propositional content (“There is a table before 
me”); but there is a second relationship—an aboutness relationship—between 
my belief and the table. It does not make sense to say of this latter content that it 
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is true or false. Moser uses this detail to distinguish between de dicto and de re 
beliefs:  
Believing, then, is a dispositional state of a person that is related to a 
propositional object. This in short is the state-object view of belief. On 
this view a belief has two essential components: a dispositional state 
and a propositional object. These two components exist not only in de 
dicto belief, where a belief is related only to a propositional object, but 
also in a de re belief, where a belief state is related to a 
nonpropositional object as well as a propositional object.61 
While both de dicto and de re beliefs have propositional content, only the de re 
belief has non-propositional content.62 There is a locutional difficulty: We often 
speak of “S’s belief.” Is this a reference to the belief itself, the propositional 
content, the non-propositional content, or some other variant? In most cases, 
when I use this locution I mean the propositional content of one’s belief; when 
further specificity is needed, I will make it explicit. 
So far I have spoken only of “belief,” and spoken of it as a propositional 
attitude. There are three propositional attitudes considered under the heading of 
belief: there is belief (doxastic affirmation that P), there is disbelief (doxastic  
denial that P), and there is suspension of judgment (withholding doxastic 
affirmation regarding P).63 Like belief, I here take disbelief and suspension of 
judgment as doxastic dispositions, not necessarily occurrent at any moment. For 
the sake of brevity, I use the term belief, but understand disbelief and withholding 
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of judgment as having essentially the same characteristics.64 Disbelief that P is 
disbelieving that P, while suspension of judgment that P is neither believing nor 
disbelieving P. 
In Knowledge and Evidence, Paul K. Moser distinguishes between believing 
and merely being disposed to believe, and this distinction provides a few 
important details that will be helpful in examining fideism.65 Roughly, to be 
disposed to believe is to be in such a state that if given the opportunity to assent 
to P, one would indeed assent. This differs from belief, which requires that one 
has (in the past or at present) assented to P.66 Assent is the psychological 
affirmation of a proposition. As Moser describes it, assent is “one’s sincerely and 
understandingly affirming it [the content of the belief].”67 There are a few details 
that need to be clarified. First, there are the dual criteria of sincerity and 
understanding. Sincerity captures the requirement that the affirmation must be 
unfeigned and honest. This is different than, say, affirming as a working 
hypothesis, affirming for the sake of argument, or lying. The criterion of 
understanding, which I shall not describe in great detail, requires that one’s 
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affirmation be suitably cognitively grounded. If S does not understand P, one 
cannot assent to P. Affirmation that does not meet these two qualifications of 
sincerity and understanding does not qualify as assent. 
Second, assent needn’t be a conscious decision. One may psychologically 
affirm a belief—and thus assent to it—without necessarily being cognitively 
aware (that is, conscious) of doing so. But assent is occurrent. One assents, 
even unconsciously, at a particular time. Merely assenting to some proposition 
does not mean one believes that proposition. While assent is a necessary 
condition of belief, assent and belief are not the same. Belief requires a 
dispositional element, as well. Assent, being an action, is not dispositional. 
Thus on the one hand we have assent; but on the other hand, we have the 
disposition to believe. This is not the same as belief; it is the fact about S that if S 
was prompted to assent to P, S would assent. One may be disposed to believe 
but not yet actually believe: 
A person, S, is merely disposed to believe that P at a time, t = df. (i) S 
does not believe that P at t, but (ii) S is in a dispositional state at t 
whereby he will come to believe that P upon his sincerely and 
understandingly answering the question whether it is the case that P.68 
Having not yet considered P, one may remain disposed to believe P. While this is 
not yet a proper belief, it reflects something about S than cannot otherwise be 
accounted for in a more basic belief model: namely, that S has developed 
doxastic dispositions to affirm certain propositions (such as, say, arithmetic 
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sums), but it need not be said that S has an infinite number of beliefs (one for 
each possible sum). 
Belief, then, is the combination of a dispositional state and assent (either 
consciously or unconsciously). Thus it has both an occurrent (though not 
necessarily presently occurrent) component and a long-term dispositional 
component. 
A person, S, believes a proposition, P, at a time, t, = df. (i) S has 
assented to P (consciously or unconsciously) either before t or at t, and 
(ii) as a nondeviant result of his assenting to P, S is in a dispositional 
state at t whereby he will assent to P in any circumstance where he 
sincerely and understandingly answers the question whether it is the 
case that P.69 
Note again that assent to P can occur either presently or at a previous time 
(again, assuming that the belief has been sustained since the time of assent). 
The distinction between belief and a disposition to believe sidesteps other 
epistemic concerns regarding “beliefs” that are not presently or have never been 
occurrent.70 For example, consider the novel proposition P: “the next integer after 
9,109,321 is 9,109,322.” Assuming S would understand and agree to the 
proposition if presented the proposition at time t, does S believe P at t - 1? A 
notion of belief that does not have, for example, the occurrent consent condition 
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may lead one to suggest that S holds a potentially infinite set of beliefs (since, 
given the example above, we could continue enumerating integers without end). 
But given our current model, we need only say one has a disposition to believe.71 
While our present focus is not on epistemology or epistemic justification, 
there is one thing that should be said here on the matter: While the traditional 
account of knowledge focuses on justified true belief, it seems that in at least 
some cases, justified true assent (as we have defined assent above) ought also 
be considered knowledge.72 This will differ from JTB-knowledge in that belief’s 
dispositional nature makes such knowledge dispositional. That is, on our 
definition, S’s knowledge that P persists even when S is not occurrently 
assenting to P. But in justified true assent (JTA), there is no underlying and 
dispositional belief to (speaking loosely) sustain S’s initial assent; to that end, 
JTA knowledge is transitory, lasting only when S is occurrently assenting to P.73 
In this section I have sketched a notion of belief that will be used throughout 
this dissertation. There remain a few clarifications to make regarding belief, the 
first of which is to what extent human agents can be said to control their beliefs. 
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Doxastic Voluntarism and Fideism 
Fideism is concerned either directly or indirectly with belief. Many forms of 
fideism (Evans’s included) make claims about S’s believing that (or believing in) 
some faith proposition. Others, such as Bishop’s version, distinguish between 
one’s believing (holding) P and one’s taking-that P (or taking it to be true that P), 
and continue on to claim that it is one’s fideistically taking-that P that matters. Of 
course, to distinguish between taking-that and belief, one must have worked out 
a notion of belief. Thus regardless of the details, both of these positions are 
concerned with belief. 
But can we choose what we believe?74 Can one follow the advice of the 
radical fideist and believe against all evidence, or decide to ignore evidence? To 
what extent does it make sense to admonish one to believe P? One puzzle often 
discussed in contemporary epistemology is the problem of doxastic voluntarism. 
To what extent, if any, do we have control over our beliefs? Can one directly or 
indirectly determine to believe P? Can one even influence one’s belief that P?  
If it were to turn out that human agents have no significant doxastic control, 
the tenor of this examination of fideism would change markedly. For the 
questions would then turn to whether being a fideist is a logical possibility, and 
whether one’s being a fideist has implications for an ethics of belief. Only if there 
is a meaningful sense in which one can influence one’s own beliefs can we 
continue along the proposed line of inquiry. It is important to examine, even if in a 
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cursory manner, the question of doxastic voluntarism. In an essay entitled “The 
Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification,” William P. Alston argues 
that we have no meaningful doxastic control.75 At best we can indirectly influence 
(but not control) our beliefs. 
Alston suggests four different modes of doxastic control: basic control, 
immediate nonbasic control, long-range nonbasic control, and indirect influence. 
The basic control thesis suggests that “one can take up at will whatever 
propositional attitude one chooses.”76  That is, beliefs—any and all of them—are 
under direct volitional control. Alston offers a few thought experiments as 
counter-examples of the basic control thesis. For example, “Can you, at this 
moment, start to believe that the United States is still a colony of Great 
Britain…?”77 Alston also suggests that in cases where there is no meaningful 
sense of an alternative to a belief it does not seem right to say that one can 
choose to believe, for there is no relevant alternative to be chosen. Thus, for 
beliefs that seem prima facie indubitable, it makes no sense to speak of 
voluntarism of any sort. Perceptual beliefs are, suggests Alston, one such 
example. “Thus, even if I willingly, or not unwillingly, form, for instance, 
perceptual beliefs in the way I do, it by no means follows that I form those beliefs 
at will, or that I have voluntary control over such belief formation, or that I can be 
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held responsible or blameworthy for doing so…. We have just as little voluntary 
control over ordinary beliefs formed by introspection, memory, and simple 
uncontroversial inferences.”78 
Alston claims that since the vast majority of our beliefs fall into categories in 
which we are bereft of doxastic control (including perceptual beliefs, recollection, 
and any propositions that seem prima facie true or false), the only sorts of beliefs 
that might remain under our control are so-called controversial beliefs. “Hence if 
only the uncertain beliefs are under voluntary control, that will not enable us to 
form a generally applicable deontological concept of epistemic justification.”79 Yet 
even with this category of controversial beliefs, Alston suggests that it is wrong to 
talk of doxastic control; for it is not the case, he says, that we choose to believe 
one proposition over another, but that once the evidence points a particular way, 
we simply do believe—belief naturally follows the direction of evidence. There is 
no decision, no action. And what of cases where evidence seems ambiguous? 
Can we choose in such cases? “To do so would be to choose a belief in the face 
of the lack of any significant inclination to suppose it to be true. It seems clear to 
me that this is not within our power.”80 Alston’s argument seems unclear, though, 
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for it suggests that inclinations are limited only to epistemic reasons. That is, 
belief in P is dependent, wholly dependent, on whether or not S supposes P to 
be true (or at least supposes P).81 But could one not have prudential or moral 
reasons to accept a proposition? This is, in fact, the contention of a number of 
fideists (though it is by no means limited to fideists).82 Indeed, this argument can 
be extended against cases where evidential ambiguity is not an issue. There may 
be cases (as discussed earlier) where one has epistemic evidence in favor of P, 
but has moral or prudential reasons for believing not-P. Thus, to claim that a 
“decision to believe” cannot exist when the epistemic evidence for a proposition 
is decisive seems to me to be based on an exclusive emphasis on epistemic 
considerations. While this consideration is far from supporting unconditional 
doxastic voluntarism (such as basic volitional control), it does suggest that the 
link between epistemic reasons and doxastic states is not as strong as Alston 
assumes. 
One might revise Alston’s argument and suggest (following our earlier 
discussion of rationality) that doxastic states are the result of generally rational 
(or ATC rational) automatic belief forming processes, and in so doing again re-
assert the claim that a human agent has little or no doxastic control. But this 
assumption seems to me to be less readily acceptable, for it suggests an 
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underlying process far more sophisticated than preponderance of evidence. Even 
if such a process can occur, and even if it can occur at an unconscious level, this 
does not necessarily conclusively show that one cannot exercise voluntary 
control. 
In another attempt at salvaging Alston’s argument, one might also be 
inclined to reject the influence of moral or prudential reasons on belief, 
suggesting that such reasons do not actually have any impact on beliefs—only 
on what one takes (hypothetically) to be true. It is not hard, however, to conjure 
examples of life-threatening situations averted by one’s prudentially motivated 
(even if evidentially ambiguous) belief that one can perform a task or endure a 
challenge. Either response, therefore, faces additional challenges before it can 
be shown to be successful. 
Alston anticipates another objection—the suggestion that we routinely 
decide to hold a position regarding propositions in political, social, or religious 
domains. Again referring to controversial beliefs, Alston suggests that perhaps 
one misleading factor is a misuse of the term belief. We say believe when we 
mean something else. Alston suggests that many times we accept a proposition, 
holding it as a working hypothesis.83 The scientist, of course, relies upon working 
hypotheses when testing theories. But Alston by no means intends to restrict this 
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to the scientific realm. Rather, he suggests that acceptance (as opposed to 
belief) is a broad pattern, extending even to religion. “One may adopt belief in 
God, or some more robust set of religious doctrines, as a guide to life, setting out 
to try to live in accordance with them, seeking to act and feel one’s way into the 
religious community, in order to determine how the doctrines work out in the 
living of them, both in terms of how satisfactory and fulfilling a life they enable 
one to live and in terms of what evidence for or against them one acquires.”84 
Thus, even the decision to hold certain religious “beliefs” may just be the decision 
to accept those propositions as a working hypothesis. 
Alston’s introduction of his notion of acceptance is evocative of a term 
introduced in the previous section on belief. There, I suggested that there are two 
components of belief: a dispositional element and an act of assent. As Alston 
introduces acceptance, it sheds some clarity on his notion of belief. Acceptance 
is capable of sometimes including assent,85 yet belief is merely conceived as a 
disposition. Contrast the account of acceptance above with his characterization 
of belief:  
Now a belief, in the psychological sense that is being used here (as 
contrasted with the abstract sense of that which is believed), is a more 
or less long-lived state of the psyche, a modification of the wiring that 
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can influence various actions and reactions of the subject so long as it 
persists.86 
Clearly, this is a wholly dispositional notion of belief; in fact, it seems unclear that 
one could distinguish (on the account above) between a disposition to believe 
and belief itself. Furthermore, the passive language above raises an important 
question. Whence belief? Alston seems to accommodate no moment of assent in 
his account of belief. Beliefs just appear, perhaps upon reaching a 
preponderance of evidence, or when confidence reaches a certain level, or when 
probability weighs in on direction rather than another: “Thus when our 
philosopher or religious seeker ‘decides’ to embrace theism or the identity theory, 
what has happened is that at that moment this position seems more likely to be 
true, seems to have weighter[sic] considerations in its favor, than the envisaged 
alternative.”87 In absence of a component of assent, belief is left as a result of 
some other non-volitional process. I think this is a crucial oversight on Alston’s 
part, one that plays a role in Alston’s other categories of doxastic control, too.88 
Alston suggests a second category of voluntarism, which he calls nonbasic 
immediate voluntary control. This locus of control requires more than just an act 
of the will. It requires some other action, such as physical movement. Alston 
quickly dismisses “perceptual, introspective, and memory propositions” from 
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being under immediate voluntary control, suggesting that there are no auxiliary 
actions that accompany the belief, and that will thereby provide us with belief-
accepting (or rejecting) powers.89 He then turns to Chisholm’s suggestion that 
one can put oneself in an epistemic position in which the evidence will influence 
one’s beliefs in a particular way. For example, one might yield to the suggestion 
to collect more evidence, rather than to form a belief based on current 
evidence.90 Alston’s counter-argument runs as follows: “Consider propositions 
concerning what is visible. I have the power to open my eyes and look about me, 
thereby putting myself in a position, when conditions are favorable, to reliably 
form propositions about the visible environment…. No one, I suppose, would take 
this to show that I have immediate voluntary control over what I believe about the 
visible environment…. And yet this is essentially the same sort of thing as the 
search for additional evidence….”91 Interestingly, when opposing Alston’s 
account, Richard Feldman takes Alston’s example as evidence that one can 
indeed have immediate voluntary control.92 
There is a third category of voluntarism, suggests Alston: “People try to 
convince themselves that X loves them, that Y will turn out all right… or that God 
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exists.”93 But this is not a directly occurring sort of voluntarism (as both basic and 
nonbasic immediate voluntary control are), for it does not happen in one specific 
set of actions. Rather, it is a long-term (diachronic) process involving many 
actions over time. Alston calls this long-range voluntary control.  By selectively 
gathering evidence, exposing oneself to influences, and keeping company with 
“believers,” one might attempt to influence one’s beliefs. But this method, points 
out Alston, is not necessarily successful. One may or may not be able to believe 
even when taking so many steps to influence one’s belief. Alston suggests that it 
takes too much vigilance to amass only confirming evidence while avoiding 
disconfirming evidence. Simply stated, because we are (as Alston puts it) at the 
mercy of “doxastic tendencies that are too deeply rooted to permit modification 
by deliberate effort,”94 exercising long-term control, while possible, is not a 
reliable enough process to consider it to be really under our control.95 
Alston concludes his examination of doxastic control with the suggestion 
that, at best, what we have is indirect influence over some of our beliefs.96 We 
make non-doxastic choices that influence our beliefs. There are “(1) activities that 
bring influences to bear or withhold influences from, a particular situation 
involving a particular candidate, or a particular field of candidates, for belief, and 
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(2) activities that affect our general belief-forming habits or tendencies.”97 I may 
choose, for example, to ruminate on my political views, and in so doing accept 
propositions that in turn result in a doxastic change. “Although the fact that it is 
within my power to either look for further evidence or not does not show that I 
have voluntary control over what attitude I take toward p, it does show that I have 
voluntary control over influences on that attitude.”98 Thus, it seems to be that the 
fact that one’s decision to continue gathering evidence (or take similar epistemic 
measures) does not necessarily result in a change of beliefs is reason enough, 
on Alston’s account, to reject this is a form of doxastic voluntarism. 
Alston’s account is not conclusive. Even reviewing just his argument against 
basic doxastic control we can see this. The argument first suggests that one 
cannot help but disbelieve clearly false beliefs. He then suggests that one also 
cannot disbelieve clearly true beliefs. Granting these, there is still the large 
matter of beliefs that are neither clearly true nor clearly false. Alston engages a 
handful of examples backed by intuitions about them—the philosopher 
considering epiphenomenalism, the gardener wondering whether to plant a 
garden today or tomorrow, and the religious seeker pondering God’s existence. 
Alston suggests that one’s final decision is not actually volitional at all. It is 
merely a toggling of belief state, and it is caused by some sort of tipping of the 
cognitive scales. But this conclusion itself raises a number of doubts: What is to 
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be said of this feeling of decision we believe we have made? Do we decide when 
a certain amount of evidence is garnered or do we decide when a certain 
threshold of confidence has been reached? Do we choose in which cases 
psychological certainty is the criterion and in in which evidential probability is the 
criterion? Alston’s simple appeal to intuition seems to mask a tangled web of 
assumptions about underlying cognitive phenomenon that are supposedly non-
volitional, yet which trigger belief. 
Keeping that in mind, we can see how the situation is made more difficult by 
Alston’s distinction between acceptance and belief. Acceptance seems to be, 
from Alston’s account, the willful affirming of a proposition. It is not directly 
related, on Alston’s account, to an enduring disposition toward P.99 But how does 
it relate to assent as we have defined it? Alston doesn’t indicate the relationship 
between acceptance and assent. More explicitly, Alston does not explain whether 
when S accepts P, S also may sincerely and understandingly affirm P. Clearly, 
there are some cases where accepting P as a hypothesis will not be done 
sincerely. But conversely, it seems equally as clear that in some circumstances 
one may accept P and do so sincerely and understandingly. Alston’s example of 
accepting religious propositions seems to suggest sincerity. Already it has been 
suggested that one can assent to P without believing P, and Alston provides no 
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reason to cause us to doubt this. Taking the rest of Alston’s argument at face 
value, then, it seems that at least some cases of acceptance may involve assent. 
It appears, given the above, that Alston is not denying the human capability 
to assent. Alston is concerned that when it comes to the other half of belief—the 
dispositional component—it is unclear that we have any doxastic control. For our 
present account of belief, this is not particularly concerning. Where Alston’s 
account becomes troubling is where he treats all cases of doxastic assent as 
unconscious, while the subdoxastic assent in acceptance is conscious. Because 
of this distinction, it does appear that one may have no explicit doxastic control. 
But I see no reason to accept this. Alston gives examples of cases where assent 
is unconscious. That is not troubling. He has not, conversely, shown that all 
assent must be unconscious. 
The result seems to be this: If there is a meaningful sense of assent, and 
there is no conclusive argument that beliefs do form automatically in all cases, it 
seems there is room for doxastic control. Returning to our original definition of 
belief, belief requires both assent and a disposition toward the belief. If assent is 
sometimes conscious and voluntary, and is so in some cases where a disposition 
to believe also exists, then there is a meaningful sense in which we can talk of 
doxastic voluntarism.100 Clearly this is not a thesis of radical doxastic 
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voluntarism; it is a moderate view, for I am not suggesting that all beliefs are 
subject to volition.  
With this characterization of moderate doxastic control, a question arises in 
the context of religious belief, and this is a question of particular importance to 
the fideist. 
The radical fideist might be inclined to suggest that one believes against 
one’s evidence. In its most simplistic form, the argument might go something like 
this: S has ample undefeated evidence that not-P; yet S ought to believe that P 
anyway. As we have seen already, Alston suggests that one cannot truly believe 
against one’s epistemic and psychological proclivities.101 But given the present 
notion of belief as assent coupled with a dispositional element, does the radical 
fideist have a foothold? 
Religious belief seems to be among the clearer cases in which (at least for 
some people) belief includes an explicit conscious moment of assent. History is 
replete with conversion stories in which individuals recount their moment of 
belief. The biblical book of Acts tells many such stories, including Saul’s 
conversion in chapter 9. Augustine’s Confessions may very well mark the 
inception of a conversion narrative as a literary work.102 And this phenomenon is 
not restricted to Christian belief, either. The Chuang-Tzu, for example, recounts 
Taoist conversion stories, and the Huang-Po provides examples from Zen 
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Buddhism.103 In both of these works, the moment of assent is the focus of the 
account. 
Yet the details of Alston’s account once again raise a question about our 
doxastic limits. For while the present notion of belief requires an element of 
assent—which seems satisfiable in religious cases—it also requires a disposition 
to believe. Clearly (and Alston illustrates this well) dispositions easily arise when 
they accord with evidence. Can a disposition be formed against evidence, 
though? 
It is far from clear that doxastic dispositions are necessarily epistemically 
warranted or even rational, regardless of whether they are voluntary. One need 
only reflect on the wide range of human psychoses and neuroses to see that 
people genuinely and sincerely believe obviously false things, and persist in 
doing so regardless of the evidence. Thus, it seems possible that one has a 
doxastic disposition toward P even in a case where evidence points to not-P.104 
Consequently, it seems possible that one can assent to P, and even sincerely 
believe P “against the evidence.” Whether or not this sort of fideism qualifies as a 
neurosis is a question for the psychologist. 
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Believing In and Believing That 
The account of belief so far has been focused on propositional belief—belief 
that. But does this exhaust what is normally meant by religious belief? It is 
commonly suggested that believing in can be contrasted with believing that. And 
since religious believers often talk about believing in God, or believing in a 
particular doctrine or set of doctrines, clearly this is a matter deserving 
investigation, even if only in a preliminary way. 
Suppose some proposition P. To believe that P is to hold the epistemic 
position that P is true. Thus, when talking about de dicto beliefs, the statement S 
believes that P is equivalent to S holds P.105 Believing that is a propositional 
attitude. 
  But the term believing in is not so clear, in part because it is used in 
multiple senses. First, there are cases where believing in expresses belief that 
some instance of a given description exists.106 Creedal uses of belief-in may 
sometimes be taken as such. “I believe in God the Father, maker of heaven and 
earth…” may be taken to be (merely) a statement that one believes that there is 
a being who is described by “God the Father, maker of heaven and earth.” 
Second, there is the sense in which believing in means having trust in someone, 
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or more specifically, having trust that that subject will do what is good, right, or 
prescribed. In this sense, people say things like “I believe in the Chicago Bears,” 
“I left my teenager at home alone, but I believe in her,” or “I believe in Senator 
Crookshanks.” Importantly, this sense seems to entail belief that, but is not 
reducible to belief that.107 Third, believing in can function as a moral report of 
one's own viewpoint; it may mean believing that a particular effort or course of 
action is right or good. “I believe in democracy,” “I believe in charity,” and “I 
believe in practicing what I preach” are all examples of this. Perhaps in this 
sense believing in P can be reduced to believing that P is good. But it is less 
clear that these cases directly entail believing that P exists. Arguably, self-
identification with an ideology or movement is also a different meaning of 
believing in. Thus “I believe in Christianity” is not just a claim that “I believe 
Christianity is good or right,” but is also an expression of acceptance of, 
membership in, or a doxastic disposition toward that movement. 
  If there is a second thing in common between various versions of belief in, 
it might be the fiducial component. Many of our uses of belief in seem to have 
something to do with trust. (And the term faith, which looms large in the present 
inquiry, suggests a similar dissection into doxastic and fiducial components.) “I 
believe in the President” seems to entail that “I trust the President” (while “I 
believe in the Easter Bunny” does not seem to entail “I trust the Easter Bunny”). 
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“I believe in democracy” similarly seems to entail something like “I trust in the 
principles of democracy.” As we shall see in the next section on faith, this overlap 
in meaning complicates the distinction between belief and faith. 
 Given the discussion above, at least some senses of belief in are 
expressive of a propositional attitude, and have this in common with locutions of 
belief that. Restricting this discussion to the propositional attitude is convenient 
and straightforward, and a major hurdle of religious language is cleared simply by 
replacing belief in statements with their less expressive belief that counterparts. 
But is this an appropriate way to proceed? How important is this fiducial or 
devotional aspect to an examination of fideism? Trusting that an agent is 
authoritative, honest, and accurate is important when that authority is part of 
one's evidence base. But our principle line of inquiry isn’t into the trustworthiness 
of a given authoritative source, but over whether holding a particular belief is 
rational.108 This is not a fiducial question, but a question regarding the 
propositional attitude. This seems to capture the gist of what most fideists claim. 
Fideists – at least the ones we shall examine here – are more concerned with 
propositional attitudes toward religious propositions. They are interested in the 
believing that P component of believing in P.109 Fideists are interested in 
                                            
108
 In chapter 4 I discuss authoritativeness and trustworthiness, but even there I refrain from 
adopting the language of “belief in” to capture this. 
109
 The opening example from Job might again serve as an illustration here. Job's inquiry is 
fiducial. He wants to know about the character of God. As I pointed out, though, fideists such as 
Shestov try to re-construe Job's inquiry as being an epistemic question about the rationality of 
belief that God exists (and belief that many other religious propositions hold). This exemplifies 
how the confusion of belief in and belief that (or between fiducial and doxastic construals of faith) 
 
49 
 
supporting their attitude toward a proposition.  This is a matter of explaining first 
why S believes that P. This is not to say that the fideist never brings fiducial or 
devotional elements into the discussion, nor that a de dicto sense fully captures 
the meaning(s) of belief in. When such aspects play an important role in a 
fideist's theory, I draw explicit attention to them, and attempt to avoid the 
obfuscation that comes from the language of believing in. But unless otherwise 
noted, I use belief as defined early in this section—as a disposition toward a 
propositional object, and a disposition to which the belief holder has assented at 
some point. 
 Much time has been spent on clarifying a notion of belief. But the 
traditional focus of fideism isn’t necessarily on belief, but on faith. How are these 
two terms related? As we shall see, there are several notions of faith, and 
different fideists will use different notions. The next section examines several 
construals of faith. 
Faith 
The name fideism suggests that at its core, such a theory deals with faith. 
But faith is a nebulous term. This is evident in the awkwardness of Barbara Sher 
Tinsley’s summary of Bayle: “[H]e insisted that, in the last analysis, faith had to 
be accepted by faith, and could not be proved by reason.”110 Faith had to be 
accepted by faith? In this single sentence faith is used to mean “a set of religious 
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beliefs,” and also as a (presumably doxastic) disposition of an individual toward 
that set of propositions. And this sentence by no means exhausts the variety of 
meanings ascribed to the term faith. 
Tinsley’s usage of faith as a set of religious beliefs (or as adherence to a 
particular religious tradition) is a common usage, but not one that will be dwelt 
upon here.111 I will use other less ambiguous terms (such as “religious beliefs”) to 
avoid confusion. But Tinsley’s other usage—her speaking of accepting by faith—
is of critical importance. What does it mean, in this sense, to have faith? 
We shall see seven models of faith in the following section. While I point out 
problems along the way, the goal of this section isn’t to decide upon a single 
notion of faith, but to identify a range of notions so as to rightly identify, in later 
sections, which notion of faith is operative within a given theory. 
Bishop’s Seven Models of Faith 
In his article “Faith” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, John 
Bishop distinguishes seven models of faith.112 He suggests models of faith as a 
purely affective state, as a special form of knowledge, as belief, as trust, as a 
doxastic venture, as a sub-doxastic venture, and as hope. 
Bishop begins by suggesting that faith has affective, volitional, and cognitive 
aspects. It is affective in the sense that there is a psychological state of 
confidence or trustingness associated with faith. It is volitional in that one 
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chooses (to at least some extent) whether to have faith. Bishop suggests that 
concerns over doxastic voluntarism are not a problem most accounts of faith. I 
will discuss the particulars as necessary below. Finally, faith has a cognitive 
component, as most accounts of faith appeal to reason to some degree. With 
these characteristics in mind, Bishop offers seven different models of faith. 
First, Bishop discusses faith as a purely affective state. In this account, faith 
is a default disposition of “feeling confident and trusting.”113 Failure to maintain 
this disposition (“losing one’s faith”) jeopardizes one’s flourishing. On this 
account, faith has neither volitional nor cognitive components. Bishop finds this 
characterization of faith to fall short of adequately encompassing the domain of 
religious faith. This notion of faith, paying little regard to volitional and cognitive 
aspects, does not seem to capture what most people have in mind when making 
claims about faith. 
Differences in the explanation of the cognitive aspect of faith play a role in 
distinguishing a few of Bishop’s seven models of faith. Bishop points out the 
presumed tension between faith and reason, a tension raised by Kant, James, 
Kierkegaard and others. “It is thus widely held that faith goes beyond what is 
ordinarily reasonable, in the sense that it involves accepting what cannot be 
established as true through the proper exercise of our naturally endowed human 
cognitive faculties—and this may be held to be an essential feature of faith.”114 
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Given this assumption, some have suggested that faith is superior to reason. 
One such claim is that faith is produced by a cognitive facility higher than other 
knowledge. 
The second model of faith takes faith to be a special form of knowledge. In 
this model (Bishop cites Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff and William Alston 
as proponents), faith is a variety of knowledge of specific truths. As Plantinga 
puts it: “Faith is not to be contrasted with knowledge: faith (at least in 
paradigmatic instances) is knowledge, knowledge of a certain special kind.”115 
Plantinga argues that theistic beliefs are what he calls “properly basic,” 
generated by the sensus divinitatis.116 Given Plantinga’s externalism, the fact that 
the sensus divinitatis is a properly functioning belief forming mechanism means 
that beliefs thus generated are warranted.117 And knowledge, on Plantinga’s 
view, is warranted true belief. An individual can then be said to know one’s 
religious beliefs.118 C. Stephen Evans, whose argument we will examine in the 
next chapter, discusses Plantinga’s account of faith and knowledge while 
elaborating his own theory of responsible fideism.119 In at least some cases, says 
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Bishop, faith in this model isn’t merely warranted belief. It may also require 
assent. To that extent, one can choose or resist faith. 
While this account might provide theistic beliefs with warrant, Bishop 
suggests that there is one thing it does not adequately provide to the reflective 
believer. The reflective theistic believer is aware of a plurality of religious 
traditions. Given that the religious tenets of all of these traditions are not mutually 
compatible, one must be concerned with holding the right beliefs, avoiding a fall 
into idolatry. The faith-seeker understands that there are competing 
interpretations of the belief,120 and desires the correct interpretation. Thus, says 
Bishop, a reflective believer is not just after what Plantinga offers under the rubric 
of warrant. This is because the believer does not feel entitled to believe. The 
externalist account “is still, it may be argued, insufficient to secure entitlement to 
theistic faith—assuming that entitlement requires that one has evidence 
adequate to establish one's knowledge, or even just one's justified belief, that 
God exists.”121 Bishop suggests here that Plantinga’s account fails to capture a 
requirement of foremost concern to a faith-seeker. Belief stemming from external 
mechanisms cannot succeed here, for entitlement requires at minimum that the 
supporting reasons be accessible (at least indirectly) to the believer. In 
consequence, an externalist notion of faith as special knowledge does not 
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succeed in capturing the needs expressed by the faith-seeker. Bishop’s notion of 
entitlement is important, and I will return to it later in the section, but for the 
moment we will continue to review Bishop’s models of faith. 
Another possible model for faith is to treat faith as firmly held belief. 
Proponents of this model focus on the relationship between belief (or faith-as-
belief) and rationality. Recalling the issue of the tension between faith and 
reason, Bishop suggests this as the challenge for the faith-seeker: “The 
rationality of faith on this model will rest on the rationality of the firmly held 
theological beliefs in which it consists.” Bishop is almost exclusively concerned 
with epistemic rationality. This faith-as-belief model (with its epistemic 
underpinnings) is compatible with various forms of epistemic evidentialism, which 
seek to delineate rational beliefs from irrational beliefs based on evidence.122 
Swinburne’s “evidential proportion” model is the first Bishop considers—and he 
does so primarily to raise his objection which serves as a foundational claim in 
his book Faith and Evidence: the so-called evidential ambiguity thesis.123 Stated 
briefly, this is the claim that any purported evidence regarding God’s existence 
(or other faith propositions) is unavoidably ambiguous, being subject to multiple 
interpretations. If this is true, then there seems to be no hope of amassing 
sufficient evidence for justifying a belief (or of satisfying the requirements of 
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epistemic entitlement). Bishop summarizes thus: “If the ambiguity thesis is 
correct, then—assuming evidentialism—firmly held theistic belief will fail to be 
reasonable.” (I take Bishop to be using “reasonable” here to refer to epistemic 
rationality only.) It is important to notice that the critique here isn’t against the 
notion of faith-as-belief, but against a particular variety of evidentialism when 
coupled with the evidential ambiguity hypothesis. But Bishop does have concerns 
with faith-as-belief. 
Bishop worries that treating faith as “belief that proposition P” invites danger, 
as it suggests that faith-beliefs are competing with scientific beliefs, subject to the 
same evidential criteria. This, thinks Bishop, will ultimately empower critics to 
easily dismiss religious beliefs on the grounds of evidential deficiency.124 Again, 
the concern is over the entitlement to believe: If one claims faith is belief, the 
same sort of thing epistemologists worry about justifying, and if that belief lacks 
unambiguous evidential support, then one is not entitled to hold that belief.125 
Thus, to consider faith to be belief is to mistakenly expose it to evaluation against 
the wrong standard. While Plantinga, Evans, and others suggest that faith is 
stronger than mere belief, it seems that here Bishop is suggesting that faith is 
weaker than belief—perhaps weak enough to not even be considered a doxastic 
state. 
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The fourth model of faith is faith-as-trust. “It may thus be held that faith as 
accepting propositional truths as divinely revealed rests on believing in God—
and it is this ‘believing in’ which is, fundamentally, the nature of faith.”126 Bishop 
suggests that the trust model is best expressed as one’s having faith in God, 
where this does not merely entail belief that God exists, but also indicate one’s 
practical commitment to act with trust in God. In the previous section, we 
discussed how some notions of belief in entail a fiducial component. Likewise, a 
fiducial element plays an important role in the model of faith-as-trust. For the time 
being, I suggest that faith as yielding and faith as obedience may be justly 
subsumed under this model (though both are more robust notions of what is 
required as a result of one’s trust). 
Bishop suggests that trust requires a venture: When S puts trust in another, 
S is acting as if the other has S’s interests in mind. This is a venture for S 
because S is giving up some measure of control and yielding to the other. But 
how do we determine in whom (or in what?) we should trust? Does it not seem 
that for one to reasonably trust another, one ought to have evidence that the 
other is trustworthy? Bishop offers two considerations here: First, we often trust a 
hitherto unknown individual on the basis of having formed general ideas about 
trusting others. Thus, if others are generally worthy of trust in a particular regard, 
then it may be rational to trust in an individual without having specific evidence of 
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that individual’s trustworthiness. Second, there are cases where one must make 
an all-or-nothing decision to trust even when evidence is unavailable. 
Such cases provide a particularly interesting class of exceptions to the 
general evidentialist requirement to take a proposition to be true only as 
justified by one's evidence. They are interesting because they do not 
involve non-epistemic considerations overriding epistemic ones, as is 
the case with some readily recognisable types of exception to trust-
evidentialism—for example, cases where being in an established 
relationship with someone obliges one to trust contrary to the weight of 
one's evidence; or cases of ‘educative’ or ‘therapeutic’ trust, where 
others are trusted in order to develop or restore their trustworthiness. In 
the target cases, the epistemic concern to grasp truth and avoid 
falsehood is not overridden: they are cases where the truth that a 
person is trustworthy may be beneficially grasped only if one first takes 
it that the person is trustworthy beyond the possible support of 
evidence—though once the venture is made conclusive evidence of 
trustworthiness may happily soon accumulate.127 
Trust, in a context such as this, is a prerequisite to having evidence of one’s 
trustworthiness. What is unclear to me is how this second example can be 
considered a case of insufficient evidence in light of the previous suggestion that 
we have general ideas about trust. For if evidence of general trustworthiness is 
sufficient for application in a particular case, then even these cases of “extreme” 
trust seem to have the balance of evidence favoring trust. In consequence, 
Bishop has not given an example of a case of an exception to general 
evidentialism, though he may have suggested that supporting evidence, while 
inconclusive, may be adequate for an agent to venture to trust. 
One might further wonder why, if faith is the conjunction of belief (that) and 
trust, the evidential insufficiency of the belief is not itself sufficient to defeat this 
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model of faith. For the account does not seem to suggest that “faith in” does not 
require “belief that,” but only that it is irreducible to “belief that.” And if that is so, 
then the evidential ambiguity thesis seems still to weigh heavily against this 
notion of faith. In the context of faith in God, the above account suggests that 
belief that God exists coupled with trust in God together composes faith. Yet if 
one is not entitled to believe that God exists, it is unclear how the fiducial 
component plays an important role. Clearly, it does not grant entitlement or 
justification. 
Bishop moves swiftly from faith-as-trust to his fifth model: Faith as doxastic 
venture, a model that he defends at length elsewhere.128 In faith-as-trust, the 
fiducial aspect is captured in one’s trust in God. That is, one believes that God 
exists and trusts that he will act with one’s best interests in mind. In contrast, faith 
as a doxastic venture is not fiducial. Rather, it deals with the belief condition; it is 
a venture that God exists. Against objections of the sort I identified above, Bishop 
suggests that the faith-as-trust model might entail the doxastic venture model: 
trusting in God may carry with it the doxastic venture that God exists. 
F. R. Tennant develops a similar model, which he calls faith-as-venture or 
faith-venture.129 “Faith,” says Tennant, “involves the determination to be guided 
by such experiences as we have, rather than none at all, and to experiment in 
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the realm of the merely possible or ideal.”130 Two things stand out about 
Tennant’s synopsis. First, faith is an alternative to suspension of judgment. 
Second, it is undergone (on Tennant’s account, at least) as a preliminary step; it 
may, in fact, lead to belief. But neither confirmation nor belief is guaranteed with 
faith. “Faith has always to take the risk of disappointment and defeat”—thus its 
venturesomeness. 
Bishop’s account shares these features. As the name implies, a fixture of 
this model is its implications for one’s beliefs. The doxastic venture model 
suggests that one believes and does so as a venture. That is, one both believes 
that P, and acts in accordance with that belief. Bishop circumvents concern over 
doxastic voluntarism by pointing out that regardless of whether or not one has 
volitional control over belief, one’s acting in accordance with a proposition is 
indeed volitional, and it is thus that aspect of the model that counts as 
venturesome.131 As Bishop puts it, “Doxastic venture is thus not a matter of 
willing oneself to believe without adequate evidential support; rather it is a matter 
of taking an already held belief to be true in one's practical reasoning while 
recognising that its truth lacks such support.”132 Bishop sees this as the re-
unification of faith as a gift (that is, as a belief given by God and outside of direct 
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doxastic control) and as one’s actions in regard to that gift. The fact that one 
believes, in this model, without adequate evidence, and is cognizant of the 
insufficiency of evidence, does seem to come into conflict with Alston’s argument 
against doxastic voluntarism in that Alston suggests that one cannot believe 
against evidence (willfully or otherwise).133  
Unlike what Bishop calls elsewhere “hard-line evidentialism,”134 the doxastic 
venture model does not attempt to base willingness to act on P upon one’s 
evidence that P. One acts on a venture, aware that the evidence does not 
conclusively show that P, and (as Tennant put it) aware of a risk of 
disappointment and defeat.135 
Bishop additionally points out that what he calls “highest-order framing 
principles,” propositions that serve a crucial role in supporting large bodies of 
beliefs, might be of the sort that simply cannot be adequately supported merely 
by appeal to “a body of independent evidence.”136 Framing principles are, on this 
account, a special sort of thing. “The framing principles of a doxastic framework 
are those propositions whose truth must be presupposed if any of the beliefs 
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belonging to the framework are to be evidentially justified.”137 And because 
evidence is incapable (in his account) of conferring adequate support to such 
principles, accepting any framing principle carries with it an element of venture. 
(Bishops notion of a framing principle is addressed in chapters 3 and 4.) And 
religious faith is the paramount example. It is only the venture model that pays 
due respect to the quandary of the religious seeker.  
The doxastic venture model may thus be regarded as capturing the 
spiritual challenge of faith more satisfactorily than evidential proportion 
models do, since it involves a deeper surrender of self-reliant control, 
not only in trusting God, but in accepting that there is a God—indeed, 
this God—who is to be trusted.138  
If all of this is the case, then how can the issue of epistemic entitlement be 
addressed for faith propositions—those that Bishop now suggests are amenable 
only to a venture model? The venture model’s challenge at this point is to 
address the following concern (again, recalling our earlier discussion of 
rationality): How can a faith venture satisfy epistemic obligations for rationality? 
Bishop offers a couple of answers. 
Bishop recounts one popular version of arational fideism, in which one 
believes in spite of the evidence. At minimum, this suggests that one forgoes, in 
this instance, one’s epistemic obligation, ostensibly in order to believe the truth. 
We will deal with this confusing notion later. Bishop points out that the majority of 
the so-called proponents of this model (including Kierkegaard) are misinterpreted 
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on the point.139 However, there is a notable proponent among 20th century 
fideists, though. While Bishop does not cite Shestov, the Russian ex-patriot does 
indeed seem to be a candidate for classification here. 
More often, proponents of the doxastic venture model rely on a notion of 
supra-rationalism: faith does not oppose reason, but instead extends beyond the 
limits of reason. C. Stephen Evans, whose version of fideism is the subject of the 
next chapter, expounds a theory of supra-rationalism based on the argument that 
reason, subject as it is to sin, is limited in crucial respects. Most crucially, it is 
limited in its ability to grasp divine truths, even those having to do with God’s 
existence. That granted, one must move beyond reason’s limits (to faith) 
regarding those truths. Bishop makes the observation that “Whether the desire to 
grasp more truth about the real than science can supply is a noble aspiration or a 
dangerous delusion is at the heart of the debate about entitlement to faith on this 
supra-rational fideist doxastic venture model.”140 Noteworthy is the fact that 
nowhere is the issue on entitlement addressed on this account. Merely 
suggesting that faculty A is deficient in some regards does not thereby grant one 
the right to trust faculty B. That is, the imperfection of “scientific” reason does not 
thereby show faith to be reliable, or even tenable. Furthermore, the faith model in 
this sort of doxastic venture does not give guidance on how to determine which 
faith propositions one ought to have faith in, and which ones she or he ought not. 
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The sixth model of faith departs on a crucial detail from the doxastic venture 
model. This sixth model is the sub-doxastic venture model, and as the name 
implies, the crucial difference is in regards to an agent’s belief. Specifically, the 
sub-doxastic model does not require that one actually believes in order to have 
faith; instead, one need only act as if the proposition in question obtains. Faith, 
here, is a decisive commitment to P without an accompanying belief that P. This 
doesn’t necessarily entail that one does not believe that P. But faith, in this 
model, is not contingent in any degree on one’s beliefs.  Bishop draws from both 
Tennant’s notion of faith venture and Alston’s “acceptance” in explaining this 
model. Earlier we saw how Alston’s definition of acceptance was ambiguous with 
regards to assent.141 Bishop’s model as explained in this context suggests an 
ambiguity, though Bishop elsewhere eliminates the source of ambiguity:  
People make a sub-doxastic venture with respect to the proposition p if 
and only if they take p to be true in their practical reasoning, while 
recognizing that it is not the case that p’s truth is adequately supported 
by their total available evidence, yet without believing that p—i.e. 
without actually holding that p is true.142 
Holding-to-be-true, on Bishop’s account, strongly correlates with what we have 
called belief. Bishop contrasts it with taking-to-be-true, which is assenting to P, 
but while making certain acknowledgements about the evidence. Taking P to be 
true is not accompanied by a disposition toward P, while holding P, on Bishop’s 
account, requires not only sincerely and understandingly affirming that P but also 
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having a doxastic disposition toward P.143 This, then, is the clear contrast 
between the doxastic and the sub-doxastic venture models: the doxastic model 
requires belief. The sub-doxastic model does not. Importantly, the sub-doxastic 
venture still requires sincerity in assent (a topic I discuss more in chapter 3). 
Theories of “faith without belief” that espouse a form of fictionalism or 
hypothetical (insincere) acceptance of a proposition are not, by this sincerity 
requirement, forms of sub-doxastic venture.144 
The seventh and final model that Bishop offers is the model of faith as hope. 
In absence of conclusive evidence that P, one can adopt an attitude of wanting P 
to be true or desiring that P obtains.145 But at the same time, one does not 
assume (to any degree) that P. Bishop suggests this as the distinguishing point 
between the hope model and the sub-doxastic model, for the sub-doxastic model 
recommends taking P to be true in practical reasoning, at least.146 Yet one can 
still act from the hope that P. But like the sub-doxastic model, it seems to be 
primarily action-oriented, suggesting that one acts toward that which they hope 
for. Be that as it may, it is unclear how, exactly, this model fits into an account or 
                                            
143
 Bishop 2007, 33-35. I cover the holding/taking distinction at length in chapter 3. 
144
 Bishop would not understand Vaihinger as being an advocate of sub-doxastic venture. For an 
examination of how Vaihinger’s fictionalism lacks sincerity, see Fine 1993. 
145
 Pojman (1986) advocates this perspective. It may be possible to read this into Vaihinger or 
other fictionalists, but it seems to me that Vaihinger does not even extend the possibility of truth 
(and thus there is no real grounds for hope). 
146
 Tennant makes a similar distinction, finding it in the writings of the apostle Paul and in the 
letter to the Hebrews. Tennant 1989, 105-107, 112. 
65 
 
rationality. Under what conditions is one entitled to act in hope that P? To what 
extent can hope-that-P be used as evidence in support of other propositions? 
Tennant suggests, further, that hope is a weaker notion than faith: 
Hope is a species of expectation fraught with pleasant feeling and 
desire. It is relatively passive, whereas faith is a creative activity 
provocative of effort. The opposite of hope is fear or despair: the 
opposite of faith is mental inertia or indifference as to any spiritual 
Beyond. Hope involves a slight degree of assurance: faith is assurance 
sanguine enough to be called certitude.147 
Hope is distinct from faith, says Tennant, and is by no means strong enough to 
capture the notion of faith frequently employed in a religious context. 
Of the seven models just outlined, neither faith as hope nor faith as an 
affective state is important for our subsequent examinations. Neither adequately 
captures the usage of the fideists we shall examine, nor of the subsequent 
theory. Remaining are faith as a sort of knowledge, faith as belief, and the three 
venture-based models of faith: faith as trust, faith as doxastic venture, and faith 
as subdoxastic venture. In coming chapters we shall return to these notions 
within the context of various theories of fideism. 
Before leaving Bishop’s discussion of faith, though, one more thing 
deserves our attention, and this is Bishop’s notion of entitlement. 
Entitlement 
The idea of entitlement figures prominently in Bishop’s assessment of 
models of faith. Bishop introduces entitlement as a satisfaction of a need of the 
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reflective religious seeker or believer: “From the perspective of reflective persons 
of faith (or would-be faith), the question of entitlement arises: are they rationally, 
epistemically—even, morally—entitled to adopt or continue in their faith?”148 
Entitlement serves multiple purposes for Bishop. 
First, it exposes what Bishop believes is missing in the externalist’s account 
of faith. For the reflective believer is concerned with the right placement of his or 
her faith. And the reflective believer seeks commitment, not just belief. 
Plantinga’s warrant (having one’s belief generated by a properly functioning 
facility) does not account for the reflective believer’s epistemic goals, for the 
reflective believer wants to avoid idolatry—misplaced worship—while also 
accepting one’s belief. This, suggests Bishop, requires what must be described 
as an internal condition: the believer must be satisfied that his or her belief is 
rightly placed. Rather than turn the argument toward the internalist/externalist 
debate in epistemology Bishop introduces the notion of entitlement. It is not 
enough that a belief be warranted; the believer must be entitled to believe it. 
Second, entitlement serves as a differentiating point between a rationally 
held faith proposition and an irrationally held faith proposition. Bishop does not 
want to suggest that any proposition can rationally be held by a faith. Entitlement 
is the watermark or certification that some proposition is held (by faith) 
rationally.149 One’s faith that (or in) P fails to be rational faith if one is not entitled 
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to have faith that P. Bishop talks about faith as a virtue only when one’s faith 
satisfies that relevant entitlement conditions. 
Third, entitlement captures a sense of the permissibility of holding a belief. 
One way of viewing Bishop’s entitlement thesis is to consider the difference 
between obligation and permissibility.150 Under this lens, entitlement is about the 
permissibility of holding a belief, and not (directly) about epistemic obligation. In 
his essay “The Nature of Epistemic Justification,” William P. Alton distinguishes 
between epistemic obligation and epistemic permissibility: Epistemic obligation is 
“doing what we can to achieve the aim of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity 
within a large body of beliefs.”151 While this is slightly different than the 
characterization made earlier in the chapter, the difference is not important in this 
context.152 What is important, though, is how Alston moves from this 
characterization of obligation to epistemic permissibility. S’s belief that P is 
permissible if and only if S’s so believing does not violate any epistemic 
obligations.153 The notion of epistemic justification introduced earlier in this 
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chapter suggests that justification requires having sufficient undefeated evidence 
in support of a belief. But perhaps the way to understand Bishop’s notion of 
entitlement, and how it differs from justification, is best explained by drawing 
upon Alston’s distinction above. Entitlement is a permissibility thesis stating that 
S is permitted to hold B because S’s belief is not held in violation of S’s epistemic 
obligations. Holding a justified belief is, of course, permissible (given that, by 
definition, it satisfies epistemic obligations); but beliefs that are not justified may 
be permissibly held, provided that they do not transgress one’s obligation to 
maximize true beliefs while avoiding false beliefs.154 
Finally, entitlement broadens the scope beyond epistemic support.155 The 
sort of justification discussed by Swinburne, Plantinga, and Alston is epistemic. 
But one may be entitled to have faith in a proposition (or perhaps non-
propositional content) without epistemic justification. Bishop suggests that one 
may be morally entitled to hold P, and we could readily imagine that one could 
claim to be prudentially entitled in holding P. While Bishop concedes that some 
may claim entitlement to be strictly epistemic, he suggests that such a restriction 
is not likely to be successful. Bishop’s own account, which he offers at length in 
his book Believing by Faith, is that strictly epistemic notions of entitlement are 
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unsuccessful; moral entitlement achieves what epistemic entitlement cannot.156 
Given this description, Bishop’s notion of entitlement, considered as a 
permissibility thesis, can be fitted into our existing model of rationality. 
Bishop suggests that the reason why the notion of entitlement is necessary 
(or desirable) is that believers need “to satisfy themselves of their entitlement to 
their faith.”157 This, as Bishop notes, requires that the believer have at least some 
level of cognitive access to the entitlement status of his or her beliefs. And he 
goes on to suggest that the typical account of evidentialist justification is 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of (presumably epistemic) entitlement.158 
But there are cases where an agent is not evidentially justified in holding a belief, 
yet may still be entitled (permitted) to hold that belief. Thus, in the end there 
seem to be two defining characteristics of Bishop’s entitlement that distinguish it 
from justification: First, if entitlement is required so that believers may satisfy 
themselves that their faith is not misplaced, there is an cognitive access 
requirement. Second, if entitlement is a permissibility thesis, as I have 
suggested, then it does not require justification (as I have defined it). 
A question arises at this point: Does the religious believer need to be 
justified, or only entitled to believe? As we shall see, various fideists answer this 
question differently. But it is fair to suggest that meeting one’s rational 
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obligations, when possible, is better than merely avoiding transgressing rational 
obligations. For rational obligations, per our model, are obligations that best meet 
the preferences of the agent. Meeting one’s obligations is, then, the most 
expedient route to achieving one’s goals. 
In chapter 3, Bishop’s notion of entitlement is fitted into his own argument 
for fideism. Entitlement and its implications will be examined more carefully there. 
But at this point, we will move from faith and entitlement back to a more general 
discussion of fideism as a theory. 
Fideism 
With an account of rationality and belief, and an examination of several 
models of faith, we are now ready to return to fideism itself. Fideism is a theory 
designed to address a particular epistemic problem: the purported resistance of 
certain propositions to epistemic justification. (I will abbreviate this as justification 
resistant, though this term is specific to epistemic justification.) In the context of 
philosophy of religion, for example, thousands of years of philosophy have failed 
to produce a conclusive argument or conclusive evidence for (or against, for that 
matter) the existence of a divine being. Therefore, the story goes, holding such a 
proposition is unjustified. Thus, on some accounts, the proposition “There is a 
divine being” is an example of a justification-resistant proposition.159 Yet such 
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propositions are, first of all, believed by many. And they are deemed by many to 
be epistemically important. The result seems to be that for an important class of 
propositions, we cannot have knowledge. S may believe P, and P may be true, 
but if P cannot be justified, then how can S know P? Fideism purports to provide 
an answer to this quandary in at least some cases—the exemplar being religious 
propositions.160 
The claim that certain propositions are resistant to justification is a crucial 
claim made by fideists. For fideism is a response to the problem—a claim that in 
such cases, one may (rationally) still hold (or take to be true) these justification-
resistant propositions.161 The fideist claims that certain propositions, which I will 
call faith propositions—are amenable to what I will for the time being call fideistic 
support. That is, one may hold or take to be true such propositions by faith. Note 
that this is not to claim that any proposition that is resistant to justification is 
amenable to fideistic support. As we shall see in the next chapter, some (perhaps 
most) fideists restrict which propositions may be held/taken by faith. 
One might answer the question of justification resistance with another 
question: Why be concerned at all with finding an alternative to justification in a 
case when justification is not an option? Is it not the case that when P cannot be 
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epistemically justified, the rational response is to suspend judgment? There are a 
number of responses available to fideists. One is the Jamesian suggestion that 
certain propositions cannot or should not be met with suspension of judgment 
(they are, in William James’ parlance, immediate, live, and forced options).162 
Another response, this time from John Bishop, is that there are epistemically and 
rationally important “framing principles” that, while required for reasoning, are 
resistant to (non-circular) justification.163 The suggestion common to these is that 
suspension of judgment is not always the right response to justificational 
deficiency. Indeed our general account of rationality makes this evident. Even if 
what is epistemically reasonable is suspension of judgment, it may be morally or 
prudentially rational to assent. It is sometimes rational to hold (or take) P even 
when one is not epistemically justified in holding (or taking) P. While fideism is 
sometimes taken to be irrationalism, the above shows that this is not necessarily 
the case, and the examples of fideism examined herein are all theories that claim 
to be rational.164 
The fideist, then, claims that (a) there are certain propositions that resist 
epistemic justification, and (b) that one may still rationally hold (or take) P.165 
                                            
162
 James, 1984. 
163
 Bishop 2007, 189. 
164
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With these two claims in view, we can then characterize fideism (generally) as 
the theory that there are at least some propositions that a given subject is 
epistemically rational to hold or take to be true without regard for evidence. Any 
specific theory of fideism must elaborate on the conditions under which a given 
faith proposition may be held or taken without violating epistemic rationality. 
By using the phrase “without regard for evidence,” I do not intend to place a 
requirement that for a theory to be fideist, it must require ignoring available 
evidence. Rather, this phrase is intended to capture three possible cases: (1) the 
case where the available evidence is insufficient, (2) the case where the 
evidence is ambiguous, and (3) the case where the evidence is disconfirming or 
defeated. Debatably, one might also suggest a fourth case: (4) the evidence is 
conclusive, undefeated, and supportive, but is rightly ignored. This position 
suffers, though, from the problem that said belief is already justified, and it is 
unclear what it would mean to fideistically hold a justified proposition. (Arguably, 
the fact that one chooses to ignore evidence does not have bearing on whether 
that evidence actually justifies a proposition.) 
Given the above, there are three obvious avenues by which one may 
attempt to defeat fideism: One may contend that there are actually no cases of 
propositions that are resistant to epistemic justification. By my lights, for such a 
claim to be satisfactorily defended, it would require showing that reason is in fact 
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qualifies as assent. I do not think that is does, as the acknowledgement of the fictionality of P is 
contrary to the requirement that one sincerely take P. 
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unlimited. That is, one would have to show that there are no propositions beyond 
the ken of reason. Given that we are not concerned with a conception of fideism 
for an ideal reasoner, but for real human agents, examples of human cognitive 
deficiencies—including generally observable psychological dispositions such as 
the confirmation bias and cognitive difficulties of processing counterfactuals—
suggest that attempting this line of argument against fideism is unlikely to be 
fruitful.166 
 A second avenue is to show that there are no cases in which one can 
rationally assent to a proposition that is resistant to epistemic justification. Yet I 
have already argued counterexamples to this in the general discussion of 
rationality. Clearly there are cases where one can be (all things considered) 
rational in believing a proposition even when that proposition is not epistemically 
justified. 
The third route is to suggest that, given the proposed theory of rationality, 
fideism is not the best theory for meeting our rational obligations, all things 
considered. Phrased more specifically, when it comes to important propositions, 
such as religious beliefs, one does not best fulfill one’s rational obligations 
through fideism. Developing this argument, though, is not a simple matter of a 
few paragraphs. It requires closer examination of various theories of fideism, for 
individual theories have crucial differences that must be addressed. This third 
route is the line of argument that I take in the following chapters. 
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Conclusion 
The goal of this introductory chapter has been to set the stage for the 
examination of fideism that is to come in the following chapters. Fideism, as I 
have characterized it, is grounded in an epistemic problem: certain propositions 
are important, yet (at least in some accounts) seem to be resistant to epistemic 
justification. To many fideists (and many non-fideists), religious propositions 
seem to be members of this class. But if these important propositions cannot be 
justified (and hence cannot be known), then how can a religious believer be 
rational? Early in the chapter, I sketched a model of rationality that includes 
epistemic, moral, and prudential notions of rationality (and of justification). And I 
sketched a general All Things Considered (ATC) rationality, as well. This 
provides us with tools to assess the rationality of fideism, and we can see that at 
least prima facie fideism is not necessarily irrational. It may be possible to 
develop a theory of fideism that is rational. 
Belief and faith are two other notions that figure largely in discussions of 
religious belief. Drawing from Moser, I have sketched a notion of belief that at 
once captures the dispositional aspects as well as the assent requirement. While 
doxastic voluntarism may yet have unclear elements, the account sketched here 
includes a moderate doxastic voluntarism. Finally, the section on belief closed 
with an examination of the difference between believing in and believing that. I 
have suggested that both de re and de dicto beliefs have propositional objects, 
and it is belief as belief that P that is of principle concern in our analysis of 
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fideism. That said, there are important senses in which de re beliefs differ, and 
those will be discussed, too, when necessary. 
Fideism ascribes tremendous importance to the role of faith on the behalf of 
the reflective religious person. Yet, following John Bishop, we have seen seven 
models of faith. Fideists, it seems, have multiple candidates when considering 
the notion of faith. While I have hinted at a few of the weaknesses in some of 
these models, I have not limited the following examinations to a certain notion of 
faith. As we examine different fideist theories we will see different notions of faith. 
Finally, I have offered a general theory of fideism, intending to capture the 
commonalities between versions of fideism that range from Bayle and 
Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian fideism to Evans’s supra-rational fideism and to Bishop’s 
Kantian notion of fideism as a morally grounded doxastic venture. I summarized 
fideism as the theory as the claim that some propositions may be held without 
regard to evidence. 
In the next chapter I turn to C. Stephen Evans’s account of what he calls 
rational (or supra-rational) fideism. There, I examine Evans’s use of externalist 
epistemology, coupled with a strong model of faith-as-belief, as groundwork for a 
theory of fideism. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RATIONAL FIDEISM 
Introduction 
“Faith enables human beings to move beyond the limitations of finite, fallen 
human reason.”1 With these words C. Stephen Evans concludes his defense of a 
version of fideism that he calls responsible fideism.2 Evans’s theory, elaborated 
in his book Faith Beyond Reason, is the subject of the present chapter. In this 
chapter, I examine Evans’s account of responsible fideism, an example of 
epistemically focused fideism. Evans combines the fideism he locates in 
Kierkegaard with contemporary externalist epistemology, particularly so-called 
Reformed epistemology.3 In doing this, Evans argues that religious knowledge is 
not an unattainable goal, and where certain beliefs cannot be justified, faith gives 
one the epistemic entitlement to rationally hold those beliefs. Ultimately, I argue 
that Evans’s account is flawed in important respects. For that reason, Evans’s 
responsible fideism does not best address the concerns of a rational agent. 
Evans’s argument illustrates the difficulties inherent in attempting to build an 
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 Evans 1998, 153. 
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 Ibid.,  52. 
3
 Evans uses Kierkegaard’s Climacus pseudonym as the source for this fideism. Evans seems to 
think that Climacus is reflecting Kierkegaard’s own considered view. 
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account of fideism that remains committed to epistemic rationality. 
In the previous chapter I provided a general model of rationality and reason, 
outlining three important forms of rationality: epistemic rationality, prudential 
rationality, and moral rationality.4 Furthermore, I suggested an account of a 
general (all things considered) rationality by which it is possible to solve rational 
conflicts wherein two or more types of rationality came into conflict. Evans’s 
account of fideism is focused almost exclusively on epistemic rationality. That is, 
the gist of his argument is that one can be an epistemically rational fideist. Moral 
and prudential rationality do not play substantial roles in Evans’s account. 
Evans employs a variety of technical terms in his argument, and in a few 
cases the technical terms are used in more than one way. Because Evans draws 
deeply on various historical texts and movements, and also works broadly within 
contemporary externalist epistemology, certain terms, such as justification, faith, 
and reason are used in various ways in various contexts. For these reasons, I 
spend time examining and explaining the key terms. The first two sections of this 
chapter are devoted to Evans’s models of epistemic rationality and faith. 
In the first section, I discuss Evans’s model of rationality, and then move to 
one of Evans’s key arguments. Evans sees reason as flawed in two important 
ways: First, reason has cognitive boundaries. These limitations mean that certain 
things cannot be understood or even reasoned about. Second, reason is tainted 
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 Again, this is not to suggest that these are the only possible types of rationality. They are, 
however, those that figure prominently in this discussion of faith and religious belief. 
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by sin—notably pride and selfishness. For these reasons, one cannot assume 
that reason is the best way to address all propositions or beliefs. Religious 
beliefs—and in particular beliefs about God—are in such a class. With this 
argument, Evans opens the door to fideism as an alternative to what he calls 
rationalism—a position he characterizes as wrongly dependent on epistemic 
reason. 
The second section focuses on faith. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
there are a variety of models of faith. There we looked at several models 
identified by John Bishop. Evans suggests a model that he calls Biblical faith. 
Drawing from what Bishop called faith-as-belief and faith-as-trust models, Evans 
elaborates an account of faith that includes three components: belief, trust, and 
obedience. 
The third section is devoted to Evans’s responsible fideism, a variety of 
fideism that begins with a commitment to religious realism and also to epistemic 
rationality. In this section, I show how Evans integrates contemporary Reformed 
epistemology with several themes he finds in Kierkegaard’s middle 
(pseudonymous) works in order to create an account of fideism that retains 
strong epistemic claims while also forwarding faith as an alternative to 
justification (in certain cases). 
In the final section I critique Evans’s responsible fideism by asking three 
questions. In addressing each question, certain issues with Evans’s argument 
come to the fore. Ultimately, I argue that the issues are enough to suggest that 
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the needs of a rational seeker are not best met by Evans’s fideism. 
Rationality 
Before exploring Evans’s fideism, it is necessary to understand Evans’s 
notion(s) of rationality, and also to understand why Evans casts a jaundiced eye 
toward reason, particularly when it comes to religious beliefs. Evans’s fideism is 
largely couched in a pair of notions familiar to the philosopher of religion: faith 
and reason. And there is no small amount of tension between the two in Evans’s 
account. The interplay between faith and reason is an important theme 
throughout the book, with a core thesis being reason’s inadequacy in certain 
domains. That is, reason is incapable of justifying, or even entitling, one’s 
religious beliefs. Consequently, one must turn to faith. Before we can examine 
the second half of this claim, we must first assess what Evans means by reason, 
what reason’s shortcomings are, and how those direct one toward fideism. 
In the previous chapter I offered a model of rationality in which I described 
three different sorts of rationality (epistemic, moral, and prudential), as well as a 
general “all things considered” rationality. Further, I suggested that one seeks to 
fulfill rational obligations in order to satisfy certain goals. I will draw on this 
previously defined model in order to explain Evans. 
In Faith Beyond Reason, Evans has a great deal to say about rationality, but 
what Evans means by rationality is sometimes unclear. This is partly due to the 
fact that Evans is often engaging with enlightenment period notions of 
knowledge, understanding, and reason. Kant, Locke, Hegel, and Kierkegaard 
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operate with notions not strongly in line with contemporary usage, and Evans 
attempts to engage these thinkers on their own ground. But this usage is the 
exception rather than the norm. Evans’s work is not a history of philosophy. 
Rather, it is largely an engagement with contemporary philosophy of religion and 
epistemology. When stepping back from the historically oriented passages, a 
clearer picture of Evans’s notion of rationality emerges. Here I attempt to capture 
Evans’s own notion of rationalism, rationality, and reason. 
First of all, Evans refers to a philosophical standpoint that he calls 
rationalism. His usage differs from what the historian of early modern philosophy 
might mean by this term. The salient claim of this form of rationalism is “that 
religious beliefs ought to be completely governed by reason.”5 Evans suggests 
Bertrand Russell and Richard Swinburne are contemporary proponents of such a 
standpoint, while John Locke and W. K. Clifford are historical proponents.6 Evans 
links rationalism strongly to evidentialism, the epistemic theory that suggests that 
justification is best understood in terms of evidence: S is justified in believing B if 
and only if S has sufficient undefeated evidence in support of that belief.7 
“Theological rationalists,” says Evans, “often seem to assume that religious 
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 Evans 1998, 7. 
6
 Ibid., 7-8, 38ff. 
7
 Ibid., 7. Indeed, Evans suggests that Russell, Swinburne, Locke, and Clifford are all 
evidentialists. Note that Locke is a “rationalist” because of his evidentialsm; Evans is not 
confusing Locke’s position in the historical rationalist/empiricist debate, but rather is applying his 
present definition of rationalism to Locke. 
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beliefs must be based on evidence.”8 This linkage between rationalism and 
evidentialism is an important detail, as it accounts for Evans’s further linking 
between one’s having reason for belief B and evidence for belief B. Importantly, 
the “opposite of rationalism” (and thus the “the denial of evidentialism”) is 
fideism.9 I suggest that we best understand (theological) rationalism as the 
doctrine that religious beliefs require sufficient undefeated evidential support.10 
This leads to a second related term: reason. Evans uses reason in two 
ways: First, there is reason as “an autonomous, relatively competent human 
faculty.”11 Reason, in this first sense, refers to our ability to critically evaluate 
evidence. Evans’s notion of an autonomous faculty seems to carry with it an 
almost personification of this faculty, as we shall see throughout. But what is 
most important about this formulation of reason as a faculty is that reason can 
come into conflict with other faculties, notably the faith-producing faculty. While 
Evans’s notion of reason has strong epistemic connotations, it is not fully clear 
that he has in mind only epistemic rationality. However, with only a few nods in 
the direction of other types of rationality (notably in the context of Kant’s moral 
argument for God’s existence), Evans restrains his own argument to epistemic 
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 Ibid., 150. 
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 Thus any theory of rationalism must offer acceptable guidelines for what “sufficient undefeated 
evidential support” involves. Also, there is the question of why beliefs require this. There are three 
likely answers to this question: entitlement, justification, and warrant (in Foley’s conception). To 
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reason. 
The related term rationality seems to be consistently used in this 
epistemically oriented sense as well. Instead of a notion of a general “all things 
considered” rationality that may be able to arbitrate between conflicting rational 
obligations, Evans draws a distinction only between (epistemic) rationality and 
faith. Reason, in the sense explained here, is on Evans’s account a deeply 
flawed faculty—flawed enough that in certain cases we ought not rely upon it. 
Later in this section we will explore the two ways in which Evans thinks reason is 
flawed. But there is a second way that Evans uses the term reason, and it, too, is 
crucial to understanding Evans’s argument. 
Evans also talks about reasons as individual items. In this usage, a reason 
is (a piece of) evidence. When Evans talks of reasons to believe or a reason to 
believe, he is talking about evidence in support of a belief.12 Evans discusses two 
types of belief. First, there are some beliefs that are supported by evidence. Such 
evidence is in turn supported by other evidence. He suggests that this form of 
evidence “is derived through some process of conscious inference….”13 By 
inference what Evans wants to capture is not so much the reasoning process, but 
that such evidence is in some way reliant on other evidence. This dependence 
causes Evans to worry about an infinite regress argument. To avoid this, he 
suggests that not all beliefs are evidentially supported. Evans employs 
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Plantinga’s notion of properly basic beliefs to demarcate a class of beliefs that 
are in some way exempt from evidential support.14 Evans suggests that certain 
beliefs are properly basic, such as beliefs about self-evident truths and 
phenomenological experiences.15 Importantly, Evans, again following Plantinga, 
suggests that belief in God—and perhaps other religious beliefs—is properly 
basic.16 While Evans does accept that there may be evidential support for God’s 
existence, he states that such evidence on its own cannot be conclusive.17 Basic 
beliefs can then serve as foundational evidence for other beliefs, and in this way 
Evans believes he has circumvented the infinite regress argument. There are 
problems with aspects of Evans’s notion of evidence, and to those I will return 
later in the chapter. But when Evans talks about reasons, it is with this notion of 
evidence that he operates. 
Finally, Evans uses the terms reasonable and rationality in a more general 
sense than the related terms rationalism and reason might otherwise suggest. 
Reasonable, as Evans uses it, simply means to accord with reason. And 
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 Evans uses Palntinga’s argument against restricting basic beliefs to a certain class, suggesting 
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(1998, 42). 
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 Ibid., 42. Again, this is strongly based on Plantinga (1983). This is a simplification, though, for 
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basic beliefs (42). 
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 Ibid., 41-43 and 149. 
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 He considers two measures of conclusiveness, which he calls threshold evidentialism and 
proportionality evidentialsm (Evans 1998, 39). In neither case, he suggests, can one’s evidence 
for God be conclusive. As we see later, this is due to reason’s limitations. 
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rationality is “a commitment to practices that are aimed at truth.”18 While being 
reasonable is not a commitment to rationalism, it is also a rejection of blanket 
irrationalism. Evans’s responsible fideism espouses this moderate rationality, 
which is evident in this turn of phrase: “[O]dd as it may sound, it may be 
‘reasonable’ to hold a belief for which one has no reasons.”19 One may be 
reasonable, as we shall see shortly, in assessing the faculty of reason and 
finding it limited and tainted by sin. 
While Evans considers rationalism the wrong way to approach religious 
belief, he maintains that one should commit to rationality. While reason may be 
flawed, and while one may believe without reasons, one should be reasonable in 
one’s beliefs. As we shall see in the next section, these distinctions become 
important as Evans argues that while reason is limited, one ought to be 
reasonable in one’s beliefs. 
Evans maintains that his version of fideism is rational fideism. What he 
means by this, given his epistemological notion of reason, is that one can remain 
epistemically rational even while holding certain unsupported religious beliefs. 
How can this be rightly construed as rational fideism? This is what Evans calls 
responsible fideism: The reason one can remain rational in this case isn’t 
because one ignores reason, but because one discovers reason’s flaws and 
boundaries, and thus (reasonably) moves beyond rationalism. Reason’s limits 
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then take center stage. 
The Failure of Reason 
As we have seen, reason is principally an epistemic notion for Evans, and 
he ties it closely to evidentialism. As Evans sketches man’s search for 
justification of religious beliefs—notably, beliefs about God’s existence—he 
interprets this quest as one of finding sufficient evidence to justify such beliefs. 
But it is an endeavor that has largely been unsuccessful. Why is this so? Is it 
because there is not sufficient available evidence? Is it divine hiddenness? 
Perhaps in part. But Evans believes that the primary culprit is nothing other than 
reason itself. Reason (alone) cannot justify belief in God, and this is so for two 
reasons. First, reason is limited in crucial ways. Second, reason, like other 
aspects of humanity, is tainted by sin, and this stymies its ability to adequately 
address certain beliefs—beliefs about God being the foremost examples. 
Reason’s limitations prevent it from functioning properly when it comes to 
gathering and evaluating evidence for this crucial class of religious beliefs.20 
As we move into a discussion of Evans’s fideism, there are certain limits that 
must be set. Evans draws heavily on Aquinas, Kant, William James, Calvin, and 
Kierkegaard (among others). In fact, he claims that his positive argument is 
inspired by his reading of Kierkegaard.21 An examination of any of these thinkers 
is a tremendous undertaking. Kierkegaard, with his many pseudonymous 
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writings, is notoriously difficult to interpret. My analysis does not focus on the 
works of these authors, but on Evans’s interpretation. Furthermore, to maintain 
the course of the examination of contemporary fideism, I do not devote attention 
to comparing Evans’s interpretation of Kierkegaard with any other interpretation. I 
simply take Evans’s argument for what it is.22 Because Evans is both advancing 
an argument and interpreting Kierkegaard, this leads to several situations where 
Evans’s interpretive remarks become points in his own positive argument. Where 
I think it is correct to do so, I take Evans’s interpretive remarks on Kierkegaard 
(“Kierkegaard believes that reason has what we might term a restless, 
domineering quality….”)23 as reflective of Evans’s own thought; I restrict this only 
to cases where Evans seems to presuppose Kierkegaard’s point of view in 
building Evans’s own argument. With this clarification in mind, we can move on to 
Evans’s historically grounded claims about the two ways in which reason fails. 
With this boundary set we may look at what Evans thinks are the two 
problems with reason. The first claim we shall look at is Evans’s claim that 
reason has certain cognitive limitations. 
The Limitations of Reason 
First, there is the claim that reason is limited. In what ways? And is this an 
irremediable condition? Evans draws on Aquinas, pointing out beliefs that 
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Aquinas says cannot be reached by reason, such as what the essence of God is 
and what it means for God to be triune.24 Aquinas’ notion of scientia (scientific 
knowledge) does not extend to such beliefs. Yet Aquinas suggests that we can 
have a kind of knowledge about such propositions. Evans interprets Aquinas as 
suggesting a knowledge-by-faith model, wherein one’s faith provides entitlement 
to believe.25 “It is not knowledge in the strict sense because it does not include a 
direct vision of the truth of what is believed. Nevertheless human beings can by 
faith apprehend ‘intelligible truths about God’ that they could not know if they 
relied solely on natural human reasoning.”26 Evans is not asserting that Aquinas 
is a fideist. Rather, he points out that he considers the limitation of human reason 
as a familiar claim in Christian theology and philosophy. 
To Aquinas’ arguments that reason is limited, Evans adds Kant’s. Kant 
famously divides pure reason from practical reason. Knowledge of God is beyond 
the grasp of pure reason. Evans explains Kant’s theory this way: “In a strong 
sense… an Idea of reason, such as the Idea of God, marks the boundary or limit 
of reason. The Idea of God is meaningful to reason; it is an Idea that reason must 
think. However, it [is] an Idea that can never become an object of knowledge.”27 
While knowledge of God may be beyond the ken of pure reason, Kant suggests 
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 It is not clear whether the object of faith is God, or the proposition in question. 
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 Evans 1998, 58. Footnotes removed. Evans is here drawing on Summa Theologiae I 32 1 and I 
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that the idea of God is necessary for morality. Kant identifies God with the 
highest good, and claims that in order for an agent to act morally, to act with 
good will, one must believe in God.28 Again, Evans talks about this as a kind of 
knowledge of God: “The heart of Kant’s philosophy of religion is his insistence 
that the knowledge of God is practical in character. The discovery of God’s reality 
is not like the discovery of the neutrino or some other exotic sub-atomic 
particle…. Knowing God, however, is supposed to make a difference to how 
people view themselves and their task.”29 One’s “knowledge” of God is not from 
pure reason; instead, any “knowledge” we have is from practical reason, where 
the concept of God is necessary for one to properly reason morally. 
Critical to Evans’s analysis is the fact that neither Aquinas nor Kant are 
dealing with a notion of knowledge that matches the contemporary notion of 
defeasible justified (or warranted) true belief.30 Regardless, points out Evans, 
these thinkers do show ways in which reason has its boundaries. It is in 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous Postscript, though, that Evans finds his most 
important arguments. Kierkegaard suggests that reason is limited in two crucial 
ways. 
First, reason is limited in its ability to grasp certain concepts. Kierkegaard 
moves a step beyond Kant and Aquinas, who suggest it is the essence of God 
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that confounds us. For Kierkegaard, it is the incarnation that causes reason to 
founder. As Evans reads Kierkegaard, the incarnation doubly exposes reason’s 
limits: 
The point of the incarnation, according to Kierkegaard, is that it is a 
concept that reason cannot understand. This is so not because reason 
has a perfectly clear grasp of what it means to be God and what it 
means to be human and properly judges that the two concepts are 
logically contradictory. In fact, just the reverse is the case. Human 
reason is baffled both by human nature and by God.31 
Evans is here seeking to explain Kierkegaard’s talk of the paradox of the 
incarnation. It is not that the incarnation gives rise to a logical contradiction. 
Rather, it is that humans understand neither God’s nature nor our own. 
Furthermore, we display what Evans calls a synthesis of the eternal and 
temporal. Evans describes this as our ability to consider, plan, and set goals. 
That is, we are forward-looking and take the future into account when we make 
decisions in the present. We are, in fact, so deeply entrenched in this way of 
thinking that it is easier for the individual to imagine his existence continuing on 
than to contemplate his or her own demise. But, points out Evans, even while we 
display such abilities and proclivities, we also often fail to match our current 
behaviors to our stated long-term goals. “In reality… all human beings 
experience life, at least at some points, as a process in which we diverge from 
our ideals.”32 In Christ, explains Evans, we discover the perfect synthesis of the 
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eternal (forward-thinking) and the temporal. Evans suggests that we find this, or 
at least Kierkegaard finds this, such a jarring revelation that we cannot properly 
comprehend it.33 
But there is a second limitation of reason that Evans finds in Kierkegaard. 
Reason is limited “by the historical finite character of human reasoners.”34 
Kierkegaard’s criticism here springs from the disparity between our high 
conception of reason and our everyday cognitive situation. For we have what 
Kierkegaard calls false but comic presupposition that reason is equipped to 
understand the world as a complete system, and in a detached way—a “view 
from nowhere.”35 It is important to see that there are two prongs to this complaint. 
One is directed against the claim (particularly dominant in Kierkegaard’s milieu) 
that reason is capable of understanding the world. This is a limitation of reason. 
The second is that it can do so in a dispassionate way—a result of sin. We will 
thus shelve the second point for the moment and focus on the first prong. 
Whereas Kierkegaard’s first limitation is based on the limits of 
understanding, the second focuses on the inability of human reason to generate 
sufficiently accurate theories about the world. 
When reason attempts to know the world, it can produce wonderful 
theories, but when those theories are applied to the actual world, they 
can never be more than ‘approximations’, since both the world that is to 
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be known and the knower are in constant temporal flux. [footnote 
removed] My knowledge of the world is both approximative and 
tentative, always subject to revision. As a temporal being I can never 
see the world as Spinoza attempted to do, ‘under the aspect of 
eternity’, as God himself sees things.36 
Again returning to Kierkegaard’s paradox of the incarnation, Evans points out 
that historically, human thought has stumbled on the juxtaposition of the eternal 
and the historical. From Parmenides to the present, endeavors to provide 
systematic explanations of the world have failed, for they cannot explain both the 
unchanging, law-like features of the universe in conjunction with the seriatim 
change of temporal existence. Neither Kierkegaard nor Evans is suggesting that 
the world is not governed by laws, nor that it is possible for an ideal mind to 
grasp it. The point is merely that human reason is ill-equipped to do this, in spite 
of our nearly obsessive attempts to generate adequate theories. Reason, in other 
words, is hindered by its inability to handle complexity. 
So two cognitive limitations hobble human reason: The first is that certain 
things seem to be beyond reason’s ken, appearing to us as “paradoxes” (to use 
Kierkegaard’s language). The second is that even within the realm of notions we 
ostensibly can grasp, human reason is still incapable of dealing with the 
complexity that must be accounted for in explanation.37 As we shall see in a 
moment, Kierkegaard (along with Calvin and others) also suggests that reason is 
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tainted by sin. But before moving to that argument, a few remarks are in order. 
First, the argument uses “reason” a little differently than the definitions 
offered earlier in the book. Here, reason has more to do with cognitive 
capabilities, and is less epistemically oriented. Called into question are matters of 
whether we can understand, whether our cognitive machinery can hold enough 
information, and whether we can process sufficient amounts of information. What 
is importantly not called into question is whether or not we can be justified in 
holding certain beliefs. In other words, nothing in this criticism defeats an account 
of justification—especially evidentialist justification. Justification does not require 
complete understanding of a belief, or of the object of the belief. One’s belief that 
electrons exist is not contingent on one’s understanding of the true nature of an 
electron. A similar point holds for beliefs about God, the incarnation, the trinity, 
and so on. Yet I think Evans is correct in pointing out that this broader notion of 
rationality (as cognitive capabilities) is indeed limited in crucial ways. While 
Evans may have run afoul of his own definitions, the general point is legitimate. It 
may not call into question our evidential practices specifically, but it does properly 
challenge any claims that reason is boundless, capable of solving any problem 
thrown its way.38 
Second, there is little in the arguments of Aquinas, Kant, or Kierkegaard that 
would come as a shock to contemporary philosophers. The suggestion that 
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reason is limited is now well accepted, and the close ties between knowledge 
and certainty in the Enlightenment conception of knowledge no longer holds 
sway. Knowledge is now widely regarded as defeasible. How does this impact 
the argument at hand? Jose R. Maia-Neto’s take on Kierkegaard may be the 
most revelatory.39 He suggests that Kierkegaard (in particular) utilizes skeptical 
arguments to show that we cannot be certain, which then makes it impossible to 
know. Consequently, faith is all that can keep us from despair. But if certainty is 
not a requirement for knowledge, one need not accept that the only alternative is 
faith.40 
In light of these points, it does not at present seem that the limitations of 
reason, as elaborated here, force one into fideism. What about the effects of sin? 
The Effect of Sin on Reason 
The second claim Evans makes about reason is that, because of sin, reason 
does not function as it ought.41 In this sense, faith comes into opposition with 
reason, seeking to remedy reason’s sin-based failure. “The claim that faith is not 
only above but against human reason is rooted, not merely in the recognition of 
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human finitude, but in the charge that human reason is radically defective.”42 
There are two ways that Evans thinks reason is tainted by sin. First, reason is 
hindered by its pride. Second, it is egoistic and selfish.43 Again, Evans finds both 
of these reasons in Kierkegaard, and suggests that these are the grounds upon 
which Kierkegaard bases his argument that faith and reason are in conflict, and 
one must sometimes choose faith over reason. In Evans’s words, while the 
limitations of reason push us toward a model of “faith above reason,” the damage 
done to reason by sin pits “faith against reason.”44 Whether or not faith is the 
appropriate response to reason’s limitations and failures is the topic of the next 
section. In this section, we will look at Evans’s Kierkegaardian argument that 
reason is tainted by sin. 
Evans identifies pride as the first of two ways in which reason is impacted by 
sin. Again drawing from Kierkegaard, Evans states that “Kierkegaard believes 
that reason has what we might term a restless, domineering quality, in that it is 
always striving to master or appropriate whatever it encounters.”45 When, for 
example, the scientist makes a startling discovery, her or his reaction isn’t merely 
to marvel, it is to master. And this, suggests Evans, is because reason is prideful. 
It tests its limits, constantly pushing for dominion over the world. But herein lies 
                                            
42
 Evans 1998, 96. I take “radically defective” to be hyperbole here. 
43
 Ibid., 96. 
44
 Ibid., 91. 
45
 Ibid., 96. 
96 
 
the problem: “Insofar as reason is confident that it will always be victorious in its 
continued quest, it will necessarily reject any claim that there is an ultimate 
mystery, anything that is in principle resistant to reason’s domination and 
control.”46 Previously we encountered Evans’s arguments that reason is limited—
that there are in fact mysteries that human reason cannot unravel. Here, though, 
Evans takes the argument a step further, and suggests that reason pridefully 
refuses to accept this, and this pride is damaging. Pride becomes a barrier for 
reason. When reason approaches something mysterious, but is then incapable of 
understanding or mastering it, reason rejects the mystery: “The attitude is, ‘What 
(in principle) I cannot understand must be nonsense’.”47 For Evans, one’s 
encounter with a mystery, and subsequently foiled attempts to understand it, 
becomes the separation point: Here, one must decide between faith and reason. 
The second form of sin that taints reason is selfishness. The crucial point of 
contrast here is in reason’s assertion of neutrality: “Reason in fact prides itself on 
its disinterestedness and objectivity.”48 Evans is building an ethical case on top of 
his previous case for reason’s limitations. Earlier, he argues that one of reason’s 
limitations is that it is incapable of taking the “view from nowhere.” Now he 
argues that sin compounded with this limitation results in blind selfishness. 
Reason maintains that it is capable of taking an objective, neutral view.  The 
                                            
46
 Ibid., 97. 
47
 Ibid., 97. 
48
 Ibid., 97. 
97 
 
scholar works hard to achieve an objective stance on her or his topic, and views 
disinterestedness as a goal to be achieved. In contrast to disinterested 
reasoning, there is interested reasoning—reasoning that is done with the goal of 
attaining a specific result.49 Evans, via Kierkegaard, argues that the existential 
aspects of our daily life necessitate interested reasoning. Ethical and religious 
thinking, with its profound influence on day-to-day life, is thus interested 
reasoning. Here is where the idea of disinterested reasoning begins to unravel 
for Evans, for in our practical reasoning, as a result of sin we are primarily 
concerned with ourselves. We are self-centered, says Evans. And this self-
centeredness does in fact extend into areas in which we attempt to maintain 
disinterestedness. "Even the disinterested scholar looks first to the index of a 
new book to see how many times he or she may be cited."50 Evans is not here 
calling into question the veracity of the scholar, but suggesting that even the 
application of disinterested analysis is in service to a goal that is self-interested. 
The scholar of history may well apply the proper apparatus of critical distance, 
but surely the scholar's own pursuits are motivated by a desire to be recognized, 
to be understood, and to contribute to her or his field. In the human proclivity of 
self-interestedness Evans finds a problem. Our own selfishness is what prevents 
us from faith in God, foremost because we cannot understand God's nature for 
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our own weakness: "The problem is that God's nature is love and we are so self-
centered that we cannot understand God's love, even when, especially when, it is 
expressed in human form."51 
Much of Evans’s characterization of selfishness suffers from the absence of 
a crucial distinction: There is a difference between acting in self interest and 
acting selfishly. Notably, acting selfishly is acting at the expense of others, while 
acting in self interest does not imply causing harm, and can be morally and 
prudentially justifiable.52 One can act in a self interested way without acting 
selfishly. In not making this distinction, Evans seems to have opened up an 
interesting moral issue: One's faith is often (if not always) motivated by self 
interest as well. A desire for life after death, a fear of eternal condemnation, even 
an earnest longing to be in the presence of a benevolent God—all of these carry 
no small amount of self interest. Can one therefore condemn the faithful, claiming 
it is sinful to have faith because of self interest seems to suggest that one morally 
ought to suspend belief? I see no reason to claim that self interested, when it 
does not transgress into selfishness, is in any way morally reprehensible. 
Interestingly, Evans does not explore what I think may be a more powerful 
argument about the effects of sinful selfishness (and one that might help distance 
the notion of selfishness from self-interest). It is not only, or not so much, an 
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understanding of God that is put in jeopardy by selfishness. Selfishness stands in 
stark contrast to what a loving God asks of us, for God requires that we display 
the same selfless love toward others. Accepting God's gift is intertwined 
inextricably with becoming part of God's gift to the rest of the world by becoming 
an avenue through which God's love is expressed.53 For a selfish agent, such an 
idea may well be repugnant—repugnant enough to make unbelief a more 
pragmatic route than belief. While Evans does not develop this line of argument, 
he does point out the result, citing both pride and selfishness as contributing: 
There is of course a link between the two ways sin operates to damage 
our rational capacities. It is our self-centeredness that makes us 
prideful and self-sufficient. It is because we are so fundamentally 
concerned with self that we want to make ourselves the centre of the 
universe and become as gods. Or, looking at things from the other 
direction, it is our prideful self-sufficiency that makes it impossible for us 
to love, that blocks us from truly seeing and caring about the other for 
the other’s sake.54 
At the end of this quote, Evans identifies selfishness as a blocker to the 
expression of genuinely other-directed love. If reason is tainted by selfishness 
and God requires that one love in this sort of way, then it does seem that one 
may cling to selfishness and for that reason make certain decisions against belief 
in God. 
The Impact 
To what extent is Evans successful in arguing for the failure of reason? On 
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one hand, I find Evans’s conflation of reason and the agent’s psychological 
dispositions to be troublesome. Reason is not prideful. An agent is prideful in 
regards to her or his rationality. One can be just as prideful in one’s faith. I 
develop this argument later in the chapter, because I think it reveals a crucial 
weakness in Evans’s account. 
Be that as it may, Evans has uncovered a troubling supposition that we 
often make: namely, we forget about the interestedness of our endeavors. Even 
in our scholarly detachment, we have intentions that motivate us. While Evans 
does not explicitly use the same model of rationality as the one introduced in 
chapter 1, the quandary he points out can be seen even more clearly in our 
model of rationality: an agent can have a rational preference in favor of, say, 
prudential rationality—to selfish extremes, even—over against other forms of 
rationality. In that way, we can certainly understand Evans’s suggestion that 
reason is tainted by sin. I suggest that if Evans’s main point is that rationality is 
not immune from the effects of sin, then he is correct. That said, I’m not quite 
sure what it would mean to say that epistemic rationality is tainted by sin, unless 
one is using the sin language here to identify cognitive limitations. For as we 
have sketched epistemic rationality, free of the personification of reason as a 
faculty, it does not have its own “agentness”—it is not the actor; the agent is the 
actor. I will return to this later in the chapter. 
Then there is the question of whether or not reason is limited, and so limited 
in important ways. There are myriad documented ways in which humans have 
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cognitive limitations—occurrent capacity, memory, understanding complex 
counterfactuals, and so on.55 Cognitive limitations impact reasoning in a very real 
way. For that reason, humans cannot act as the ideal reasoners in spite of the 
loftiest hopes of philosophers. Again, the point deserves re-iteration that there is 
nothing in this account that calls evidentialism directly into question. Evans’s 
ambiguous use of “reason” and “rationalism” can sometimes lead to a conflation 
of reason—the faculty—and evidentialism or evidentially oriented accounts of 
justification. Showing that reason is flawed does not by that fact show that 
evidentialism is untenable, for contemporary evidentialism does not require an 
ideal faculty of reason. Most evidentialists accept that knowledge is defeasible, 
that one cannot occurrently (or even dispositionally) hold all evidence, and that 
evidence can be forgotten or otherwise lost. The correct conclusion to draw from 
Evans’s argument is that, yes, reason is limited in critical ways. But these 
limitations do not show evidentialism untenable.56 
Cognitive limitations and the effects of sin both contribute to reason’s 
incompetence in matters of religious belief. This is the direction of Evans’s 
argument. If this is so, if reason is really so incapacitated, then where ought the 
religious seeker look? Whence comes the believers entitlement to believe? 
Evans argues that the solution is faith. 
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Faith 
In the previous chapter we saw seven distinct models of faith. Early in his 
book, Evans highlights one of many difficulties in defining faith: “In both secular 
and religious contexts, we sometimes speak of faith to highlight uncertainty…. 
Paradoxically, we sometimes use the term in a way that connotes some kind of 
certitude, if not objective certainty….”57 The term faith is used in many ways, and 
it can be far from clear what the operative notion behind the term is in any given 
context. To clarify what would otherwise be a highly problematic ambiguity, 
Evans devotes substantial time to characterizing faith. Yet he stops short of 
giving a single unified definition. For that reason, we will need to do some work to 
clear away a few difficulties. As with Evans’s description of reason, his 
description of faith is sometimes interleaved with analysis of late modern 
philosophers, the most notable being Kierkegaard. Evans’s frequent references 
to Kierkegaard introduce a difficulty, as it becomes difficult at times to separate 
Evans’s notion of faith from Kierkegaard’s (assuming that Evans wishes to 
distinguish his from Kierkegaard). For these reasons, understanding what Evans 
means by faith requires a bit of reconstruction from his descriptions.  
In the previous chapter, I outlined John Bishop’s several models of faith.58 
As we begin to examine Evans’s conception of faith, we will see elements of 
three of Bishop’s models. Bishop suggests that some so-called Reformed 
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epistemologists (such as Alvin Plantinga) treat faith as a special sort of 
knowledge. Evans’s argument has strong Reformed elements, but what we will 
see is that his notion of faith diverges from other Reformed epistemologists.59 
Then there is the model of faith as a particular variety of belief—belief, we might 
say, with a high degree of certainty or conviction. And the third relevant model is 
Bishop’s model of faith as trust. My reading of Evans is that he intends to be 
most closely related to the third model, but often falls back into the second 
model. And this, as we shall see, is no surprise given his characterization of faith 
as consisting of three elements. 
Biblical Faith 
Evans is interested exclusively in what it means to have religious faith. In 
fact, he is most interested in what it means to have faith in God. While he 
acknowledges a wide variety of conceptions of faith, Evans thoroughly introduces 
only one account of faith, and this he calls Biblical faith.60 Yet he does not claim 
that this is his operative notion of faith. After examining this characterization we 
will need to determine whether this is in fact his operative notion as well. 
Biblical faith, says Evans, has three components: belief, trust, and 
obedience. Belief, the first component, is propositional in nature. Biblical faith is 
faith in God, not necessarily faith that God exists. Evans treats faith that as 
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merely propositional, reducing in all important ways to belief (that).61 Evans is 
skeptical, though, that faith and belief in these contexts are sufficient to capture 
religious faith—and Christian faith in particular. The belief component in his 
tripartite faith model is indeed belief that God exists.62 In what remains, I treat this 
as the principle meaning of Evans’s belief condition. But Evans expands on his 
belief condition, claiming that it is also “believing what God has said.”63 This 
suggests that Evans has a more robust model of belief than epistemologists tend 
to immediately attach to the term. Belief of the sort required by faith is belief that 
extends beyond its initial target (God) and well into doctrine. What did God say? 
There are two ways to interpret what Evans is suggesting here. On the one hand, 
one may read Evans as claiming that believing in God (in his sense) entails 
holding several related beliefs, such as that the Bible is God’s word. On the other 
hand, perhaps he is merely pointing out that Biblical characters believed what 
God told them. But this introduces an ambiguity that Evans does not unpack. For 
one may then ask what is the difference between belief in this later sense—belief 
that what God says is true—and trust. For we might just as readily say “I trust 
what S has said” in exchange for “I believe what S has said” and prima facie 
mean the same thing. But trust is a separate component in Evans’s 
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characterization of faith.64 
To trust someone, says Evans, “is to say that one would be inclined to 
believe the person even when that person says something that one has some 
reason to doubt.”65 It is tied closely to an epistemic notion of authority and 
credulity: Well-placed trust is trust in one recognized as an authoritative source. 
That is, to believe a source when one has reason to doubt, one ascribes greater 
authority to the trusted source over the other source or sources. “So trust in 
another person is linked to beliefs about that person in a double way; it seems 
not only to require that we believe what the person tells us, but to require that we 
do so partly because we have certain beliefs about the character of that 
person.”66 On this account, both belief and trust involve the recognition of 
authority. Not only are we to take God as a moral authority; Evans suggests here 
that to have faith in God is to consider God an epistemic authority as well. 
The third component of the so-called Biblical model of faith is obedience. 
This final element is linked primarily to our ethics and actions. Faith in God 
includes an action component. That is, a necessary condition of faith is that one 
acts in accordance with that faith. If God is to be viewed as an authority—moral, 
epistemic, and otherwise—then faith necessarily involves acting as if that were 
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so. Evans draws upon an historical rift between the Roman Catholic and 
protestant theologians over what Luther called “the straw epistle.” Evans 
suggests that the Epistle of James be understood as essentially focusing on the 
obedience aspect of faith.67 The historical arguments, suggests Evans, were 
primarily rooted in a misunderstanding of terminology: The Catholic doctrines did 
not explicitly include obedience, while the protestant notion of faith did. Both 
understood the necessity of a “willingness to be obedient,” so the dispute was 
largely a failure to begin with the same notion of faith. Biblical faith, reiterates 
Evans, can only be understood as having three components: belief, trust, and 
obedience. 
This three-part notion of faith serves as the basis for Evans’s argument that 
one ought to believe “by faith” beyond or even occasionally against reason. But 
while Evans does pose faith against reason on numerous occasions, it should be 
clear that there is nothing inherent in this notion of faith that necessitates the 
juxtaposition of faith and reason. That is, faith and reason are not contradictory, 
contrary, or “opposites.” But when it comes to further characterization of faith, 
there is one additional step Evans takes: He explains faith as a capacity or a 
faculty, using much the same language as he does when talking about reason as 
a faculty. 
Faith as a Capacity 
Again drawing on Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings, Evans explains 
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how faith is a capacity which one developers through certain actions and 
attitudes. 
For Kierkegaard, faith in God in the general sense we are here 
discussing… is essentially a developed spiritual capacity. Cognitively 
this capacity expresses itself by giving a person an interpretive skill, an 
ability to see a pattern and discern its meaning, where those who lack 
the skill in question might see nothing.68 
Faith is a capacity, says Evans, to trust God and see God’s presence.69 The trust 
aspect of the Biblical model is apparent in Evans’s description here, and the 
belief aspect is also readily inferred (one must have a host of beliefs about God, 
says Evans earlier, before one can trust in God). Remarking on the effectiveness 
of natural theology, Evans states that the so-called proofs of natural theology are 
only effective for the believer: “In the beginning of the proof I presuppose that 
God exists and actually begin with trust in him.”70 Only with that presumption can 
one accept the conclusion.71 It seems clear, then, that faith-as-a-capacity is only 
possible if one already has faith in God as explained by Evans’s Biblical faith 
model. 
What does Evans gain in construing faith as a capacity? Why make this 
addition to the model? The primary utility in explaining faith thus is in the 
juxtaposition one can then maintain. Recall that on Evans’s account, reason is a 
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faculty. Evans frequently personifies reason such that reason is making 
decisions, reason is prideful, and reason is acting in a certain way. By framing 
faith as a capacity or faculty, Evans can now talk about faith in similar terms. 
Faith can see the evidence, faith can approach God, and so on. If reason is an 
agent-within-an-agent (a homunculus), yet faith is but a disposition of an agent, 
the juxtaposition between faith and reason is in some sense strained. However if 
both are active within a human, each pushing the agent in a particular direction, 
then one can more readily sketch an account of faith versus reason. 
I disagree with Evans’s personification of faith just as I do with his 
personification of reason, and I will return to that point later in the chapter. But I 
think there is another answer to the question of why faith is construed as a 
capacity. 
Faith, on Evans’s middle-Kierkegaardian account, becomes a faculty of 
evidential evaluation. What do I mean by this? Consider Evans’s Biblical model 
of faith: Faith is belief that God exists, trust in God (as an authority), and 
obedience to God. On this model, to say that one believes that God exists by 
faith implies that one has assented to the proposition that God exists and that 
one now has a disposition to believe thus. Now consider this modified conception 
of faith as a capacity. As a result of Biblical faith one now has a capacity to—
what? To see evidence previously unavailable? Or to interpret certain evidence 
in different ways? What is Evans claiming? 
Is faith the capacity to see evidence previously unavailable? Suggesting that 
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believing E1 may enable one access to evidence E2 is not, by my lights, 
problematic. One may look at mathematical beliefs as an example: believing (or 
assenting to) a particular theorem or proof may indeed become a foundation for 
discoveries that would have been otherwise inconceivable.72 The subsequent 
discovery may then become further evidence for yet other mathematical beliefs 
(perhaps even beliefs already held). Or consider the case of a doctor evaluating 
a patient who may be suffering from one or more heretofore undiagnosed 
ailments. When assessing the sick patient who is displaying a litany of 
symptoms, the doctor may accept (or even believe) that symptom S is indicative 
of disease D. In so accepting this, the doctor may then begin to probe for other 
confirming evidence, prompting the patient to disclose more information or 
running tests designed to discover latent symptoms. While simply accepting S 
does not in itself lead to the immediate availability of other symptoms, it leads the 
doctor to direct her investigation in a particular way, thus uncovering previously 
hidden evidence. If Evans is suggesting that faith may open one to further 
evidence, I do not object. But it strikes me as a category mistake to suggest that 
by virtue of opening a route to other evidence, faith is now a capacity. To be a 
capacity, it seems to me that faith must also augment one's cognitive abilities 
such that one can now do something that one could not otherwise do. 
There is a second way of interpreting Evans’s faith-as-capacity model that is 
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not in danger of this category mistake. If faith is the ability to interpret evidence 
differently, to interpret evidence in a way fundamentally impossible in the 
absence of faith, then it does seem that faith is rightly called a capacity. But what 
is this new ability that is gained? Here I think Evans’s account is problematic, for 
the few examples he gives—acceptance of proofs of God's existence or 
openness to seeing God's purpose revealed in nature—do not seem to require 
new cognitive capacities. By my lights, they seem to require only holding certain 
beliefs (namely, belief in God) as preconditions  for holding other beliefs. And as 
previous examples show, this is by no means a capacity limited to the religious 
believer. It is, in fact, a cornerstone of internalist accounts of evidentialism: Two 
people may hold belief B, but while one is justified because she has evidence 
that B, the other is not justified because he does not hold evidence that B.73 We 
do not say that our first believer has a capacity that the second does not merely 
because she has access to evidence that the second does not. Likewise, I think 
that ascribing to faith the status of capacity is ill-conceived. 
Evans’s operating notion of faith is the Biblical model discussed previously. 
Nevertheless, by calling faith a capacity, Evans now personifies faith in the same 
way as he personifies reason. 
Fideism and Responsible Fideism 
Thus far we have examined Evans’s models of rationality and faith. Reason, 
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construed in largely epistemic terms, is a faculty devoted to evaluating beliefs on 
the basis of available evidence. But reason is not the pure, wholly objective 
faculty that some suggest that it is. It is both cognitively limited and tainted by sin. 
Evans defines faith according to what he calls the Biblical model. It is the 
conjunction of belief that God exists, trust that what God communicates is in fact 
the truth, and obedience to God. Evans treats both faith and reason as 
independent faculties, active parts of one’s mental life capable of coming at odds 
with each other. Against this backdrop Evans proffers his theory of fideism. We 
have already, in the previous chapter, seen a generic account of fideism. Here 
we will look at Evans’s own variety of fideism, responsible fideism in that it does 
not attempt to dispense with rationality altogether, but rather responds to 
reason’s limitations. 
Evans introduces fideism this way, contrasting fideism to evidentialism: 
The fideist says rather that faith must be accepted as at least partly 
autonomous or independent of reason, or even that reason must in 
some ways be corrected by or be made subservient to faith… In other 
words, the fideist typically rejects the rationalist assumption that reason 
is our best or even our only guide to truth, at least with respect to 
religious truth. The fideist sees human reason as limited, flawed, or 
damaged in some way. Thus, humans who rely on it to obtain religious 
truth will not achieve their end. For Christians, the flaw is usually linked 
to the sinfulness of human beings.74 
Fideism is a response to the recognition that reason is critically flawed. All 
varieties of fideism, suggests Evans, have this distrust of reason in common. But 
this does not mean that all varieties of fideism reject reason entirely or even 
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within the context of religious beliefs. In fact, Evans claims that reason is a 
necessary component in a successful theory of fideism.75 Evans calls his version 
of fideism responsible fideism in order to distinguish it from the caricature of 
fideism as stubborn irrationalism. He also seeks to distance his version of fideism 
from varieties of fideism based on anti-realism or language-game approaches.76 
Though he does not make the overt statement of this as his goal, Evans provides 
an account of fideism that combines elements of contemporary analytic 
epistemology with a form of fideism he finds in Kierkegaard (mostly in the 
pseudonymous writings). 
Evans distances his account from irrationalist and skeptical fideism. For 
Evans, the irrationalist is one who “rejects reason as a whole.”77 That is, 
irrationalism is the rejection of the claim that reason (a faculty) can or ought to 
offer any guidance in matters of religious belief. Lev Shestov, whose anti-rational 
quips we saw in the previous chapter, is clearly an irrationalist in this way. Evans 
also seems to group the theologian Cornelius Van Til with irrationalists as well, 
citing Van Til’s claim that only the miracle, and nothing else, can bring one to 
faith.78 
It is not only irrationalism, but also varieties of language-game and anti-
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realist theories of fideism that Evans wishes to distance from his responsible 
fideism. Evans dismisses the fideism he finds in Norman Malcom, D.Z. Philips, 
and the theologian Don Cupitt, suggesting that a critical characteristic of religious 
belief is lost in these models.79  His argument against these can be summarized 
thus: The typical religious believer does not believe she or he is using language 
symbolically, or merely trying to express certain feelings or affective states 
through a certain use of words. Rather, he says, they are expressing their belief 
in certain facts. “[M]ost religious believers will continue to see their faith as linked 
to claims about the character of reality, and there is no reason why they should 
not do so.”80 Because anti-realism and language game accounts cannot 
accommodate this, they are inadequate theories. 
Against irrationalist and anti-realist forms of fideism, Evans positions his 
responsible fideism as one that recognizes the benefit and usefulness of 
rationality. But it suggests that the faculty of reason has certain deficiencies. As 
we saw earlier in the chapter, reason is both limited and tainted by sin. In certain 
circumstances, the appropriate response to this deficiency is faith. That is, some 
beliefs must be held by faith because reason cannot provide the necessary 
support. 
This is the gist of Evans’s theory. As we unpack it, we first must look at how 
justification is related to knowledge, both explicitly and implicitly, in Evans’s 
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account. We must also examine how faith is supposed to fill the perceived gaps 
left by reason’s inadequacy and sinfulness. Answering these questions should 
leave us with a succinct account of Evans’s fideism, an account which we can 
then assess critically. 
Epistemic Justification and Knowledge 
It is important to not get our epistemological wires crossed. Historically, at 
least some forms of fideism may have arisen as a reaction against the strong 
coupling of certainty and knowledge.81 And even in contemporary epistemology, 
questions about epistemic justification become inextricably entangled with 
questions about knowledge. But a careful distinction between talk about 
epistemic justification (herein just justification) and the role (or potential role) of 
justification in knowledge will make understanding Evans’s argument easier.82 
Some philosophers make a useful distinction between epistemic justification 
and warrant. One such recent example is Richard Foley, who views the 
differentiation between the two as playing an important role in distinguishing 
questions about knowledge from questions about the rationality of belief.83 
Warrant, as Foley uses the term, is that which is added to true belief (perhaps 
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with a Gettier-defeating clause) to make that belief knowledge. Any given theory 
may suggest that warrant is satisfied internally, externally, or by some 
combination of the two. Justification, on the other hand, is about rationality of 
belief, and as such is generally internal to an agent. One is justified in believing P 
when one’s belief is correctly mentally supported.84 When S is justified in 
believing P, S is epistemically rational to believe that P. It should be readily 
apparent that Foley’s description of justification works in conjunction with the 
model of rationality provided in the last chapter. Evidentialism, on this reading, is 
an account of justification.85  
With this division between warrant and justification in place, we can then 
leave it as an open question whether or not justification confers warrant (and 
whether justification is the only way to be warranted). Evans’s own view is 
nuanced. While he does make a distinction between warrant and justification, he 
is not strict about the terminological distinction. He sometimes uses the term 
justification to mean only evidentialist justification, and other times uses the term 
to mean warrant.86 I attempt to clarify any cases where justification seems to be 
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used ambiguously. 
Evans’s defense of fideism is not principally about knowledge, but about 
epistemic justification. Above I characterized justification along an evidentialist 
vein. Evans has the same thing in mind when he talks about internalism and 
evidentialism. Insofar as Evans is critiquing “rationalism” and evidentialism, he 
conceives of epistemic justification primarily as an internal condition. It seems, 
though, that Evans himself espouses a form of externalism about knowledge.87 
He relies upon Plantinga’s notion of a properly functioning belief forming process 
to account for how certain beliefs may arise and be warranted.88 For Evans, 
(internal) justification is not a necessary condition of knowledge. Some beliefs 
may be properly held without evidence, and hence without justification. Warrant, 
in contrast, is necessary. “Having evidence for a belief is clearly one type of 
warrant,” says Evans, but it is not the only source of warrant.89 Later in the 
chapter, we will explore Evans’s use of warrant and externalism, but for the time 
being the salient detail is that there is a clear distinction between (internal) 
justification and warrant, with warrant being a necessary component of 
knowledge. 
Hidden in this brief characterization is a premise that ought to be brought to 
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the surface. If knowledge does not require (internal) justification, why is 
justification important? Evans does not explicitly give an answer, but I think the 
answer can be gleaned from the context.90 What is important about Evans’s 
distinction between justification and warrant is not so much what it says about a 
theory of knowledge, but of what it says about the importance of having internal 
truth-indicators about a belief. In the last chapter we saw how John Bishop 
captures the importance of this need in his account of faith. The religious faith-
seeker, says Bishop, is wary of falling into idolatry.91 Thus, the seeker wants not 
just true belief, or even (externally) warranted true belief, but a sense of 
entitlement to believe.92 Evans, too, recognizes the same need to which Bishop 
has drawn attention: Evans recognizes that the faith seeker wants reasons to 
believe. And reasons, in Evans’s lexicon, is evidence. Evans goes so far as to 
suggest that one’s beliefs ought to be reasonable to the greatest possible extent. 
This comes through when Evans says, “For fideism, at least as I have interpreted 
it, does not wish faith to come into conflict with logical truths and cannot simply 
embrace genuine logical contradictions. Nor can the believer simply assume 
without argument that reason is completely powerless when it comes to looking 
at religious questions.”93 I find at least two reasons Evans thinks that justification 
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is important for an epistemic agent: First, the rational agent should genuinely 
seek to avoid cognitive dissonance—and especially contradictions—whenever 
possible.94 As we shall see later, Evans maintains a role for defeaters that can (at 
least in theory) defeat even faith-beliefs.95 Second, religious naiveté  ought to be 
avoided. Even while Evans defends fideism, he seems to acknowledge the 
danger of what Bishop calls idolatry: misplacing one’s faith, even if well-
intentioned.96 There is the third possibility, and Evans mentions this explicitly, 
that justification can be warranting.97 However, in spite of the fact that Evans 
thinks justification may confer warrant, this particular reason cannot account on 
its own for Evans’s emphasis on justification, especially in light of Evans’s claim 
that religious beliefs are properly basic (and thus not in need of justification). 
Furthermore if warrant were the only reason justification is important, there would 
be no need for a substitutionary faith (as faith very clearly does not confer 
warrant). Within an externalist conception of knowledge, fideist faith only has a 
role if it can meaningfully supplant justification in the conference of warrant. 
Consequently, faith must be understood as having to do primarily with 
entitlement, and not as having a role in conferring warrant. 
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Justification is a general tool for entitling one’s belief.98 But Evans is 
particularly concerned with religious beliefs. Are these in any way a special case 
when it comes to questions of entitlement? As Evans puts it, many see 
evidentialism as the way to meet the entitlement challenge even for religious 
beliefs.99 Evans does not think this is a goal that can be attained. When he pits 
evidentialism against fideism what he is suggesting is that there are at least 
some cases where faith can replace evidence (and evidentialism) in the role of 
granting entitlement to believe. Instead of reasons for belief, Evans’s responsible 
fideism proposes that one believe by faith. By faith, Evans is not suggesting that 
one has carte blanche to believe anything. As he develops his theory of fideism, 
he provides controls intended to combat both naive belief and irrational belief, 
though as we have seen, he intentionally leaves room for beliefs that are, as he 
puts it, above reason. 
Another important issue must be raised here. In the previous chapter I 
suggested that John Bishop’s entitlement thesis is based on permissibility. That 
is, one is entitled to believe if it is not the case that one ought not believe. 
Justification typically has a stronger sense of obligation: If one is justified in 
believing P it is the case that one ought to believe P. Justification satisfies the 
                                            
98
 Entitlement, recall, says that S is (epistemically) permitted to believe B. 
99
 Evans is not merely suggesting that philosopher or even academics use evidentialism thus. 
Rather, he suggests that religious seekers of all stripes tend to approach religion this way. 
120 
 
requirements of entitlement as understood above.100 If one is justified in believing 
P, one is entitled to believe P. But as we shall see, Evans suggests an alternative 
to epistemic justification, an alternative rooted in faith. Is this alternative merely a 
claim that it is permissible to believe, or does (or can) Evans claim that this faith-
based alternative leads to epistemic obligation? I will suggest here that Evans’s 
notion of faith tends toward a permissibility thesis. That is, I think Evans is best 
understood as claiming that one is rationally permitted to hold beliefs in virtue of 
one’s faith.101 But I will add the caveat that Evans himself does not make this 
distinction between permission and obligation, and this occasionally seems to 
lead him to confuse permissibility with obligation, and thus directly compare 
fideist faith with epistemic justification. I return to this issue when I question 
Evans’s strong ties between faith and knowledge. 
Thus far we have distinguished between justification and warrant, where 
justification captures an internal state, and warrant is construed as that which, 
when added to true belief, makes knowledge. And we have suggested that 
justification may confer warrant in some cases, though we have not made it 
necessary that a justified belief is a warranted belief. This model seems to best fit 
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Evans’s argument. We have also looked at the role of justification in Evans’s 
model, with an eye toward understanding why Evans thinks faith can, at least to 
some extent, stand as a substitute for justification. Bishop’s notion of entitlement 
has helped capture this point. 
But what we haven’t seen yet is how Evans construes knowledge. Because 
Evans frequently talks about knowledge of God and religious knowledge, to 
understand Evans’s fideism we must understand what Evans means by 
knowledge. 
Warrant and Knowledge 
I have suggested that to best understand Evans, we must distinguish 
between notions of justification and warrant, and I briefly suggested how 
justification may be important even in cases where it does not confer warrant. 
And I have stressed that on Evans’s account, justification is not a necessary 
component of knowledge. However, Evans frequently talks about knowledge, 
particularly knowledge of God. How is this to be understood? Here I want to 
sketch what I take to be Evans’s theory of knowledge, an account based 
substantially on Reformed epistemology.102 
Early in Faith Beyond Reason, Evans introduces externalism, but does so 
primarily as a foil to a certain variety of evidentialism. Not until the last chapter 
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does Evans “come out” as an externalist about knowledge.103 For that reason he 
sometimes sounds as if he is explaining what others believe when he is in fact 
enunciating his own theory. Evans explicates his externalism piecemeal, 
beginning with the introduction of properly basic beliefs, then adding the notion of 
grounded belief, and finally suggesting that a belief may be warranted even if it is 
not internally justified. 
Evans introduces the notion of a basic belief in the context of a traditional 
problem for foundationalism: the so-called regress problem. Evidentialist 
justification, suggests Evans, is based on the idea that a belief is justified by 
other beliefs, which in turn are justified by other beliefs. This chain of beliefs, 
though, cannot go on forever. Some set of beliefs, whether large or small, must 
(on Evans’s account) be held without justification.104 
[I]f the chain of evidential reasons is not going to be infinitely long, it 
seems that I must believe some things without believing those things 
on the basis of any other beliefs…. Presumably, then, some of our 
beliefs are not only basic, but properly so, in the sense that the person 
holding the belief not based on any other beliefs has not violated any 
epistemic duty and is not guilty of any intellectual failing.105 
Evans suggests here that there is a class of beliefs that are basic—not requiring 
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any further justification—and that one may rightly hold these beliefs without 
justification. Such beliefs he calls properly basic beliefs. But what makes a belief 
properly basic? How is it distinguished from other non-basic beliefs? To answer 
these questions Evans draws on an argument that Plantinga offers in “Reason 
and Belief in God”: We need no criterion or criteria for determining which beliefs 
are properly basic. Rather, the question is inductive: we must discover such 
beliefs as we go. However, one feature of a basic belief is that it has a ground.106 
Evans defines a ground thus:  
The ground is not properly thought of as a belief at all, or even as an 
experience, but rather as a set of circumstances which includes an 
experience of a certain kind… The circumstances in these cases 
function as grounds by virtue of the fact that God is said to have 
created the mechanisms by which these beliefs are formed.107 
A ground is not evidence, and Evans goes to pains to ensure that one does not 
misunderstand him thus.108 Grounds have more to do with external 
circumstances and belief-producing mechanisms. As Evans explains it, grounded 
beliefs are formed immediately because of the circumstances, having no 
evidence, but arising spontaneously.109  
When Evans considers the question of what knowledge is, and what makes 
warrant, Evans invokes the arguments offered by Plantinga, Alston, and others in 
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the tradition of Reformed epistemology. Knowledge, on Evans’s account, is 
warranted true belief, where warrant is to be understood in an externalist way. He 
gives a rough characterization of externalism: “The externalist insists that 
whether a belief amounts to knowledge depends upon many factors that are 
external to my consciousness and not completely within my control.”110 However, 
when it comes to specifics, Evans is non-committal on which precise formulation 
of externalism he espouses. Yet while he sketches both Alston’s version of 
reliablism and Plantinga’s earlier proper-function account, it is from Plantinga he 
most frequently draws.111 
What is important about Evans’s externalist theory of knowledge is what it 
confers on the fideistic believer: If S believes that P, and in fact (it is the case 
that) P, yet S cannot be justified in believing P, then on the internalist account of 
knowledge, S cannot know P. But Evans wants to make the stronger claim that 
we can have knowledge about God (and not strictly in the acquaintance sense 
that he sometimes uses, but in the propositional sense, too). However, if warrant 
can be had externally, then one may in fact be able to have knowledge of God 
without being justified. And to turn a Kantian phrase, this makes room for faith. 
Now we are ready to turn to Evans’s responsible fideism, and see how Evans’s 
accounts of knowledge and justification combine with his view of faith and reason 
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to produce what he calls responsible fideism. 
Responsible Fideism 
Thus far I have sketched Evans’s models of rationality and faith and I have 
outlined Evans’s epistemology, with emphasis on his views on (internal) 
justification, warrant, and knowledge. Now we can formulate Evans fideism in its 
epistemic context. 
Reason, we have seen, is deeply flawed in two ways. First, it is limited. Its 
capacities do not extend indefinitely, and clearly reason cannot comprehend all 
that it encounters in the world. Second, reason is tainted by sin. It is prone to 
selfishness and pride, refusing to acknowledge its limits, and subverting its own 
claims of objectivity by pursuing (subjective) interests and agendas. This, more 
than anything, becomes Evans’s impetus for fideism. Reason is most critically 
flawed in its approach to religious matters, specifically in its approach to the 
question of whether there is a transcendent God who is an absolute authority. 
Reason cannot understand this, nor does it, in its pride and selfishness, wish it to 
be the case that it is accountable to a greater authority. Thus, reason cannot on 
its own be trusted to lead one to truth.112 
This leads to the problem of justification of beliefs about God. Justification, 
understood along evidentialist lines, requires that one have sufficient undefeated 
evidence in support of a belief. But because of reason’s limitations, we cannot 
rely upon it to produce such justification. Whether there is available evidence for 
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God’s existence is inconsequential, for a deeper problem exists. Reason may 
operate well enough for our run-of-the-mill beliefs, but when it comes to religious 
beliefs, when it comes to inquiry about God, reason’s litany of shortcomings have 
the combined effect of rendering our everyday evidentialism useless or, at best, 
highly dubious. 
But, says Evans, this should neither foreclose the possibility of being entitled 
to believe that God exists (and hold other religious beliefs), nor foreclose the 
possibility of having knowledge about religious things. On the one hand, faith can 
entitle belief, and on the other hand, the externalism of Reformed epistemology 
shows that knowledge does not require justification. Accepting these propositions 
is not wholesale acceptance of irrationalism, though it is fideism. Rather, it is 
accepting rationalism only to the point where one ought to accept rationalism—it 
is accepting that reason functions properly in certain domains, while in others its 
limitations prevent it from autonomously functioning correctly. In such 
circumstances, faith is the better alternative. 
Divested of its Kierkegaardian, Thomistic, and Kantian trappings, this is the 
outline of the argument that Evans is making. All of this is what Evans has in 
mind when he offers this characterization of his own theory: 
[F]aith is against reason only in the sense that it runs into conflict with a 
concrete form of reason that is damaged. Perhaps it is best to describe 
such a faith as beyond reason rather than against reason, since there 
is no necessary conflict with reason, but only a conflict with reason that 
has suffered damage but refuses to recognize this.113 
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Evans offers a partial taxonomy of fideism. First, there is fideism in general, 
characterized as it is by its distrust of reason, and it’s forwarding of faith as the 
remedy. Within fideism in general, Evans offers three strains he sees as 
untenable, or at least undesirable. These we have addressed before: 
irrationalism (including at least some types of skeptical fideism), anti-realism, and 
Wittgensteinian fideism (or language-game fideism). But there is also a type of 
fideism that maintains a commitment to religious realism and also rejects the 
blanket dismissal of rationality as espoused by irrationalists.114 This is the sort of 
fideism Evans calls responsible fideism. 
There are several reasons why Evans characterizes his fideism as 
responsible: First, he suggests that reason is the appropriate tool in most 
epistemic situations. Thus, reason cannot be discarded. Second, while reason 
may be critically limited, Evans thinks that one can become aware of this and 
adjust accordingly. While, on Evans’s account, this requires humbling oneself 
and accepting both one’s own limitations and God’s authority even on epistemic 
matters, Evans seems to suggest that a sort of epistemic rehabilitation occurs 
thereafter.115 While reason’s deficiencies are not remedied, an agent’s reliance 
on reason may continue because the agent is aware of those deficiencies and 
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can work around them.116 (Without the rehabilitation that comes from faith, one 
cannot work around the deficiencies.) Third, reason in responsible fideism plays 
the role of assessing defeaters to faith. That is, faith can be defeated 
rationally.117 
But following his interpretation of Kierkegaard, Evans takes one further step 
to claim that faith is in some sense against reason. There are religious truths, 
says Evans, that stymie reason. They appear in the form of Kierkegaardian 
paradoxes.118 The incarnation of the God-man is the foremost example. When 
one encounters these “absurdities,” these challenges to a faculty of reason that 
will not and cannot accept such propositions, one must make an informed choice 
between faith and the conclusions of reason. Such areas are precisely the ones 
in which, Evans points out, reason is at or beyond its limits. To assent, to believe, 
is to go against reason. But it is to go against reason where reason is not reliable 
anyway. 
Where does this fideism leave the believer, epistemically speaking? Faith 
does not confer justification; rather it replaces it in its entitling role. That is, in 
these cases where reason has reached its limit, one is entitled to believe by faith. 
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It is, epistemically speaking, permissible for one to believe. But without 
justification, can one have knowledge about these faith beliefs? Here, the 
externalism of Reformed epistemology provides a clear yes: knowledge does not 
require internal justification. So long as one’s faith is formed by a reliable or 
properly functioning belief forming process, one’s belief may be justified. John 
Calvin’s sensus divinitatis, or the guidance of the Holy Spirit, may play that role of 
a reliable process.119 Thus it is reasonable to suggest that one may indeed have 
religious knowledge, even when one is not justified in one’s belief. 
This is Evans’s account of responsible fideism. With an externalist 
epistemology that preserves knowledge in absence of justification, and a model 
of faith and reason that suggests that there are areas of belief that extend 
beyond the ken of reason, Evans argues that when it comes to religious beliefs—
especially beliefs about an absolutely authoritative God—we would do best to 
shelve the arguments of natural theology and take the advice of Kierkegaard, 
having faith beyond reason, and perhaps even faith against reason. 
Three Questions 
So far we have seen how Evans construes fideism. By examining what 
Evans means by faith, reason, and justification, we have seen how Evans’s 
fideism suggests that human rationality is both limited and flawed. We have seen 
how Evans uses this argument to dismiss the efficacy of evidentialism in 
justifying belief in God and in other religious propositions. And we have seen how 
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Evans suggests that faith can bridge the gap purportedly impassable to reason. 
Evans calls fideism that is committed to reason responsible fideism. 
But there are questions that arise about Evans’s theory. In this section I 
raise three that are particularly telling. In answering these questions, certain 
issues with Evans’s theory come to the surface. I suggest that these issues 
indicate that Evans’s fideism may not be the best grounds for believing in God, 
and may not even admit permissibility of such beliefs. 
The first question is in regards to Evans’s suggestion that reason plays an 
evaluative and corrective role in faith. Evans suggests that defeaters may rightly 
defeat faith. The second question has to do with the conflict between faith and 
reason. Evans suggests that in some circumstances we are confronted with faith 
on one hand, and reason on the other, and we ought to select faith. And the final 
question focuses on the relationship between knowledge and faith. Here I 
question Evans’s use of externalism. 
What is the Role of Defeaters? 
Defeaters play a curious role in Evans’s overall scheme. Evans spends 
considerable time developing an account of the limitations of reason. As a 
remedy, he suggests faith. Given his externalist bent, justification is not a 
requirement on his account, as beliefs may be warranted even when unjustified. 
But just as it seems that Evans has departed wholesale from internalism, he 
suggests a new role that reason plays in relation to faith. Faith, he says, may be 
defeated by undefeated defeaters. This claim, which is the subject of the present 
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section, is then further complicated by Evans’s other claim that in some cases, 
“paradoxes,” “absurdities,” and “contradictions” ought to be accepted against 
reason. But if this is so, what exactly are we to make of defeaters? How powerful 
are they, and under what circumstances are they a concern? 
Defeaters 
From Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, Evans draws the conclusion 
that there is no role for evidence in supporting religious beliefs. But Kierkegaard, 
he thinks, has gone too far. Evans makes this remark: “Objective evidence may 
be neither necessary nor sufficient for faith. However, it does not follow from this 
that objective evidence is simply irrelevant for faith, or that the believer will have 
no concern for evidence. Even a belief that is properly basic is subject to being 
‘defeated’ or overturned by evidence.”120 Evans thus suggests that for any given 
belief, evidence may arise that overturns or defeats the belief. And this is a 
proper role for reason. 
Evans does not spend substantial time developing a notion of defeaters in 
Faith Beyond Reason. In an earlier book, The Historical Christ and the Jesus of 
Faith, he outlines a theory of defeaters in the context of basic and non-basic 
beliefs, though even this characterization is brief: There are defeaters that 
suggest belief B is false, and there are defeaters that suggest the process of 
arriving at B is not truth conducive.121 Either type may possibly overturn one’s 
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belief if left undefeated. Much has been written in contemporary epistemology 
about the nature of defeaters.122 But rather than dwell on details and edge cases, 
Evans suggests that, “It is not always clear when it is reasonable to think a belief 
has been defeated,” and with this acknowledgement he moves on to cases that 
he thinks are clear cut.123 The particular case he chooses reveals what I take to 
be the most perplexing aspect of his claim that reason can play a role in fideist 
faith. 
[I]t seems wrong to say that the believer would always be right to ignore 
evidence that falsified the belief. Suppose, for example, that we found 
overwhelmingly powerful evidence that Jesus never existed, and that 
the whole of Christianity, along with its early history, had been invented 
in the fifth century. If the evidence were really powerful, would it still be 
possible to continue to believe that an historical figure from first-century 
Palestine, Jesus of Nazareth, was divine?124 
What is the responsible fideist to do? Evans’s conclusion: In this case, the 
evidence is a defeater. Rationality wins out over faith. I find this perplexing for a 
few reasons, but before explaining those, there is the matter of defeating the 
defeater. 
Evans claims that even while reason may alight upon evidence that is rightly 
a defeater for a belief held by faith, that defeater can be defeated. That may 
seem unsurprising, but there is a twist: In cases where the original (defeated) 
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belief is held by faith, “[t]he intellectual inquiry and amount of evidence that might 
be necessary in order to ‘defeat the defeater’ is quite different than what would 
be required if the belief itself were based simply in objective evidence.”125 And it 
is not that a faith-defeater defeater needs more evidence—on the contrary, it 
needs less. Evans suggests that for a faith belief, the criterion for defeating a 
defeater is only that there “is no overwhelmingly powerful evidence,” while the 
requirement for the evidentialist is that the truth be “proved.”126 That is, in the 
case of the alleged fifth century Christianity fraud, the faith-holder need only 
discover that there is no overwhelming evidence that the Jesus story was a myth, 
while presumably a believer who believed on the basis of evidence would 
require, it seems, conclusive evidence that the alleged first century fraud story is 
itself untrue.127 The rationale for this perplexing dual standard is not explained. 
Even granting Evans’s initial claims about fideism, I do not see any reason 
to accept the suggestion that defeaters are defeated differently for beliefs held by 
faith and beliefs supported by evidence. More detailed accounts of defeaters and 
defeating defeaters may better address what is required for defeating defeaters, 
but for the present, I suggest that Evans is mistaken in claiming that evidentially 
held beliefs have a higher onus when confronting defeaters. If anything, it seems 
that the opposite would be true: faith beliefs, absent sufficient evidence, ought to 
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be more readily jettisoned when confronted with an undefeated defeater. 
Drawing on the earlier distinction between faith and justification, it seems clear 
that psychological conviction notwithstanding, faith is on weaker epistemic 
footing than a justified belief in virtue of the fact that it is not evidentially 
supported. Suggesting that an evidence-less belief is less susceptible to defeat 
than a justified belief borders on irrational, as it clearly does not align with the 
rational obligation to maximize true beliefs while minimizing false ones.  
Defeating the defeater, as troublesome as it appears here, is the lesser 
problem. The greater problem is Evans’s account of defeaters and one’s 
response. 
What Defeats What? 
The main point of Evans’s introduction of defeaters is this: While one may 
hold a belief by faith, reason may reveal defeaters that can (and perhaps ought 
to) defeat faith. That is, when an undefeated defeater against a belief held by 
faith comes to one’s attention, one must assess whether, as a result of the 
defeater, one ought not believe. While defeaters are traditionally posed against 
justification or warrant, Evans acknowledges that they may operate against faith 
as well. There are, however, two difficulties with such a use of defeaters. 
First, it is not clear what part of faith the defeater defeats. All things 
considered, this may be a minor point, but I find it troublesome. Evans’s account 
suggests that defeaters work against faith in the same way that they work against 
justification. The context of Evans’s discussion, too, is on internalist notions of 
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justification—and more specifically, it is about evidentialism. A defeater works 
against evidence in that it can rebut or undercut that evidence. In the typical 
account of defeaters, when E is evidence in support of P, a rebutting defeater E* 
indicates that not-P.128 Evans’s example above is an example of a rebutting 
defeater. A defeater is undercutting when it calls into question the connection 
between evidence E and P. Undercutting defeaters capture the case where E’s 
relation to P is not such that P follows by virtue of E, or, as Pollock and Cruz put 
it, an undercutting defeater shows that E does not guarantee P.129 In short, a 
defeater presents a challenge to the source of support for a proposition.130 
But how do defeaters work against faith? Faith, in Evans’s Biblical model, is 
a combination of belief (that), and trust and obedience to God. Even in the 
traditional account of defeaters, a defeater is not a defeater of belief, but of 
justification. Thus, there is no reason to suggest that a defeater in this context 
defeats belief. Indeed, it is not clear what that would even mean. So does a 
defeater defeat obedience, or defeat trust? Both trust and obedience seem to be 
about a relationship tangental to the actual belief. I may trust God and I may 
obey God, but what part of Evans’s example of the alleged fifth century 
Christianity scandal undermines that specific trust? I may continue to trust and 
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obey God, but reject propositions about early Christianity, perhaps even about 
the incarnation. I think the actual role that the defeater is playing here is in regard 
to entitlement. This defeater theory suggests that in light of an undefeated 
defeater, it is simply no longer epistemically permissible to believe that which has 
been defeated. But entitlement is something I have added to Evans’s account. 
Thus, it seems to me that importing the notion of a defeater and using it in 
relation to faith exposes a weakness of Evans’s account—an overzealous 
attempt, perhaps, to make faith act like justification. Only when faith is properly 
understood as only entitlement, and not a direct analog or alternative to 
justification do we see how faith can be undermined by a defeater. Again, this is 
a minor problem, one that the present account has already corrected. The other 
looms large. 
Secondly, there is the matter of reason defeating faith. How does this 
concept of a defeater coexist with Evans’s claim that sometimes reason is 
incapable of addressing certain propositions simply because it is too limited? 
Evans cites Aquinas, Kant, and Kierkegaard all on this matter, concluding that 
reason sometimes falls short.131 Evans believes reason is critically flawed. But in 
light of reason’s incapacity to understand how God could become a person, 
reason’s incapacity to understand triunity, reason’s incapacity to understand 
God’s authority or power, and so on how can reason suddenly be competent to 
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defeat faith? 
I find it odd that while evidence for or against a religious proposition does 
not count toward entitling a religious belief, evidence against an already held 
proposition does count. Evans reiterates throughout the book that when it comes 
to certain matters, and religious propositions are the foremost example, reason’s 
limitations and sinfulness make it an ill candidate for supporting religious beliefs. 
Evans does not argue that there is no evidence for God’s existence, nor does he 
argue even that the evidence is necessarily unavailable or underdetermining. He 
argues that reason is the problem. Regardless of whether there is evidence for 
God’s existence or for the historical works of Jesus, reason is incapable of 
justifying such religious beliefs because of its own flaws. Broaching such 
religious topics is beyond reason’s capabilities. This, of course, is what makes 
faith an indispensable component of rational religious belief. Why, then, is reason 
suddenly qualified to defeat faith? Are not those same limitations of reason—its 
pridefulness, its selfishness, its limitations in capacity and understanding—
reasons that should also disqualify it from presenting defeaters?132 One might 
attempt to circumvent this argument by claiming that, once aware of its 
limitations, reason can properly operate in cooperation with faith, and thus in this 
renewed capacity rightly present defeaters. But this borders on begging the 
question, for if reason presents defeaters that undermine faith in propositions 
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about God’s existence, one does not then say it is by God’s rehabilitation of 
reason that reason properly undermines belief in God.133 
It does seem, though, that Evans’s intuition about defeaters is correct: When 
overwhelming evidence presents itself, one ought to follow the evidence. If Evans 
indeed wants to maintain an air of epistemic rationality, such a move is, it seems, 
necessary. To refuse a role for defeaters is to concede the point to the irrational 
fideist: reason plays no role in faith. To avoid this, acknowledging a role for 
defeaters seems to be a requirement. Yet it also does not work, for it must, to 
turn a phrase, place reason above faith. 
Finally, Evans’s introduction of defeaters brings into sharp relief a nagging 
issue with his characterization of reason in general: Repeatedly we see reason 
characterized as imperfect—“fatally flawed,” says Evans. Yet he continually 
returns to the claim that fideism can be reasonable. Even with the hairline 
differentiation between rationalism, rationality, and reason, Evans still seems to 
have transgressed on an important detail: ultimately faith (on this account) has to 
be judged to be reasonable, and so judged by a faculty Evans says is decisively 
unreliable. This account of defeaters is but one example of how Evans smuggles 
reason back in as a counterbalance to faith while still maintaining that reason is 
not competent in such matters. Evans does argue that even a flawed reason 
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would be capable of recognizing its own limits, but can it compensate for these 
limitations? The best answer Evans has to offer is that reason is in some way 
redeemed by faith.134 However, it is unclear what this redemption looks like, and 
the context indicates that all Evans really means by redemption is that once one 
has faith that P, one can then proceed to use P as the basis for other beliefs. 
In the end, the re-introduction of reason and evidence in relation to 
defeaters is problematic. We are left with three problems arising out of two 
questions: First, there is the ambiguity of what is defeated by a defeater. Second, 
there is the question of how reason can play a role regarding raising and 
defeating defeaters when it was deemed to deficient to bring to bear on the 
proposition in question. Third, there is the fact that in the end, reason becomes 
the judge of faith, reversing the roles Evans has so assiduously asserted. What 
all of this illustrates is the tension that arises when epistemic goals of maximizing 
true beliefs and minimizing false ones come into conflict with the very notion that 
is central to fideism: that some beliefs can be held by faith, regardless of the 
evidence. Evans’s attempt to introduce reason back into the picture as a check 
and balance to faith unveils the weakness in the theory. If reason is incapable of 
providing positive support for a belief, why is it capable of undermining faith? If 
evidence plays no role in supporting religious beliefs, why can it play a role in 
defeating religious beliefs? But if defeaters are not allowed, we end up in the 
position Evans thinks is so undesirable: faith is unchecked by reason. 
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If Knowledge is External, How Can It Depend on Faith? 
In the previous section I suggested that Evans’s attempt to incorporate a 
theory of defeaters into his model of faith-based epistemic entitlement suffers 
from several flaws. In this section, I change tack from talking about entitlement 
and justification to examining what Evans has to say about knowledge. Evans 
defends a form of externalism strongly influenced by Reformed epistemology. 
But he also integrates faith into this knowledge model. I argue that Evans’s 
attempt to integrate faith into an account of knowledge causes problems for his 
overall theory of fideism. 
Knowledge, Warrant, and Justification 
While Evans discusses externalism at various points in Faith Beyond 
Reason, it is in chapter 10 that Evans incorporates externalist epistemology into 
his account of knowing God. What purpose does an external account of 
knowledge serve? Given that Evans is intent upon producing a strongly epistemic 
fideism, what I see Evans doing here is preserving the idea that there can be 
knowledge of God, while also attempting to preserve faith-based beliefs against 
the failed attempts at justification he broadly criticizes.135 How does his 
externalism mesh with his concern for evidential (internal) justification and faith’s 
substitutionally entitling role? 
To begin answering this, we can inquire into the role of justification in 
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Evans’s epistemology. As we saw earlier in the chapter, Evans does maintain a 
deep concern for evidentialist justification of at least some propositions. Why is 
Evans so concerned with internal justification (and thus with providing an account 
of faith to “fill the gap”)? Earlier I suggested two reasons: The first is that Evans is 
committed to epistemic rationality—applying reason in cases where reason is 
qualified for that application (i.e. where reason’s deficiencies do not disqualify it). 
While Evans is an externalist, this notion of epistemic rationality always plays out 
in his works in a primarily internal fashion: We seek justification (or entitlement) in 
order to avoid conflict and eschew contradiction, and rightly so. The epistemic 
import of justification, then, is to meet in whole or in part this requirement.136 The 
second reason that justification is important is that one of our rational goals is to 
maximize our true beliefs while minimizing false ones. Justification is a tool for, if 
nothing else, satisfying our own questions as to whether or not we have done 
this. John Bishop adds what I consider an appropriate religious spin on this when 
talking about religious beliefs: The religious seeker wants to avoid idolatry. That 
is, the religious seeker wants to avoid believing the wrong things about God or 
about ultimate reality, the religious seeker wants to avoid misdirecting her or his 
devotion. As we have seen, Evans suggests that faith may also meet this need. 
The version of externalism Evans finds in Plantinga does not necessarily 
accommodate these needs. Thus it seems that justification, in its internalist 
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sense, retains an important role in describing a common epistemic goal. But 
Evans does not alter his externalist theory of knowledge. What we are left with is 
Evans’s separate accounts of knowledge and of justification/entitlement. 
Knowledge is warranted true belief, where warrant may arise externally. 
Justification is a primarily internal matter of evaluating one’s beliefs, as is 
entitlement. But Evans’s view of justification differs in another way: He is not so 
much interested in being obligated to hold a faith belief, as traditional justification 
models might indicate. He is more interested in whether one is permitted to 
believe. While justification caries with it a sense of epistemic obligation, 
entitlement is about the permissibility of holding a belief. That is, if S is justified in 
believing P, one epistemically ought to believe P; if S is entitled to believe P, then 
it is not the case that S ought to believe not-P. Thus, for Evans, epistemic 
justification that P implies epistemic entitlement to believe P. 
At first blush, it seems that we can then make a clear segmentation between 
justification and entitlement on the one hand, and warrant (and knowledge) on 
the other. However, the separation is not so clean as the picture above may 
indicate, for Evans describes faith as necessary for knowledge. 
Externalism 
In the chapter entitled “A Fideistic Account of Knowing God,” Evans makes 
a curious claim:  
What I wish to argue is that a fideist does not have to deny that there is 
any such thing as a natural knowledge of God. What the fideist must 
deny is that there is any knowledge of God, or at least any worthwhile 
knowledge, that can be had independently of faith. Such a claim is 
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consistent, however, with affirming the possibility of real knowledge that 
is dependent on faith.137 
How can knowledge be dependent upon faith? Evans is an externalist about 
knowledge, characterizing externalism as being free from dependence upon just 
this sort of internal state. The traditional externalist does not require justification, 
or even entitlement as a criterion for knowledge. So how can faith be required for 
knowledge? 
There are a few ways to understand what Evans claims. The first is to 
suggest that Evans has not wholly jettisoned his notion of internal justification, 
even as he espouses a form of externalism. And this is born not so much from 
any attempt to build an integrated internalist/externalist epistemology, but out of a 
terminological misstep. It is a confusion introduced by ambiguous use of the term 
justification to sometimes mean warrant (as we have defined it) and to 
sometimes mean internalist justification.138 This dual usage becomes more 
problematic when combined with Evans’s negligence in distinguishing 
justification from entitlement, which sometimes leads to the posing of faith as a 
replacement for internal justification.139 And what we are left with is the 
unqualified suggestion that faith is required for knowledge regarding religious 
propositions even while it is seemingly not necessary in “garden variety” cases of 
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knowledge. 
If we are to read Evans in this way, then it appears that he makes a critical 
mistake in his characterization of belief. Evans suggests that certain religious 
beliefs, such as the belief that God exists, are properly basic. On Evans’s 
account, such a properly basic belief arises from an external ground, from a 
properly functioning belief forming process. (In this case the sensus divinitatis is 
the likely candidate.)140 But here arises the confusion: Evans suggests that in 
regards to one’s internal relation to certain religious beliefs, one cannot have 
justification, and instead one has faith. Note a crucial detail of this argument: faith 
does not produce the belief. It cannot, by definition, produce the belief, as belief 
is a component of faith. Perhaps it arises with the belief, and is as Evans remarks 
at one point, a gift. Or perhaps taking the belief by faith is the result of rational 
deliberation, as Evans argues in a sustained way.141 But the belief itself is a 
result of the properly functioning process. 
So we have two things. First there is the externalist explanation of a belief B 
arising from a properly functioning belief forming process. Also we have the 
internalist explanation that one is entitled to believe by faith. But Evans’s claim is 
that faith plays a role in knowing. Where does faith come in to the question of 
knowledge? Here I think Evans’s terminological overload causes a problem. He 
mistakenly takes the internalist sense of entitlement to be serving as warrant for 
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the belief. I think this arises from Evans’s argument that faith can replace 
justification, conjoined with Evans’s usage of the term justification to sometimes 
mean internal justification and sometimes mean warrant. But this claim clearly 
cannot hold. Faith does not justify a belief, and faith cannot warrant a belief. This 
is quite simply not the role that faith is deemed to play. 
If this is the confusion that causes Evans to claim that religious knowledge is 
dependent on faith, then it appears that such a claim has been overturned. But 
perhaps there is another way to interpret this difficulty. 
What if what Evans means when he claims that (natural) knowledge of God 
is based on faith is merely that for one to attain knowledge of God, one must first 
hold certain fideistically held beliefs?142 This can roughly be abstracted into 
something like this: S believes B1, S has faith that B1, and S then uses B1 as 
evidence in support of some other belief, B2. Faith, in this account, is then 
necessary in that it is S’s faith that brings B1 as evidence for B2. While Evans is 
an externalist, he does suggest that evidence sometimes plays a role in 
warranting some beliefs.143 In this case, the claim might be better understood as 
S knows B2 because S has faith that B1 and hence can use B1 as evidence for 
B2 (and B1 is sufficient evidence for B2). It seems that such an account does not 
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fall victim to the argument I raised above. However, it has its own problem. 
The problem with this attempted escape is it is based upon a mis-construal 
of how warrant works, for if B1 is a basic belief, faith is altogether superfluous to 
the account. First, by definition, S already believes B1. So we do not need faith 
merely for the belief component. Second, neither obedience nor trust have any 
bearing on B1. Third, at no point has entitlement been a requirement for warrant, 
or for evidence. The opposite seems to be the case for externalism. S can have 
B1 as evidence without B1’s being a faith belief (or without S’s being entitled to 
believe B1).144 In fact, to suggest otherwise defeats externalism’s most 
trumpeted claim: that one can know P without needing to possess some internal 
state linking one’s belief to P. Take, for example, the early version of Plantinga’s 
externalism of which Evans makes use. Basic beliefs (on this account), in virtue 
of their basicality, obviate the need for S to produce support for one’s belief. 
Their support is found in their arising from a properly functioning belief forming 
process. To make Evans’s claim that basic beliefs (specifically, here, basic 
religious beliefs) cannot be justified—and thus faith is required—is to undercut 
the claim that external support is sufficient for warrant. If B1 is a basic belief, then 
B1 is warranted if and only if B1 arose from a properly functioning belief forming 
process. Neither internal justification nor entitlement have any bearing on B1’s 
warrant. Nor do they have any bearing on belief, or the truth of B1. Thus, faith 
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has no bearing on B1’s being known. 
Even granting that B2 is warranted by evidentialist means, and that B1 is 
sufficient undefeated evidence for B2, faith does not play a role in either B1’s 
being evidence or B1’s warranting B2.145 
In the end it does not seem that faith is necessary for knowledge of God, 
even of natural knowledge of God. We have already examined at length why 
entitlement is important for a reflective believer—for one inquiring into their 
beliefs. But to retain an externalist notion of knowledge, it seems best to not 
attempt to add an entitlement requirement. 
The Result 
Evans wants to link faith to knowledge, yet retain an externalism about 
knowledge. As we have seen, this does not work without coining an 
epistemology with the strained requirement that religious knowledge is a special 
case of knowledge, requiring not just warranted true belief, but also an extra 
internalist condition of faith. This clearly is not what Evans intends. I suggest that 
the right response is to eliminate the faith-knowledge connection. 
Thus what we are instead left with is another role for faith: Faith is an 
internalist entitlement condition, an “assurance,” as it were, that one is not 
irrational in holding one’s religious beliefs; that one is epistemically permitted to 
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hold such a belief. One might ask what value entitlement offers. And is this what 
we, as epistemic agents, really ought to seek? Evans says yes, we must, 
because there is no better epistemic route for us to take. We are epistemic 
irrationalists, naive believers, or responsible fideists. We can be nothing more, 
says Evans, because reason is fatally flawed. Thus of the three, Evans has 
argued, fideism is the most preferable.  This raises our last question: Is faith 
really a better candidate than reason? 
Should We Really Side with Faith Over Reason? 
The single most important conclusion Evans claims to have drawn is that 
responsible fideism is the best route to take for epistemic entitlement of faith 
beliefs. I have already raised questions about Evans’s attempts to re-integrate “a 
role for reason” in the form of a theory of defeaters, and also about Evans’s 
attempt to make faith a condition for religious knowledge. But Evans’s critical 
point is his argument that due to reason’s flaws, the move to faith is one’s best 
option for entitling certain religious beliefs. Now I want to address the question of 
whether Evans has given sufficient reason for accepting this conclusion. Should 
we really side with faith over reason? 
Earlier, I devoted a substantial part of this chapter to exploring what Evans 
has to say about reason. I noted that for Evans, reason is an epistemic faculty. 
Evans ties it to evidentialism as a faculty that evaluates evidence and produces 
justification. Most notably, Evans reiterates countless times that reason is flawed 
in such a way as to render it unreliable in certain important domains, most 
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importantly in regard to religious beliefs. 
Evans personifies reason, and to an extent does the same with faith. Like 
dueling homunculi, Evans portrays reason and faith as battling capacities. He 
conjures images of inner turmoil in which a person’s will is caught between 
warring forces within herself or himself. But ought reason and faith be construed 
in such terms? Or in doing so is Evans introducing a false metaphor? I suggest 
that his characterization is inaccurate and leads to a confused conclusion. Once 
we jettison the talk of “faith versus reason” we see the great problem in Evans’s 
outcome: There is no reason to accept that faith is a better candidate than 
reason. A rational agent, even a limited one whose judgment may be clouded by 
sin, is not best served by abandoning reason and espousing a doctrine of 
“believing by faith.” On such grounds, one may embrace all sorts of abhorrent 
beliefs.146 
What does Evans mean when he says “reason attempts to know the 
world”?147 What about suggesting that it “is possible, however, for reason itself to 
recognize its own ‘neediness’, if it is properly ‘educated’ by a transforming 
encounter with God’s revelation.”148 What does it mean to suggest that reason is 
prideful or restless or domineering or confident? What does it mean to say that, 
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“Reason… prides itself on its disinterestedness and objectivity”?149 In these 
passages, showing samples of a literary device used throughout the book, 
reason is personified, treated as if it is in some way capable of making decisions, 
having feelings, and setting agendas independently of the agent. I call it a literary 
device because I do not think that Evans is really suggesting that reason is a 
homunculus-like independent agent operating within the human mind. But I think 
that this literary device introduces a flaw into the argument. 
Evans talks about two deficiencies in reason. The first is its cognitive 
limitations. Reason is incapable of understanding everything, or of grasping 
everything, or of holding large amounts of data simultaneously, or even of 
intuiting the details of all arguments. As contemporary empirical psychology has 
shown with ample evidence, reason is not without its ticks and quirks. That 
reason is limited seems to be a broadly accepted thesis, and the fact that Evans 
personifies reason when talking about it does not seem to adversely impact the 
argument. 
But then Evans talks about reason as being tainted by sin. Reason is 
prideful. Reason is selfish. Reason balks at being placed under the authority of 
God. This characterization is problematic. It indicates that reason has some 
degree of isolation from the human agent. It suggests that reason, not the agent, 
is the culprit. In and of itself this might not present a problem. But Evans chooses 
to frame the argument in terms of reason and faith, where faith takes on an 
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analogous personality. Thus Evans makes statements such as “faith does not 
even want objective certainty; it thrives on uncertainty….”150 
With this personification of two faculties, it is no surprise that there is an 
intra-agent tone to Evans’s positioning of faith and reason. Here is an account of 
faith versus reason, a battle within an agent, with reason pushing one agenda 
and faith pushing another. And while reason comes across as the demon on the 
left shoulder, faith is the angel on the right shoulder, seemingly untainted by 
selfishness, pride, and the other sins and deficiencies. 
With a setup like this, it is easy for Evans to argue that in light of reason’s 
obvious deficiencies, faith is the better candidate. With sinful reason bound to 
lead us astray, faith alone seems capable of leading us into the light. While pride 
prevents reason from correctly assessing, or even locating, evidence in support 
of a religious belief, faith dutifully bridges the gap. But is this not taking the 
metaphor too far? It no longer sounds like a literary device, but an attempt to 
describe mental faculties as actually agent-like, and this is a misstep. 
To make this point, the relationship between an agent, sin, and reason can 
be altered slightly. Instead of ascribing sin to reason, let’s ascribe sin to the 
human agent—S is prideful, S is selfish—and then suggest that S’s sin can have 
a profound impact on S’s rationality. We can enumerate a few ways in which this 
is possible, drawing from our model of rationality offered in the first chapter. 
One’s overall rational goals may change as a result of sin. One might, for 
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example, selfishly favor prudential rationalism over moral and epistemic 
rationalism. Sin may lead one to ignore some evidence, discount legitimate 
defeaters, or simply fail to inquire. Sin may, in fact, lead one to intentionally seek 
disconfirming evidence while avoiding confirming evidence.151 I see no reason to 
personify either reason or faith. 
Sin is tied to the agent rather than to a faculty of reason. Where does this 
leave faith? It leaves faith equally susceptible to sin. One may misplace one’s 
faith—we call this idolatry. One may exercise bad faith.152 One may exercise 
blind faith. One may have faith for selfish reasons, hoping, for example, that faith 
in God results in health, wealth, and power—even at the expense of others. To 
me, this account seems far more plausible than the suggestion that reason alone 
is prone to sinfulness. But to what extent does this conflict with Evans’s 
argument? 
Evans gives no reason to accept that faith is immune to the effects of sin. 
Evans does, though, clearly acknowledge that faith propositions are defeasible. 
As the defeater account suggests, faith could lead one astray. Otherwise there 
would be no reason to attempt to introduce an account of defeaters. But the point 
remains understated. In assessing Evans, I think it must be concluded that faith 
is just as susceptible to cognitive limitations and sin as reason is. It certainly 
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seems broadly consistent with observable fact that at least some people at some 
times have had misplaced or mismotivated faith. But if we accept this, where 
does it leave Evans’s argument? 
If nothing else, this changed approach to reason and faith leads to an 
important question: Under what set of circumstances am I more epistemically 
rational in believing “by faith” instead of seeking justification for my beliefs? Even 
granting all of Evans’s claims about the epistemic shortcomings of human 
beings, we are still left with the very real possibility that those shortcomings will 
have as much impact on faith as they will on epistemic reasoning. To the 
potential fallibility of faith, an additional point must be added: faith itself doesn’t 
seem to come with any overt relationship to truth-indicators. Evidentialism is a 
theory based on the idea that one ought to follow one’s evidence, one ought to 
follow the direction of truth indicators. But faith as Evans has presented it does 
not seem to have this same characteristic. Faith, as Evans has described it, is a 
move without evidence, and sometimes against evidence. Again, attention must 
be drawn to the fact that Evans does not deny the possibility of evidence, or even 
the real existence of evidence. His argument rests on reason’s limitations. But if 
faith suffers those same limitations, yet has a weaker relationship to truth 
indicators, it seems to me that faith is a dubious guide.153 
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If Evans is to maintain his position that reason is the culprit, that reason has 
transgressed to an extent that one must look to faith, then Evans must show that 
faith itself escapes the problems of reason. This he does not do, and I do not see 
any clear route to claiming that while reason suffers from the impact of cognitive 
limitations and sinful proclivities, faith remains unscathed. On the contrary, faith 
without the guidance of truth indicators is doubly dubious, claiming (as Evans 
states) a high degree of certainty, but without any support.154 
 Evans’s central claim in Faith Beyond Reason is that because of reason’s 
faults, we ought to believe by faith. But I suggest that this conclusion is not 
without its faults—faults severe enough that it seems better to accept our 
epistemic limitations, yet forge on ahead in our evidential quest rather than resort 
to Evans’s faith. In the last chapter, I shall return to this point, asking whether 
evidentialism is still the best candidate for meeting rational obligations—
specifically epistemic obligations. 
Conclusion 
To what extent is Evans’s responsible fideism a successful theory? Among 
its stronger traits, and what distinguishes Evans’s fideism from other popular 
forms, is Evans’s use of epistemic externalism. This enables Evans to make 
stronger epistemic claims than most fideists can muster. For example, Evans can 
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claim that one may have religious knowledge. But as we saw, there are several 
problems with Evans’s fideism. His account of defeaters highlights a difficulty of 
fideism in general: faith seems to bring with it a sense of arbitrariness. Free from 
the restraints that rationality imposes, beliefs held by faith seem to be 
unchallengeable. This rightly leads to concerns about bad faith, misplaced faith, 
and idolatry. But as Evans’s theory of defeaters shows, remedying this while still 
maintaining that reason is deeply flawed (to the point of requiring faith) is a 
difficult task. In my estimation, Evans is unsuccessful in his attempts. What this 
discussion brings to the surface is the seemingly unresolvable tension between 
the claim that reason is fatally flawed and the claim that fideism is reasonable. 
A second difficulty for Evans arises from the externalism upon which Evans 
relies. Evans maintains strong contact with internalist notions of justification, and 
suggests that sometimes justification confers warrant. But he makes a further 
move, suggesting that faith is required for knowledge. I have argued that this 
cannot be the case. Faith does not and cannot play a warranting role (doing so 
undermines externalism). Nor can this suggestion be re-cast in terms of faith 
making available evidence otherwise unavailable, for to do so also undermines 
his externalism. 
Finally, I have raised what I think is the most significant difficulty. I have 
argued that when the personification of reason and faith is stripped away, a 
substantial problem becomes visible: is faith more reliable than reason? In 
absence of an argument showing that faith is immune to the effects of sin and 
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cognitive limitations, there is no compelling reason to take faith to be more 
reliable. Even with its flaws, reason is grounded in truth indicators. Faith is not. 
This leads to a conclusion contrary to Evans’s argument: even in matters of 
religious propositions, one is most likely to satisfy one’s epistemic obligations by 
seeking to hold justified beliefs, not by accepting propositions by faith. 
While Evans’s argument may not be compelling, in the final analysis, it is 
nonetheless interesting in part because it is epistemological through and through. 
Evans constrains his discussion of rationality to just epistemic rationality, and he 
proposes a solution that, as he presents it, is epistemically oriented. Faith plays 
an epistemic role. Faith, he claims, is an adequate guide to truth. His introduction 
of epistemic externalism aids this argument, as it allows Evans to maintain focus 
on questions about justification, warrant, and knowledge. Yet the difficulties in 
Evans’s theory are suggestive for any epistemically oriented fideism: an attempt 
to substitute (to any degree) a notion of justification with a notion of evidence-
less faith must somehow produce a theory of belief-holding that does not admit of 
arbitrariness. I have argued that ultimately Evans’s argument does not succeed 
in overcoming the difficulties inherent in any fideist theory. 
Two major questions are left open at this point. The first is whether or not 
Evans’s critique of evidentialism, and his suggestion that evidence is incapable of 
supporting certain religious beliefs, is conclusive. In the forth chapter, in which 
evidentialism is contrasted with fideism, I will return to this argument. Secondly, 
there is a larger threat to the sort of fideism that Evans suggests than any I have 
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offered thus far. And this is skepticism. A mark of a good epistemic theory is its 
resilience to skepticism. As we shall see when I return to the point in chapter 4, 
responsible fideism does not address the skeptical challenge. 
In the next chapter we will turn to John Bishop’s articulation of fideism. 
While Evans has chosen to focus on the agent as he develops his account, 
Bishop focuses on the evidence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FAITH AS VENTURE 
Introduction 
Is there conclusive evidence for the existence of God? In the previous 
chapter we saw how Evans suggests that this is the wrong question to ask. He 
suggests that epistemic reason itself is too flawed to reliably approach such a 
question. As we saw, this led Evans to offer a theory of fideism. In this theory, in 
cases where justification is unavailable, one may hold a belief “by faith.” 
John Bishop’s answer to the question of evidence is different, and it leads 
him to formulate a different kind of fideism.  In his book Believing by Faith, 
Bishop suggests that the evidence for many religious propositions—with the 
question of God’s existence being one such example—is ambiguous.1 This, 
suggests Bishop, accounts for the impasse between various philosophers of 
religion. Such evidential ambiguity poses a serious problem for epistemologists 
who urge that one must “follow the evidence.” Bishop offers a response to this 
ambiguity thesis, and this response is a new variety of fideism that he calls 
supra-evidential fideism. Inspired by William James, Bishop suggests a model of 
faith as a venture, and he suggests that in some cases, undertaking a faith 
venture is preferable to accepting the hard-line evidentialist’s conclusion that 
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evidential ambiguity ought to be met with suspension of judgment. 
Epistemically speaking, Bishop’s theory is a refinement of evidentialism, but 
Bishop’s fideism is not just epistemological. In the previous chapter, we 
examined C. Stephan Evans’s responsible fideism, which I characterized there 
as epistemically oriented fideism because of its nearly exclusive focus on 
epistemology, epistemic justification, and epistemic rationality. But Bishop’s 
fideism is oriented differently: Instead of approaching the question in a strictly 
epistemic fashion, Bishop inquires whether moral rationality might, in certain 
cases, trump epistemic rationality even in an area more frequently approached 
epistemically. In certain circumstances, suggests Bishop, one ought to take what 
he calls a doxastic venture, accepting an epistemically unjustified proposition on 
moral grounds, and thereafter giving it full weight in epistemic contexts. Bishop 
calls this a form of fideism. 
Bishop’s supra-evidential fideism is the subject of this chapter. I explain 
several key components of Bishop’s theory, and then elaborate the core behind 
his supra-evidential fideism. Bishop’s account has its difficulties. In the course of 
the chapter, I point out those that I find threaten the success of his theory of 
fideism. In the end, I ask whether Bishop’s theory is ultimately the most 
compelling for the religious seeker. 
This is how we shall proceed. The first section of this chapter covers 
Bishop’s evidential ambiguity thesis, which states that the total available 
evidence for (or against) religious beliefs is ambiguous. This is a crucial part of 
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Bishop’s argument, for if it is true, certain avenues of justification are closed to 
the religious seeker. Bishop argues that the evidential ambiguity thesis does not 
necessarily lead to Reformed epistemology (as some epistemologists have 
suggested), but to fideism. And his own variety of fideism is largely a response to 
the ambiguity thesis. In this first section, I explain the thesis along with the 
implications Bishop identifies. 
Second, I discuss Bishop’s emphasis on moral rationality, how it is 
positioned in regard to epistemic rationality, and what this relationship says about 
solving rational conflict. Bishop’s rationality can be compared with the model of 
rationality offered in the first chapter, and in so doing we gain a level of clarity in 
assessing Bishop’s central claim. This claim is that when it comes to religious 
beliefs that are evidentially ambiguous, one may rightly solve a rational conflict 
by setting moral rational preferences above epistemic rational preferences. This 
is a critical step in Bishop’s development of a theory of fideism. 
The third section introduces Bishop’s venture model of fideism. Bishop’s 
fideism is oriented around a notion of faith-as-venture. In important cases, where 
morality dictates and epistemic rationality does not contradict, it may be 
appropriate to act as if a belief is true, even while acknowledging that one is not 
justified in holding this belief. While this approach may stand in conflict with 
traditional “hard line” evidentialism, Bishop suggests that the approach best 
meets one’s rational obligations, and is thus the preferable model. Bishop offers 
what he calls thesis (J+), which provides conditions under which a faith venture is 
161 
 
morally acceptable, and under which one may rightly hold certain faith 
propositions with full epistemic weight. 
As I move through these sections, I point out a few issues with Bishop’s 
account. At the conclusion of this chapter, I ask whether these issues, when 
taken in concert, recommend Bishop’s fideism. Bishop offers a compelling theory 
for dealing with cases of evidential ambiguity. But in the end, I argue that his 
notion of evidential ambiguity is flawed. Furthermore, his model of rationality 
raises questions as to whether his argument is quite as conclusive as it may at 
first appear. I question whether Bishop’s model best addresses the epistemic and 
rational (ATC) goals of an agent. Finally, I suggest that there are a few problems 
with his (J+) thesis that, when conjoined with the previous issues, indicate that 
fideism is not the best stance to take when one finds oneself in the evidential 
situation described by Bishop. 
Clarifications 
At the outset of Believing by Faith, Bishop develops several key terms along 
similar lines to how I developed them in chapter 1. In this first section, I gloss 
some of this terminology, pointing out any important differences, and also 
drawing attention to those facets that play a major role in Bishop’s version of 
fideism. 
First, Bishop defines belief as holding a proposition true, while he also 
identifies a second state of taking a proposition to be true.2 Holding a proposition 
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to be true requires both assent to the proposition and an enduring disposition 
toward that belief. Thus, in the case of propositional beliefs (which are the 
primary sort of beliefs we are here interested in), to hold P is to assent to P and 
to have a disposition toward P. Thus Bishop’s notion of holding P is not dissimilar 
from the notion of believing P I introduced in the first chapter. Bishop makes the 
further observation that one who believes P is also generally inclined to act as if 
P. In practical reasoning, one performs a mental act (consciously or perhaps 
unconsciously) in favor of P.3 This act is what Bishop calls taking a proposition to 
be true.  An individual, points out Bishop, can take P to be true without really 
believing P. In the language we have already employed in chapter 1, one can 
assent to P and act accordingly, but not develop any long term disposition toward 
P. Bishop’s division into holding and taking is most pronounced when it comes to 
action. It is one’s taking a proposition to be true (an event, says Bishop, that 
occurs in reasoning) that leads one to act as if P. There are some minor ways in 
which Bishop’s definition of taking-to-be-true differs from assent as explained in 
chapter 1. Perhaps one noteworthy difference is that Bishop does not explicitly 
require that one sincerely take P to be true, while our characterization requires 
sincerity for assent.4 Yet as this plays out in Bishop’s discussion, the differences 
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between assent and taking-to-be-true are minor enough that I treat taking-to-be-
true as assent.5 
Second, a certain amount of doxastic voluntarism is required by Bishop’s 
theory. Bishop offers an account of doxastic voluntarism in which he identifies 
what he calls the two loci of doxastic control.6 He suggests there are both direct 
and indirect ways in which we can exercise doxastic control, though direct 
doxastic control is restricted in certain ways. In the first chapter I also dealt with 
doxastic voluntarism, suggesting a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism. My 
claim there was that there are clearly areas where assent is under doxastic 
control. While Bishop’s account differs from mine on minor details (and may be 
more restrictive), the differences do not impact the present discussion. The most 
salient aspect of Bishop’s account of doxastic voluntarism is found in his notion 
of the second locus of doxastic control. Bishop claims that when one is taking 
action, one has doxastic control over whether or not one assents to certain 
propositions7. The sketch of doxastic voluntarism I offered in chapter 1 also 
allows for doxastic control at this level.8 
Finally, throughout this work I have used the terms religious seekers or faith 
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 Ibid., 28-41. 
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 In other words, Bishop suggests that even if one has a disposition toward P, one may still 
choose at time t to refuse to assent to P. 
8
 Bishop notes that doxastic control does not entail conscious or deliberate assent (Ibid., 37). 
This, too, is compatible with the account I have offered. 
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seekers as a label for those who are in some way engaged in reflective 
examination of religious beliefs. Bishop uses the term reflective believers to 
identify that same group. Bishop is quick to point out that a reflective believer 
may not necessarily be a believer in a particular faith, and I should also qualify 
my own usage to indicate that it is not the case that a seeker is one without 
religious beliefs.9 A lifelong believer may, in virtue of her or his reflectiveness 
about those beliefs, be a religious seeker, just as an atheist reflectively 
examining the claims of Christianity may be rightly called a reflective believer. In 
short, both terms describe agents reflectively seeking to hold only rational 
religious beliefs (where religious beliefs may include atheism). 
One more refinement is in order, and this is in regards to Bishop’s notion of 
entitlement. 
Entitlement Refined 
In the previous two chapters, I have used Bishop’s notion of epistemic 
entitlement as a point of contrast with the stronger notion of epistemic obligation. 
Epistemic entitlement is a permissibility thesis suggesting that it is not the case 
that S should not hold/take P. Bishop’s use of the term entitlement in his book 
Believing by Faith has a few additional nuances beyond the characterization he 
offers in the Faith article used in the first chapter. 
Bishop recognizes a distinction between different types of rationality—moral, 
epistemic, and otherwise. Entitlement, like justification, plays out differently in 
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each rational context. In a general sense, entitlement plays a normative role in 
one’s reasoning. Following Plantinga’s distinction between de jure and de facto 
objections to faith, Bishop suggests that entitlement is the indicator that one is 
within one’s rights (de jure) in holding a belief.10 Thus, moral entitlement is about 
whether one is within one’s moral rights to believe. “[T]he de jure question about 
Christian belief is ultimately just the question of moral entitlement to take 
Christian beliefs to be true….”11 One is morally entitled to hold P if holding P 
does not cause S to commit a moral transgression.  
Bishop offers a more thorough characterization of epistemic entitlement in 
this book. And here the notion is more refined than the generic sense of 
entitlement that appears in his “Faith” article.12 As Bishop characterizes epistemic 
entitlement here, S is epistemically entitled to hold belief B only if S’s belief is 
“made through the right exercise of their epistemic capacities.”13  Bishop expands 
this characterization to impose three requirements on the believer: 
[T]he right exercise of those capacities comes to this: reflective believers will 
need to have paid proper attention to the question of the truth of their faith-
propositions, to have judged that issue properly (in accordance with the 
correct application of the objective norms applicable to such judgments), 
and to have taken proper account of that judgment in deciding to commit 
themselves practically to the truth of their faith-propositions.14 
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What Bishop has provided here are a list of criteria that must be met before S is 
epistemically entitled to hold P.15 One must properly reflect on the epistemic 
status of one’s faith beliefs, one must judge the issue properly, and one’s 
practical commitments must “take proper account” of that judgment. How should 
we understand the second requirement—judging the issue properly? Bishop first 
explores the notion that epistemic entitlement requires epistemic justification in 
the form of adequate evidential support (a suggestion he rejects later).16 He calls 
this first possibility hard-line evidentialism.17 
This hard-line evidentialism has an interesting consequence: because 
entitlement requires justification, when the evidence is ambiguous one ought to 
suspend one’s belief about P—one is not entitled to believe P.18 Prima facie, 
Bishop thinks this requirement seems overly stringent, for it suggests that one is 
not epistemically entitled to hold any unjustified beliefs even if holding such 
beliefs does not conflict with available evidence.19 This is particularly problematic 
for Bishop, for he wants to claim that entitlement allows for making what he calls 
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a doxastic venture—taking a belief to be true (in practical reasoning at least) 
when the evidence is not (yet) conclusive.20 Faith-ventures are doxastic ventures 
regarding religious belief. Such ventures become the basis for Bishop’s fideism. 
Consequently, a notion of entitlement that requires justification becomes an 
apparent road-block to Bishop’s supra-evidential fideism, denying as it does that 
one can be entitled to hold any unjustified belief.21 
Against this strong, hard-line sense of entitlement, Bishop proposes a 
weaker requirement that one needn’t be justified in holding a belief, but only 
permitted to hold such a belief. “[E]pistemic entitlement in making such faith-
commitments requires that their truth not be evidentially excluded under the 
applicable evidential practice.”22 That is, provided that the available evidence 
does not foreclose P, one is entitled to hold P. This version shifts from epistemic 
obligation to epistemic permissibility—from requiring justification to merely 
requiring that one not be required not to believe. Distinguishing between 
entitlement and justification on this ground opens up “the possibility that taking a 
proposition to be true in reasoning may carry epistemic entitlement even though 
the person concerned is in no position to certify the epistemic worth of his or her 
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“realist integrationist doxastic values” (explained on 155-162). Evans sees the tempering of the 
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holding that proposition to be true.”23 This last bit about an individual’s ability to 
certify the epistemic worth of holding a proposition is of crucial importance. 
Warrant, or any externalist construal of “justification”, does not give an agent any 
sense of assurance that she or he meets the three requirements for entitlement 
that Bishop enumerates in the quote above.24 Entitlement requires that the agent 
has mentally judged the belief, has found the belief not at odds with the 
evidence, and has also assented to this belief.25 Using epistemic entitlement in 
this specific way, Bishop suggests that even if externalist epistemologies provide 
the best (or even a plausible) theory of knowledge, there remains an evidentialist 
requirement that plays an important role for a reflective inquirer (and this is not 
limited to strictly religious inquiries). 
At this point, we have revisited a few terms introduced earlier in this 
dissertation, but have clarified them in the context of Bishop’s present argument. 
The notion of entitlement, as revised here, provides the foundation for Bishop’s 
subsequent argument that it is sometimes permissible to make doxastic 
ventures. What makes doxastic venture (and entitlement) such a crucial part of 
Bishop’s argument? The answer for this lies in Bishop’s thesis of evidential 
ambiguity. 
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The Evidential Ambiguity Thesis 
Religious belief has enjoyed widespread philosophical analysis since the 
birth of philosophy. Arguments for God’s existence—the usual suspects, 
teleological, ontological, cosmological, and so on—prove a perennial interest for 
philosophers of religion. But in the thousands of years during which they have 
been debated, no single argument has been either conclusively demonstrated or 
conclusively shown to be false. Or consider claims about divine hiddenness—the 
idea (roughly) that if there is a God, evidence is not readily available. Atheists 
and agnostics claim that divine hiddenness supports their position while theists 
suggest that hiddenness is compatible with God’s character, and is perhaps even 
a necessary aspect of it.26 A litany of epistemological questions arises as well. Is 
there evidence for the existence of God? Is it sufficient (or conclusive) evidence? 
Is it publicly available evidence? Should we expect it to be public evidence?27 
While such questions have enjoyed broad debate, no answer has enjoyed broad 
agreement. It is thus no wonder that some philosophers have thrown in the 
proverbial towel and proclaimed that the search for evidence is a doomed 
endeavor. When considering this debate, Bishop remarks on the evidential 
problem, and then gives it a name. 
Although this debate has often been assumed to be at the heart of 
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 The proposition “God exists” is of course only one of a multitude of religious propositions that 
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Philosophy of Religion, there is also a long-standing view that it is a debate 
which neither side can win. This view may be expressed as a thesis of 
evidential ambiguity which accepts that the question of God’s existence is 
left open—perhaps necessarily—because our overall evidence is equally 
viably interpreted either from a theistic or an atheistic perspective.28 
Bishop suggests that it is now an attractive option to accept that the total 
available evidence for God’s existence does not clearly indicate whether God 
does in fact exist: “the evidence is ‘open’ in the sense that it neither shows the 
truth of the claim that God exists nor the truth of its denial to be significantly more 
probably than not.”29 Bishop suggests that calling this conundrum an ambiguity 
most aptly describes how competing perspectives have interpreted the evidence 
differently. This is attested, at least to some degree, by the fact that after 
centuries of debate no single conclusion has been reached. “I myself incline to 
the view that the arguments of both natural theology and natural atheology 
typically exhibit epistemic circularity by resting on hidden presuppositions 
acceptable only to those already convinced of their conclusions—and, if that is 
correct, the case for the evidential ambiguity of theism is strengthened.”30 
Evidential ambiguity is not merely inconclusiveness of evidence. Evidence may 
be inconclusive, but still have directionality—that is, one might not have 
conclusive evidence for the existence of Higgs Bosons, yet of the evidence that 
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one has, it may point toward the existence of these particles.31 In contrast, for a 
body of evidence related to P to be ambiguous, that same body must be 
interpretable as supporting P, supporting not-P, and possibly even supporting the 
claim that one should withhold judgment regarding P. Ambiguity is a far more 
troubling situation than inconclusiveness. 
As strong as Bishop believes the argument for evidential ambiguity is, he 
does not claim to have conclusively shown it to be the case. Instead, he claims 
only that it is “plausible enough” for it to be taken seriously when examining faith 
commitment.32 The reflective believer, suggests Bishop, will recognize that the 
longstanding debates over natural theology may best be explained by the 
evidential ambiguity thesis. 
Does the Evidential Ambiguity Thesis Hold? 
The idea of the evidential ambiguity of theism is crucial for Bishop’s 
argument, and his argument in support of it is compelling. But there is one 
difficulty that Bishop mentions, yet does not develop. The evidential ambiguity of 
theism is based on the total available evidence. How do we characterize this 
notion of total available evidence? 
As Bishop initially sketches his account of total available evidence, he 
introduces it as pertinent to what he thinks are widely held epistemic practices 
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regarding religious propositions: “judgments of evidential support for theistic 
beliefs are to be made taking into account all the evidence that ‘we’ have 
available that could conceivably be relevant to their truth….”33 Bishop is careful to 
clarify here that this includes not only public evidence, but evidence “private to 
them or to some local community to which they belong.”34 He is equally careful to 
note that one cannot limit evidence to only private evidence; to remain 
intellectually honest, one is epistemically (and perhaps morally) obligated to 
include all available evidence.35 
But a complication arises. Bishop suggests that total available evidence is 
all the evidence ‘we’ have. Who is ‘we’? Bishop claims it is “no less than the 
entire human race over its full history to date.”36 Bishop tempers this grandiose 
claim by noting that any individual human agent is also fallibilist and limited when 
making judgments. But when attempting to build a coherent picture of total 
available evidence from these glimpses, certain difficulties threaten the 
coherence of a notion of total available evidence that at once admits public and 
private evidence, but also encapsulates the evidence of the “entire human race 
over its full history to date.” Here are four ways one may try to construct a theory 
of total available evidence. 
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First, we may say that total available evidence is all publicly available 
evidence, excluding private evidence by fiat. For the moment we will ignore 
Bishop’s inclusion of private evidence, for by doing so, we can ask whether 
evidential ambiguity can be rendered consistent. As he considers evidential 
ambiguity, he limits his examination to natural theology and public evidence.37 
Therefore this characterization is intended to capture all of the evidence 
traditionally relied upon by natural theology.  The intent of labeling evidence 
public is to suggest that this evidence has an air of neutrality, approachable 
“objectively” by believers and unbelievers alike.38 By so categorizing it, we can 
see already why the evidential ambiguity thesis is a plausible outcome. For 
centuries, the same evidence has been at the center of debate. Thus, it is no 
surprise that the condition Bishop wishes to avoid—that of ceaseless back-and-
forth arguing between theists and non-theists—is in fact the most likely state of 
debate around public evidence. This is the first way we may understand total 
available evidence, and with this understanding, Bishop’s thesis of evidential 
ambiguity does make sense. 
The problem with this account arises when examined in the context of using 
evidence. Bishop’s reflective believer is one who evaluates her or his evidence, 
and makes a conscious decision thereupon. As Bishop explains this, such an 
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agent possibly has access to private evidence, not merely public evidence. And 
Bishop does claim that it is imperative (epistemically and morally) that evidence 
should not be ignored when available. While Bishop himself seems to limit his 
examinations to the arguments of natural theology, based as they are on public 
evidence, it seems clear that he does not intend to disqualify the individual’s 
private evidence from the total available evidence. If, as Bishop suggests, one 
has an epistemic (and perhaps moral) obligation to include all evidence—public 
and private—to which one has access, the notion of total available evidence as 
described here does not adequately capture all of the evidence to which an 
individual may have access. To try to expand this notion of total available 
evidence to include private evidence leads us to the next few characterizations. 
The second way to characterize total available evidence is as the totality of 
all evidence, both public and private, of all agents at all times. From the natural 
causal order of the world to St. Augustine’s vision in the garden, from cosmology 
to answered (and unanswered) prayers, all actual evidence falls within the scope 
of total available evidence. Is this what Bishop is suggesting? Such a construal of 
total available evidence may superficially sound compelling to the proponent of 
evidential ambiguity. If we look at it all and still find it ambiguous, then it truly is 
ambiguous. But, of course, the problem is simply that no human agent has 
access to the totality of evidence.  Private evidence, by definition, is inaccessible 
to all but those who experience it, and even public evidence is not therefore 
globally available to all reasoners. 
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It is important to note, in passing, that there is nothing necessarily mystical 
about private evidence.39 Phenomenological evidence (beliefs whose non-
propositional content is phenomenological) is private, and yet clearly admissible 
as evidence. The fact that it is private divests the evidence neither of its 
evidential import nor of its epistemic relevancy. Be that as it may, it remains 
private, and thus inaccessible to some people at some times. 
With such a broad view of total available evidence as suggested here, to 
include all real private evidence is to eliminate the possibility that any one human 
agent could assess the evidence. And Bishop does not intend to build a theory of 
fideism based on a notion of the ideal reasoner. Evidential ambiguity is 
something Bishop believes many and perhaps all reflective believers encounter 
as a result of their own fallible, finite adventures in epistemology. In absence of a 
“view from nowhere,” a notion of total available evidence that includes evidence 
beyond the evidential purview of an individual renders the notion impractical. One 
cannot meaningfully draw conclusions from inaccessible evidence. Thus this 
characterization of total available evidence fails to fit Bishop’s theory. 
The third way to characterize total available evidence is as the total 
evidence available to a particular subject S at a particular time t. Such a 
characterization would include both public and private evidence, but only the 
evidence to which S has access. This is the notion of total evidence often 
operating in internalist accounts of justification. But were Bishop to accept it, the 
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consequences would not be so good for his theory of fideism. Evidential 
ambiguity, on this understanding of total available evidence, is no longer the 
global problem it is purported to be. Theists don’t appear to feel it—reflective 
believers claim to have evidence in favor of their religious propositions. Atheists 
don’t appear to feel it, either—they claim to have evidence against those same 
religious propositions. Might it be the case that at least some of these are 
justified in their beliefs by the body of evidence available to them (including their 
private evidence)? Perhaps only some percentage of religious seekers suffer the 
tyranny of evidential ambiguity, and perhaps this is a consequence of the fact 
that such seeker’s available evidence is ambiguous or incomplete. While 
accepting this conclusion does not defeat Bishop’s fideism, it weakens the 
central claim that evidential ambiguity is the right, and perhaps the necessary, 
conclusion to draw in regard to evidence for religious propositions. 
The fourth and final way to characterize total available evidence may also 
be the most difficult reading of Bishop. Bishop displays deep concern for 
recognizing and respecting the religious beliefs of others—a stance laudable in 
itself.40 What if we suppose that this concern may be the undercurrent pushing a 
theory of evidence in which the evidence that counts in favor of P is that 
evidence which is not currently disputed by the community surrounding the 
examiner. Evidence admitted in support of P is not all available evidence, but all 
of the evidence that does not raise the hackles of one’s peers in the epistemic 
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community. Thus relevant evidence—whether public or private—is nothing but 
community-accepted evidence. In an epistemic community divided over an issue, 
the evidence base agreed upon by the community is far more likely to result in 
the sort of ambiguity Bishop describes. In a hotly disputed area, such as religious 
beliefs, ambiguity of religious evidence is an unsurprising conclusion. Evidential 
ambiguity may even be, as Bishop suggests, unavoidable in such circumstances. 
The major problem for such a social epistemology has to do with the 
vagueness of the epistemic community: which epistemic community or 
communities determine which evidence is included in total available evidence? 
Are we to infer that a community of stout theists would come to the same 
conclusion about evidential ambiguity that a community of atheists would? Or are 
we to assume that “the relevant community” includes both of those communities? 
Is there a specific community that appropriately decides about evidence, or is 
Bishop suggesting that all communities would (necessarily?) arrive at the same 
conclusion? Or are we once again back at a “view from nowhere” in which “the 
community” is that grand community of all religious seekers, past and present? 
Without an answer to these questions, the claim of ambiguity of religious 
evidence seems itself terminally ambiguous. 
Of the four ways of characterizing Bishop’s notion of total available 
evidence, none looks to be an unproblematic fit. All four theories fall short of 
supporting Bishop’s claim that the evidence for these important religious 
propositions is in fact ambiguous in a pervasive sort of way for every human 
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agent. At best, we must settle for a weakened notion of evidential ambiguity. 
What is the consequence of this evaluation? We have seen that evidence 
may be ambiguous to some people at some times, and perhaps taking the “view 
from nowhere” may in fact be ambiguous, but it no longer seems to be the case 
that evidential ambiguity is a pervasive or systemic problem for all reflective 
believers. It seems that many believers may in fact have evidence for their 
religious beliefs, and unproblematically so. At least some religious disagreement, 
then, may not be so much a result of evidential ambiguity, but rather of the fact 
that different people possess different evidence at different times. 
Epistemic and Moral Rationality 
The evidential ambiguity thesis, if taken in its strongest form, leads the so-
called hard-line evidentialist to the epistemic conclusion that one ought to 
suspend judgment on each of those beliefs that fall under the canopy of 
evidential ambiguity. Thus, if many of the crucial tenets of religious faith, such as 
belief that God exists, are evidentially ambiguous, hard-line evidentialism claims 
that one ought not hold such tenets. On Bishop’s characterization, the hard-line 
evidentialist will then draw the conclusion that rationally, one ought to suspend 
judgment.41 
But Bishop suggests that here the hard-line evidentialist may be incorrectly 
privileging epistemic rationality. Might one have moral grounds for accepting 
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such beliefs even if the evidence is ambiguous? Bishop thinks so. In this section I 
focus on Bishop’s model of rationality. Bishop explains, in his account of fideism, 
under what circumstances one may choose to make what he calls a faith venture 
on moral grounds, even when epistemic rationality is stymied by evidential 
ambiguity.42 
There are two aspects of Bishop’s model of rationality that I will examine 
below. The first is Bishop’s claims about how moral rationality sometimes must 
be privileged over epistemic rationality (a much stronger claim than what I 
sketched in the model of rationality offered in the first chapter). This is grounded 
in Bishop’s underlying claim that epistemic obligations are in many or all cases 
reducible to moral obligations. The second is Bishop’s so-called moral-epistemic 
link principle. This principle suggests that one can believe P morally only when 
one is epistemically entitled to believe P.43 
Privileging Moral Obligation 
In the first chapter I sketched a general account of rationality. Bishop’s 
fideism is founded not just on epistemic rationality, or even on moral rationality, 
but on a general account of rationality that takes into considerations both moral 
and epistemic rationality.44 On the one hand, Bishop is deeply concerned with 
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moral obligation. Yet to be morally rational in holding (or taking) P, one must be 
morally justified. As we shall see shortly, Bishop regards moral justification as, at 
least in many cases, requiring epistemic justification.45 Later I will contrast this 
with the model of rationality explored in the first chapter, but for the present the 
focus is on understanding Bishop’s model and how it pertains to his argument for 
fideism. 
Bishop introduces the relation between moral and epistemic rationality not 
by sketching a general account of rationality, but by suggesting that epistemic 
rationality has a goal: “Why… should we care in general about the epistemic 
justifiability of our beliefs? Because, the standard answer maintains, our beliefs 
influence how we act.”46 Bishop does not give what I would consider to be the 
standard answer: because we want to maximize our true beliefs and minimize 
our false ones. Instead, he gives an ethically oriented response: because our 
beliefs influence our actions. This leads Bishop to make the following claim: 
“While agreeing that practical, moral, and epistemic evaluation are indeed not to 
be confused, I nevertheless wish to argue that—at least when it comes to faith-
beliefs—it is reasonable to hold that our doxastic responsibilities are ultimately 
moral responsibilities.”47 An ethics of belief, then, is a morally charged ethics of 
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belief. Bishop claims that because our epistemic goal is to act “rightly,” our 
epistemic obligations are subsumed under moral obligations. 
The goal of Bishop’s discussion of rationality is to establish a connection 
between epistemic concerns and moral concerns, a crucial step in his 
development of an account of fideism. Bishop here refuses a role for an ethics of 
belief that has to do with purely epistemic goals. Instead of acknowledging 
epistemic goals as legitimate goals in themselves, Bishop claims that epistemic 
aims are ultimately moral aims—that one wants true beliefs only because they 
aid one in action, and if they are related to action, then they are within the 
domain of morality.48 Thus, when Bishop talks of an ethics of belief, he has in 
mind a moral evaluation of the consequences of holding a belief. Bishop gives as 
an example the case of the Inquisitor who believes that by burning the heretic at 
the stake, he is saving the heretic’s soul from eternal fiery torment. The 
Inquisitor, we are to infer, has what he deems adequate evidence that burning a 
heretic saves the heretic’s soul. Yet, is not the Inquisitor’s assenting to this belief 
a morally wrong action? “[I]t seems clear that the Inquisitor’s taking it to be true in 
his practical reasoning that heretics will burn everlastingly if they are not burnt 
briefly here must itself be a morally wrong action.”49 Perhaps Bishop is right that 
one may be morally culpable for holding such a belief. But as I have argued, 
asking whether the Inquisitor ought to hold this belief is an ambiguous question. 
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Is this a moral ought? Or is it epistemic? Or perhaps something else altogether? 
If, as Bishop suggests, an epistemic goal is really bound to moral 
considerations, then an epistemic “ought” is reducible to a moral “ought.” There 
is, on this account, no way that an epistemic obligation can arise that is contrary 
to a moral obligation simply because epistemic obligations are rooted in moral 
rationality. We are morally obligated to hold beliefs conducive to morality, and our 
epistemic goal is to hold beliefs that conduce to moral rationality.50 Can an 
epistemic ought be separated from moral considerations? Bishop does not think 
so. “One could, perhaps, reply that this ‘ought’ is an epistemic ‘ought’. But that 
reply is, in effect, a way of refusing the question—or it is tantamount to answering 
it with the implausible essentialist claim that it is just in our nature as believers 
that we accept these epistemic duties.”51 Bishop finds it untenable to claim that 
an epistemic ought is something other than a moral ought. An epistemic ought is 
a practical ought, because it is focused on action, and a practical ought is a 
moral ought because the practical goal is to act in a morally right way. 
In the model of rationality I offered in the first chapter, I suggested that 
rational obligations are directed by rational goals. Moral goals are one kind of 
rational goal. Prudential goals are another, and the epistemic goal of maximizing 
truth and avoiding falsehood is yet another. Here, the “ought” of rational 
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obligation captures the stipulation to reason in a certain way in order to achieve a 
goal. Thus, to satisfy an epistemic goal, one’s epistemically rational obligation is 
to hold epistemically justified beliefs. Similarly, to satisfy one’s morally rational 
obligations, one ought to hold beliefs that are morally advantageous. It is, for 
example, morally advantageous to hold beliefs that lead one to act morally. As 
the Inquisitor example amply illustrates, assuming the Inquisitor is justified in his 
belief, the Inquisitor may find his moral obligations in conflict with his rational 
obligations. What Bishop is suggesting, though, is that the Inquisitor transgresses 
both epistemic and moral obligations in holding his belief that burning a heretic 
saves the heretic’s soul from eternal damnation.52 
Does Bishop’s folding of epistemic obligations into moral obligations then 
lead to the undesirable conclusion that one cannot be epistemically rational in 
holding beliefs that conflict with moral rationality? It would seem that this is so, 
and with an odd consequence: it turns the immoral (or amoral) genius into an 
epistemic lunatic. To illustrate, consider the case of two individuals intent on 
acquiring a great deal of justified beliefs about weapons of mass destruction. The 
first individual (Agent A) acquires such beliefs in order to be able to dismantle 
such weapons should she ever find them, while the second person (Agent B) 
intends to build and use such weapons against an unsuspecting general 
populace. Both have the epistemic goal of acquiring true beliefs about said 
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weapons, while also minimizing false beliefs about them. Let’s say that the two 
acquire an identical set of beliefs about these weapons, and hold them based on 
identical evidence bases. By my lights, it is undesirable to say that Agent A is 
epistemically rational in her beliefs, while Agent B is not epistemically rational. If 
Agent A has satisfied the epistemic requirements for belief, surely so has Agent 
B. Likewise, it seems that if we claim that Agent A’s epistemic goal is best served 
by pursuing evidence (Agent A epistemically ought to…), we seem bound to 
extend the same epistemic obligation to Agent B. The question of moral 
rationality is separate. Agent B may be morally irrational in her beliefs about the 
destruction of human life and motives for acquiring knowledge, but this does not 
translate to the claim that one’s epistemic “ethics of belief” have been violated as 
well.53 It should be clear though that this is not to suggest that one is immune to 
moral considerations when engaged in epistemic evaluation. 
In summary, there are two problems in Bishop’s ethics of belief. The first is 
that it does not follow that just because holding or taking P is open to moral 
evaluation, one’s epistemic obligation in regard to P is in any way contingent 
upon one’s moral obligation in regard to P. Secondly, there appears to be a 
confusion about epistemic goals. Epistemic goals may indeed be distinct from 
moral goals. Even granting for a moment that one’s epistemic goals are action-
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oriented (which does not seem to me to be completely correct), it still does not 
follow that one’s epistemic goals are ipso facto moral goals. One may act 
according to the truth of a proposition, but act immorally. We may be able to call 
such an individual immoral, but can we call such a person (all things considered) 
irrational? 
In the end, I think Bishop’s desire to privilege moral rationality is laudable, 
but not sufficiently defended. Furthermore, I think a simpler claim can be made. 
Bishop may well proceed under the assumption that the genuine religious seeker 
is nobly motivated by moral goals. In this case we can continue to understand 
Bishop’s argument with the preface: Assume one privileges moral obligation over 
epistemic obligation [when it comes to religious beliefs]. I think this provision best 
represents what Bishop means when he says “reflective believers’ concern for 
the justifiability of their faith-beliefs should be regarded primarily as a concern 
about whether it is morally justified to take faith-beliefs to be true in one’s 
practical reasoning.”54 Epistemic obligation cannot be as conveniently collapsed 
into moral obligation as Bishop suggests. While this weakens Bishop’s argument, 
it does not defeat it. Bishop is targeting the same audience: “This inquiry into the 
justifiability of faith-beliefs takes it[s] origin, then, in the situation of reflective faith-
believers (or would-be faith-believers) who are interested in the question whether 
they are morally justified in taking, or continuing to take, the relevant faith-beliefs 
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to be true in their practical reasoning.”55 The religious seeker is, on this account, 
one who has a rational preference for morally rational religious beliefs. 
Bishop has more to say on the relationship between moral rationality and 
epistemic rationality. As we shall see, he suggests that in some ways moral 
justification is contingent upon epistemic justification. This he calls the moral-
epistemic link principle. 
The Moral-Epistemic Link Principle 
Already we have looked at how Bishop ties moral and epistemic obligation. 
Bishop raises another case where epistemic and moral rationality are intertwined: 
justification. He calls this second area the moral-epistemic link, and he initially 
characterizes it as the principle that “it is morally justifiable to take beliefs to be 
true in our reasoning only when it is epistemically justifiable to do so.”56 Bishop 
sees this particular formulation of the link as the culprit of many misdeeds in 
epistemology, for by this principle one may rightly suspend judgment on morally 
important propositions by citing evidential ambiguity. By Bishop’s action-oriented 
perspective, the result of this is the rather troublesome possibility that one will fail 
to act upon certain moral beliefs because one has not achieved epistemic 
justification (and hence has not achieved moral justification) regarding those 
beliefs. Yet while he thinks this version of the principle has flaws, Bishop does 
not reject it wholesale. Instead, he seeks to revise it. 
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Why does Bishop think the principle, as stated above, is problematic? 
Bishop’s concern is with the case made by the hard-line evidentialist. As he 
characterizes it, the hard-line evidentialist claims that it is morally justifiable to 
take/hold a belief only if one is epistemically justified to do so; by the evidential 
ambiguity thesis one does not have sufficient evidence to justify pertinent 
religious beliefs, and hence once cannot be epistemically justified. Consequently, 
by the link principle, one is not morally justified in holding/taking religious beliefs: 
“If epistemic entitlement as certified under this evidential practice is required for 
the moral probity of living by theistic beliefs, then the upshot is that it is not 
morally justifiable to make theistic faith-commitments.”57 Even if one has a 
disposition toward certain religious propositions, one ought not assent. In one’s 
practical commitments, says Bishop, one must not take religious beliefs to be 
true.58 
Must we accept the moral-epistemic link, asks Bishop, “Or do people have a 
perfect moral right to commit themselves beyond their evidence to the truth of 
faith-beliefs if they so choose—and have the necessary psychic resources?”59 
Bishop thinks the moral-epistemic link, in this initial form, is too strong. Perhaps 
by beginning with the intent, it can be reformulated to be more broadly 
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accommodating.60 Upon examination, says Bishop: 
The moral-epistemic link principle, at its most basic, may thus be interpreted 
as claiming that their moral conscience can be clear only if, so to speak, 
their epistemic conscience is clear also: people may be morally justified in 
practical commitment to the truth of their faith-beliefs only if, I shall say, that 
commitment carries epistemic entitlement.61 
Bishop believes the hard-line evidentialist has made a mistake in requiring 
epistemic justification that P as a necessary condition for moral justification that 
P. Moral justification requires that one has done one’s epistemic due diligence. 
But requiring epistemic justification is too strong. This requirement is better 
captured as a permissibility thesis. Thus, Bishop’s final characterization of the 
moral-epistemic link principle is expressed as follows: “People are morally 
entitled to take their beliefs to be true only if they are epistemically entitled to do 
so.”62 Here and elsewhere, Bishop shifts between moral justification and moral 
entitlement, but he does not clarify the difference as carefully as he does with 
epistemic justification and epistemic entitlement. In regard to the moral-epistemic 
link principle, Bishop seems to suggest that epistemic entitlement (not epistemic 
justification) is the correct requirement for moral justification. But when he comes 
to formulating the principle, the term moral entitlement is used. 
Given this revised version of the moral-epistemic link principle, moral 
justification (or at least moral entitlement) still requires an epistemic element. But 
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does this rule out conflict between moral and epistemic rationality? Let’s take one 
of the standard cases for rational conflict: Bob has some evidence that his wife 
Susan has been unfaithful. But Bob recognizes his faith in his marriage as a 
strong source of moral goodness in his life. Following the evidence leads to the 
epistemically rational conclusion that Bob’s marriage is dissolving while the 
conclusion of moral rationality is that Bob’s faith in his marriage promotes 
morality. The important question for Bishop is whether Bob remains epistemically 
entitled to believe that his marriage is not dissolving, in spite of the fact that the 
evidence points to the contrary. Assuming for a moment that we have a 
satisfactory definition of sufficient evidence, one might perhaps claim that until 
one has sufficient evidence for P, holding not-P is still epistemically permissible 
even if it is perhaps more epistemically responsible to hold P.63 Under such 
circumstances, it appears that one could be morally entitled to hold not-P (in 
virtue of one’s epistemic entitlement to hold not-P), while also being epistemically 
entitled to hold P. (Keep in mind that to be entitled is a state, and does not 
require assent or any other mental action on the part of the agent.) Thus, it 
seems possible to experience rational conflict while still satisfying the moral-
epistemic link principle. As Bishop has characterized it, the hard-line evidentialist 
cannot admit rational conflict between moral and epistemic obligations because 
one cannot be morally justified in holding a belief that is not epistemically 
justified. And perhaps we might be able to define evidential requirements in such 
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a way as to rule it impermissible to hold not-P whenever evidence points to P. 
That, too, would make it impossible to gain moral justification for not-P, and thus 
would once again rule out moral-epistemic rational conflict. But as we have seen, 
there is at least one plausible way to interpret Bishop in such a way that leaves 
open the possibility of a rational conflict. 
The consequence of this is that, based on this examination of Bishop’s tying 
of moral and epistemic rationality, it still seems that it is most appropriate to 
acknowledge the possibility of rational conflict, which in turn leaves open the 
question of how one ought to solve such problems. Bishop’s preference, as we 
saw in the previous section, is to countenance moral rationality over epistemic 
rationality. He believes this is most coherent with the goals of the true religious 
seeker. But perhaps that later claim is anything but sure. Religious seekers may 
well privilege epistemic, prudential or other rational goals above moral goals. 
Thus far, we have examined Bishop’s claim that the evidence for many 
religious beliefs is ambiguous. The religious seeker, says Bishop, is concerned 
with holding (or taking) morally rational beliefs. But to be morally justified in 
taking P one must be epistemically entitled to take P. In the face of evidential 
ambiguity, can the religious seeker satisfy epistemic entitlement in regards to 
religious propositions? Bishop answers this question by suggesting his own 
variety of fideism. 
Supra-evidential Fideism 
Bishop’s discussion of rationality identifies a general problem for rational 
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agents: When evidence about a practically important matter is ambiguous, how 
should a rational agent respond? Bishop frames the problem in terms of rational 
and moral obligations. The hard-line evidentialist, says Bishop, claims that 
because one is morally justified in taking P only when one is epistemically 
justified in taking P. In regard to religious belief, if the evidential ambiguity thesis 
holds, the hard-line evidentialist claims that (all things considered) an agent 
ought not assent to religious beliefs.64 But Bishop claims that this conclusion is 
based on the too-stringent requirement that one must be epistemically justified 
before one can take P to be true. Might S rationally take P to be true if S is 
morally and epistemically entitled to take P? Answering this question in the 
affirmative opens the possibility for what Bishop develops as supra-evidential 
fideism. As we shall see in this section, Bishop develops an account of fideism 
that suggests that under certain circumstances one is rational in holding religious 
beliefs even in the case where the evidence is ambiguous. 
Returning first to Bishop’s models of faith, we will see in this section how 
Bishop develops a notion of doxastic venture, and from this Bishop introduces his 
fideist thesis, first as thesis (J), and then as the revised thesis (J+). 
Faith 
As Bishop begins to unfurl his particular type of fideism he offers his own 
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characterization of faith. The model he offers ultimately emphasizes doxastic 
venture—a particularly important aspect of his fideism. But venture alone does 
not describe faith. 
Bishop suggests that there are at least three components to faith. The first is 
the cognitive component, which involves propositional beliefs. One necessary 
condition for S to have faith in God is that S believes that God exists. And to talk 
more generally of a religion as a faith, Bishop suggests that for one to hold to the 
Christian faith, one must believe certain propositions about God, Jesus, and so 
on. The epistemic origin of these beliefs is not at issue here, says Bishop. 
Calvin’s claim that these beliefs arise as revelations from God is not, says 
Bishop, incompatible with this characterization of faith.65 In making such a claim, 
Bishop is sidestepping an early challenge from the externalist, and as we shall 
see later, this is important. 
The second component of faith is what Bishop calls the evaluative-
affectional component of faith. This is “the believer’s welcoming the content of 
the cognitive component of his or her faith.” This entails assent, as I 
characterized it in the first chapter. But is this evaluative-affectional component 
just assent?66 Bishop indicates that there is more to it, that there is a certain 
affectional character to it that distinguishes this welcoming from mere assent. 
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Citing James 2:19, Bishop points out that it is possible to believe, yet not be one 
of the faithful: “You believe that God is one; well and good. Even the demons 
believe that—and tremble with fear.” Bishop suggests that what differentiates 
between the demons—enemies of God—and the followers is beyond mere faith. 
One must also be receptive to these faith-beliefs. The evaluative-affectional 
component requires a degree of receptivity and affection that is beyond the 
doxastic stance of the demon in James’ epistle. Perhaps it is better to liken this 
component to trust, as in Evans’s model, if one understands trust as an 
affectional attitude.67 
In addition to these, Bishop enunciates a third requirement: “Faith is not just 
a matter of holding faith-beliefs, and being glad of the truths so held. Faith 
involves commitment so some kind of act is thereby essential to faith.”68 While 
Bishop suggests the term commitment, what he means, it seems, is closer to 
what Evans calls obedience: one seeks to do God’s will.69 It is not just that one 
continues to hold faith propositions, but that one allows one’s faith to give 
direction in one’s practical life. 
These last two elements, says Bishop, have an element of risk, of 
venturesomeness. 
Christians rely on God for their ultimate welfare, and must therefore 
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relinquish the egotistic fantasy of trusting only themselves for directive 
control over their lives—and that involves genuine risk and real venture. 
That is common ground: what is contentions is the nature of the venture or 
ventures involved in authentic Christian faith.70 
Thus faith involves a transition from determining one’s own goals and 
motivations, determining one’s own fate, to trusting another (namely, God) as an 
authority and seeking to conform one’s will to the will of that authority. And it is at 
this point that Bishop makes an interesting move from what might initially seem 
like a trust-based model of faith to what he calls a doxastic venture model. 
Doxastic and Sub-doxastic Ventures 
In the first chapter we surveyed the seven models of faith that Bishop 
enumerates in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “Faith.”71 That 
section introduced general notions of faith as doxastic and sub-doxastic 
ventures. As Bishop develops his account of supra-evidential fideism in Believing 
by Faith, he offers a more specific and detailed examination of these two models 
of faith. The main model of faith with which Bishop is concerned is the doxastic 
venture model. 
Bishop transitions from his characterization of faith to his explanation of the 
doxastic venture model. His first characterization of faith involves a tripartite 
conjunction of (cognitive) belief, (evaluative-affectional) welcoming, and 
commitment or obedience. Bishop suggests that this model is venturesome, in 
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that it involves a realignment of interests from the egotistical to the obedient. That 
notion of venturesomeness as obedience dissipates when he introduces the 
doxastic venture model. He introduces doxastic venture with no mention of 
welcoming or obedience: “The doxastic venture model of such faith-commitment 
maintains that it involves an active venture in practical commitment to the truth of 
faith-propositions that the believer correctly recognizes not to be adequately 
supported by his or her evidence.”72 How does this relate to the characterization 
of faith Bishop has just offered? 
Bishop’s characterization of faith involves belief, welcoming, and obedience, 
but it does not involve epistemic justification.73 Indeed, given evidential 
ambiguity, evidential justification is not possible. It is the obedience or 
commitment condition that links his characterization of faith to this model of 
venture. Obedience (commitment) is action-oriented. It involves taking certain 
beliefs to be true even if these are as of yet unjustified, and this is particularly 
true in the context of action. That is, one must act as if such beliefs are true. 
While this may seem redundant, given that belief entails assent (holding B 
entails taking B to be true), the real emphasis here is on the practical context: 
one’s actions proceed in accordance with one’s beliefs. Thus, Bishop isn’t simply 
suggesting that one must believe, and then assent again. What he is suggesting 
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is that one must believe, and one must act according to one’s assent.74 Practical 
commitment is the point Bishop wishes to emphasize, and he explains practical 
commitment (in doxastic venture) as having three key aspects: (1) S must 
believe B, (2) S must “take it to be true (with full weight)” that B when practically 
reasoning, and (3) S must recognize that S is not evidentially justified in believing 
B.75 
In regard to (1), belief in this case is the disposition toward P. Here it does 
not seem to include assent, which is instead captured in clause (2). As Bishop 
puts it, “there can be occasion for doxastic venture only if there is already a 
passionally caused tendency to hold the proposition concerned to be true.”76 
Here Bishop suggests that the disposition toward P is “passionally caused.” This 
phrase he borrows from William James, and he invokes the notion of passion 
here to explain how one would have the disposition, and yet have neither 
sufficient evidence nor assent. I return to this point later. 
The idea of “taking B to be true (with full weight)” is crucial for Bishop. He is 
explicitly distancing himself from an evidential proportionality model.77 He 
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eschews the claim that one should proportion one’s belief to one’s evidence. Part 
of the venturesomeness of the doxastic venture is in holding this unjustified belief 
with the same degree of belief as one would hold a justified belief—and again 
note that the context here is practical reasoning.78 Bishop understands practical 
reasoning as requiring a degree of responsibility beyond contemplation or 
consideration. In this way, taking P to be true in practical reasoning is more 
demanding than taking P to be true in theoretical reasoning. Acting (especially 
morally important acting) carries with it a higher onus than, say, thinking about an 
article one has read in the newspaper.79 Thus, when Bishop says in the third 
claim that one must recognize one’s epistemic state, he goes so far as to 
stipulate that this is deliberate (and occurrent) recognition because “the venturing 
involved in doxastic venture is conscious venturing.”80 For one to be responsible 
in one’s venture, one must be conscious of what one is venturing. Moreover, 
Bishop is concerned that faith be genuine or authentic faith. “Authentic faith 
requires full pragmatic commitment… theistic doxastic venture involves giving the 
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truth that God exists full weight in one’s practical reasoning.”81 To proportion a 
belief to the evidence seems, in Bishop’s mind, to undermine the genuineness of 
belief. (This notion of authenticity is important, and I will return to it in the context 
of sub-doxastic faith ventures.) 
One cannot make a doxastic venture that P, says Bishop, if one has 
epistemic justification that P. As far as I can tell, Bishop’s reason for this is that 
he does not think of justified beliefs as ventures. But if justification is understood 
as defeasible, does that not make holding even justified beliefs venturesome? 
For S to hold P defeasibly, S acknowledges that even while S believes P and has 
evidence that P, S cannot be certain that P. It still may be the case that not-P. Is 
holding P thus not a venture? (Bishop’s emphasis on justification is on P being 
justified for S, not just that S is justified in holding P.) Perhaps Bishop would 
suggest that with justification comes assurance or confidence, and that for such a 
reason, believing a justified proposition is no longer psychologically 
venturesome. But it is not clear where venture ends and confidence begins, nor 
is it clear that confidence precludes venture.82 Another way to interpret doxastic 
venture is in relation to a notion of degrees of belief. Bishop, as we have seen, 
mentions proportioning belief to evidence, but suggests that a defining 
characteristic of doxastic venture is the “taking P with full epistemic weight.” It 
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seems that an argument could be made for the claim that S is taking a doxastic 
venture regarding P even when possessing evidence in cases where the 
evidence demands only a low degree of belief. Here, the doxastic venture may 
be grounds for taking P with full epistemic weight (as Bishop says) even when 
the evidence recommends a lesser degree of belief.83 Does Bishop’s neglecting 
this point hurt his overall argument? Perhaps not. Indeed, it may be a boon. No 
longer is the doxastic venture limited to only propositions with ambiguous 
evidence, but perhaps also beliefs with little evidence. 
Doxastic venture describes a case where one believes, and one ventures to 
act in accordance with that belief even while recognizing that one is not justified 
in believing.84 Bishop considers another case, though: the case where one does 
not believe—where the doxastic disposition is absent. And he describes a 
second form of venture model that he calls the sub-doxastic venture. 
In a sub-doxastic venture, the first condition of the doxastic venture need not 
hold. It is not the case that S must believe (as a doxastic disposition toward) B. In 
the first chapter, I offered an account of belief that has both a dispositional 
element and a requirement that an agent (either consciously or unconsciously) 
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assent. There I also suggested that one might assent to B but not (at that point or 
any other) develop a disposition toward B. I even suggested that justified true 
assent (at time t) may count (at t) as knowledge. Bishop’s holding/taking 
distinction shares the traits described: one can take B to be true (at time t) 
without the dispositional component required in holding B. The sub-doxastic 
model makes much of this distinction, as it suggests that one can take B to be 
true (assent to B) at time t, while not believing B. 
Assent, as I have construed it, must be sincere. Sincerity requires that one’s 
assent is both unfeigned and honest. Does Bishop understand sincerity as a 
requirement even for sub-doxastic venture? Bishop’s primary interest in his 
account of taking-to-be-true is that one’s assent is lived out in one’s action. But 
there remains the possibility that one may act on an insincerely held proposition. 
It seems that one can take P to be true without sincerity. Bishop does not think 
this counts as taking-to-be-true. “[F]ull commitment to a faith-proposition’s truth 
will not suffice for authentic faith if it is undertaken in a purely experimental spirit, 
or as an exercise in pretending to believe.”85 This answer is inspired by Mark 9: 
24: “I believe; help my unbelief!” This may be understood, says Bishop, as the 
statement that “I assent, Lord, help me to form the disposition!”86 Bishop 
suggests that “if people can be so prepared without actually believing the truth of 
the faith-propositions on which they act, then it ought to be conceded that they 
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may indeed be making an authentic venture in faith.”87 I suggest that what Bishop 
earmarks as authentic in this expression is sincerity.88  One is committing to B 
because one desires to form belief that B. While it may not be possible or 
prudent to thereby infer from this that Bishop holds that all takings-to-be-true are 
ipso facto sincere, the specific faith ventures that are at issue in this context do 
seem to be characterized by sincerity.89 
Authenticity plays a significant role in Bishop’s notion of venture. Both 
doxastic and sub-doxastic ventures require that the agent is authentically taking 
P to be true. Why does Bishop make this a requirement? Why not allow that a 
venture be hypothetical, an “acting-as-if”? Doing so would substantially simplify 
Bishop’s argument, perhaps eliminating “fideism” altogether. But Bishop insists 
on a higher degree of commitment, and this is a result of his definition of faith. 
Bishop understands genuine religious commitment to require faith. (This rightly 
raises significant questions about Bishop’s notion of God—a question I address 
in the next chapter. Genuine religious commitment is about a relationship with 
God, and a genuine relationship cannot be had by “acting-as-if.”) The cognitive 
and evaluative-affectional components of faith demand more than a hypothetical 
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venture. So the doxastic venture, and even the sub-doxastic venture, requires 
that one assent sincerely, making an (affectional) commitment beyond “acting as 
if.” This, I take it, is the meaning of authenticity for Bishop. 
There is a second (related) question we might ask about Bishop’s doxastic 
venture model of fideism. Given both doxastic and sub-doxastic models, why 
does Bishop emphasize the doxastic venture model? Instead, he could discount 
doxastic dispositions and focus on sub-doxastic venture. The answer to this, I 
think, has more to do with descriptiveness than prescriptiveness. Bishop (again 
following James) is interested in giving an account of how those who believe may 
rationally do so. Recall that for Bishop, the disposition to believe is a precondition 
for a doxastic venture, not a result of it. The sub-doxastic venture model certainly 
admits those who are seeking and who are willing to assent before believing—
and this captures a very real class of people. But Bishop is most concerned with 
those who find the disposition already there, yet have difficulty assenting in light 
of evidential ambiguity. 
Bishop suggests that a doxastic venture may be the appropriate response to 
propositions plagued by evidential ambiguity. In the next section we will 
encounter a certain class of propositions that Bishop finds to be a particularly 
troublesome example of evidentially ambiguous, yet important, propositions. 
Some propositions play the role of framing principles. 
Framing Principles 
We have explored Bishop’s notions of faith, doxastic venture, and sub-
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doxastic venture. These are critical components of Bishop’s fideism. Specifically, 
they explain the attitude of the believer (or assenter) in relation to beliefs. But 
there is an important aspect of Bishop’s argument that has to do with types of 
belief. Bishop wants to identify certain classes of religious beliefs as particular 
candidates for faith ventures. One such class of beliefs is what he calls framing 
principles. 
Bishop uses the term “doxastic framework” to describe a set of related 
beliefs: “For an identifiable doxastic framework to be a feature of a person’s 
overall noetic structure is for the person to have a related set of beliefs that all 
presuppose the truth of a specific set of framing principles.”90 A doxastic 
framework is not (necessarily) isolationist—beliefs that are part of that framework 
may be related to beliefs not in that framework. As this integrationist attitude 
suggests, Bishop is not smuggling an anti-realist conception of belief into his 
account. But he is attempting to capture the fact that humans may have (and 
perhaps often have) clusters of closely related beliefs (political views, religious 
beliefs, and so on), and that often times those clusters have certain higher order 
“framing principles” that in some sense undergird them. Thus, Bishop describes 
framing principles as “those propositions whose truth must be presupposed if any 
of the beliefs belonging to the framework are to be evidentially justified.”91 
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Presumably, for example, a monotheistic doxastic framework (e.g. evangelical 
Christianity) will have the framing principle “God exists.” Some framing principles 
are what Bishop calls highest-order framing principles, not depending for support 
on any other propositions within the doxastic framework.92 
Framing principles, thinks Bishop, have an interesting property: even if one 
were to adopt proportionality (“degrees of belief”) evidentialism as a general 
strategy, framing principles don’t seem to admit to degrees of belief. Bishop 
suggests that when it comes to a framing principle one either buys into it or one 
does not; one either takes them true (in practical reasoning) or one does not.93 
Bishop adopts James’ terminology, and describes framing principles as forced—
one either accepts or does not accept. And again drawing from the so-called 
evidential ambiguity of theism, Bishop suggests that at least some framing 
principles are undecidable.94 “[T]he choice whether or not to commit to the truth 
of the framing principles of a whole doxastic framework of faith-beliefs could 
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present… a genuine and essentially evidentially undecidable option.”95 In virtue 
of it being a framing principle, one must either buy in (all the way) or not. “Either 
one is practically committed to the framework’s principles or one is not. Either 
one takes them to be true with full weight or one does not.”96  
Bishop’s notion of framing principles plays three roles in his fideism: First, 
they explain Bishop’s own notion of how we hold related beliefs. We can see 
from his description that Bishop’s noetic “web of belief” has clusters of associated 
beliefs, and at least some propositions in at least some such clusters are highest-
order framing principles. Second, the notion of framing principles bolsters 
Bishop’s claim that some propositions are evidentially ambiguous. I read Bishop 
as here trying to make an architectural case for ambiguity. This is different from 
the empirical case we have already encountered. Bishop here claims that 
evidential ambiguity may be a necessary result of the architecture of belief. 
Finally, by positioning framing principles as crucial to entire groupings of beliefs, 
Bishop has elevated the urgency of his argument. Fideism is important, he 
claims, when it alone can provide rationale for holding (or taking) certain 
beliefs—beliefs that play a critical role in supporting broad clusters of beliefs. 
The second claim, that framing principles are evidentially ambiguous, is 
troublesome. The implication is that some propositions cannot be evidentially 
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supported because of their role in one’s noetic framework.  I see no clear reason 
why the role of a proposition would prevent evidential support, and the very 
examples Bishop gives are those currently under dispute anyway: the existence 
of God, the idea that God acts in history. What Bishop seems to be doing here is 
forwarding propositions that he believes are evidentially ambiguous in the 
empirical sense discussed previously, then claiming that these are framing 
principles that play an architectural role, and thereby concluding that framing 
principles cannot be supported by evidence. Two things seem to surface when 
viewed in this light. First, if the empirical argument for evidential ambiguity thesis 
is weakened, so must the ambiguity of framing principles. We must shy away 
from Bishop’s claim that framing principles may be essentially evidentially 
undecidable.97 Secondly, with no further indications of what might constitute a 
unique class of framing principles, it seems there is no reason to treat framing 
principles as evidentially undecidable in virtue of their role.  
Framing principles—especially those highest order framing principles—
represent an important class of propositions for Bishop’s theory of fideism. They 
play an important role in one’s doxastic framework, yet on Bishop’s account they 
are architecturally resistant to evidential support. These principles then seem to 
Bishop to be the ideal case for doxastic venture, and lead to supra-evidential 
fideism. 
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Theses (J) and (J+) 
Bishop’s account of rationality combines with the moral-epistemic link 
principle and the evidential ambiguity thesis to pose a serious problem for the 
religious seeker who espouses hard-line evidentialism: Evidentially ambiguous 
religious propositions can be neither epistemically nor morally justified, and one 
therefore ought to suspend judgment on such propositions. From such a 
perspective, it appears that one cannot be both rational and a religious believer. 
But Bishop calls into question the assumption that he finds in hard-line 
evidentialism: is epistemic justification really necessary for moral justification? In 
answer, Bishop suggests that epistemic entitlement (which, as he explains it, 
does not require epistemic justification) meets the epistemic requirements for 
moral justification. Epistemic justification is not required. But what other 
conditions must be met before one may hold (or take to be true) religious 
propositions, even if on principally moral grounds? 
Bishop’s version of fideism, which he calls supra-evidential fideism, is based 
on the doxastic venture model introduced earlier. Supra-evidential fideism is the 
thesis that under some circumstances it is morally permissible to make a 
doxastic or sub-doxastic venture when the evidence is inconclusive. (Bishop 
does not delve into the question of how moral permissibility is tied to moral 
justification. It appears both here and elsewhere that moral permissibility may in 
fact require moral justification, making him “hard-line.” But a weaker reading 
seems consistent with Bishop’s claims as well. Moral permissibility requires 
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epistemic permissibility, but may not require satisfaction of other (unspecified) 
stipulations of moral justification.) 
The crucial question is this: under what circumstances can one undertake 
such a venture? While Bishop is ultimately focused on only religious beliefs, he 
begins with a generic account of what circumstances may admit doxastic 
venture. He begins with William James’ essay “The Will to Believe,” and 
suggests a la James, that only genuine options be considered candidates for 
religious belief.98 According to James, there are three qualifications for an option 
(candidate for assent or belief) to be genuine: it must be live, it must be forced, 
and it must be momentous.99 An option is live only if that option is a real 
possibility for the inquirer. One must be able to assent sincerely to P in order for 
P to be live for that person. Momentous live options are those that, if held, will 
have a significant impact on a believer’s overall actions or beliefs. It impacts, 
says Bishop “what kind of lives they lead or persons they become.”100 
Momentousness also requires an element of immediacy or uniqueness: a 
momentous option is one about which a decision must be made right away. 
Finally, an option is forced if the possible responses are a bivalent for or against. 
(The notion of a forced option was introduced in the previous section.) In the 
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context of a particular religious belief (“Jesus is my personal savior”), says 
Bishop, the option is between accepting and not accepting because there is “no 
salient practical difference between not doing so while suspending judgment and 
not doing so while ‘positively’ disbelieving it.”101 
Thesis (J): Permissibility of Doxastic Ventures 
With this, Bishop introduces thesis (J), a thesis about under what conditions 
one is morally permitted to make a doxastic or sub-doxastic venture regarding 
religious propositions. 
(J) Where P is a faith-proposition of the kind exemplified in the context 
of theistic religious faith, it is morally permissible for people to take P to be 
true with full weight in their practical reasoning while correctly judging that it 
is not the case that P’s truth is adequately supported by their total available 
evidence (‘to make a faith-venture in favor of P’) if and only if: 
(i) the question whether P presents itself to them as a genuine option; and 
(ii) the question whether P is essentially evidentially undecidable.102 
Evidential undecidability is related to the evidential ambiguity thesis Bishop 
offers. But there is more to it—especially when coupled with (i). Evidential 
undecidability would, under most circumstances, indicate that one ought to 
suspend judgment. But Bishop argues that this is not necessarily the case when 
P is a genuine option (live, forced, and momentous), for there are non-epistemic 
considerations that must be taken into account—not the least of which is this 
                                            
101
 Ibid., 127. I find this claim problematic, and return to it in the following chapter. 
102
 Ibid., 147. 
210 
 
decision’s having to do with one’s practical reasoning.103 Because the option is 
forced, by definition one cannot invoke a proportional belief model. Thus, the 
“undecidability” in (ii) cannot be avoided by claiming that one may adjust one’s 
degree of belief based on the evidence. But if suspending judgment in regards to 
P is not an option (or is performatively the same as disbelieving P), and the 
evidence is undecidable, isn’t it simply the case that one should not assent to P? 
Not necessarily, says Bishop. If “the evidence neither supports P’s truth nor P’s 
falsity, then either taking P to be true or not doing so would be consistent with 
intellectual assessment of the evidence, and the decision must be determined by 
some further considerations about what one ought to do in such a situation of 
open evidence.”104 Bishop is suggesting that if a live option P cannot be 
epistemically justified, yet P has importance for practical reasoning, one may still 
be morally justified in holding/taking P. But moral justification has an epistemic 
requirement. And this is where thesis (J) comes in: It spells out the conditions 
under which S may satisfy the epistemic component of moral justification without 
having epistemic justification. 
Clause (ii) has another important effect: it rules out what Bishop calls 
counter-evidential fideism. In the last chapter we saw Evans suggest that in 
some cases faith may be against reason. On Evans’s account, reason’s 
limitations and sinfulness will lead to the conclusion that not-P, when faith urges 
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toward P. Sometimes, says Evans, one must (in light of reason’s deficiency) 
choose faith against reason. Bishop is opposed to any such claim, and clause (ii) 
rules out this possibility for supra-evidential fideism. Only in cases where 
evidence is undecidable is one morally permitted to make a doxastic venture.105 
When it comes to cases in which the evidence points in a particular direction, “it 
is indeed our ethical duty to take to be true only what the evidence shows to be 
true, irrespective of where our passional inclinations may lie.”106 By “passional 
inclinations,” Bishop intends to identify emotive (often morally charged) 
inclinations that an agent may have. He suggests here that such feelings—even 
if morally motivated—must not trump the epistemic outcome. Yet when Bishop 
pays this point further attention later, he concludes that in non-religious contexts, 
counter-evidential doxastic venture may in fact be permitted “only on the grounds 
that the consequences of refraining from it might, in more or less contrived 
circumstances, be sufficiently serious.”107 Why the exception for non-religious 
contexts? Admitting one exception to the moral-epistemic link principle (and on 
such weak explanatory grounds) calls into question whether Bishop’s method of 
solving rational conflict is insufficient. Be that as it may, Bishop’s emphasis on 
following the evidence whenever possible (even if only in religious contexts) does 
avoid some of the issues we observed with Evans in the last chapter. 
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Bishop is also eager to point out that (J) is a permissibility thesis. One is 
permitted to make a doxastic venture if the conditions obtain, but one is not 
obligated (ever) to make a doxastic venture. Given the requirement that 
epistemic obligation proceeds from epistemic justification, one is not 
epistemically obligated. And given (J)’s moral emphasis, I interpret Bishop to be 
suggesting that one is not morally obligated to believe, either.108 This, says 
Bishop, is a virtue of (J)—recognition of this fact (that doxastic venture is 
permitted, but not required) encourages one to accept religious pluralism.109 One 
may act as if P is true with full weight, but one still ought not become dogmatic, 
for one must acknowledge the venturesomeness of taking P to be true. 
Thesis (J+): Morally Moral Permissibility 
There is something peculiar about thesis (J). Ostensibly, we have an 
account of moral permissibility, yet all of the conditions are epistemic. Nothing at 
all is said of morality. It seems, then, that under thesis (J), one may be morally 
entitled to make patently immoral doxastic ventures. Bishop gives the example of 
a Nazi religion: One may (by (J)) be morally entitled to make a faith venture in 
favor of a religion that extols the extermination of others, is committed to racism, 
and aspires to world military domination. Thesis (J) then, seems to be a rather 
amoral moral permissibility thesis. 
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To rectify this, Bishop suggests two additional conditions. First, he suggests 
that the doxastic venture can only be considered moral “if it is motivated by a 
morally acceptable type of motivation.”110 Bishop suggests, rightly I think, that 
any adequate moral theory should be able to answer the question of whether, for 
any doxastic venture V, S’s motivation in making V is morally acceptable.111 
Adding this condition should successfully rule out cases where one's motivations 
are immoral. But what about the case where one earnestly ventures in favor of 
an immoral religion (again take Bishop's Nazi religion as an example) for morally 
laudable reasons? Bishop is concerned about this case. "It seems... that it is 
possible to commit oneself to a morally objectionable faith-belief with a non-
evidential motivation of a morally respectable kind."112 To eliminate this 
possibility, another condition is necessary. 
This other condition, claims Bishop, must stipulate that the proposition about 
which one makes a doxastic venture must itself be morally good. Bishop spells 
out this revised version of (J) as thesis (J+): 
(J+) Where P is a faith-proposition of the kind exemplified by the 
proposition taken to be true in the context of theistic faith, it is morally 
permissible for people to take P to be true with full weight in their practical 
reasoning while correctly judging that it is not the case that P’s truth is 
adequately supported by their total available evidence, if and only if: 
(i) the question whether P presents itself to them as a genuine option; 
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and 
(ii) the question whether P is essentially evidentially undecidable; 
and 
(iii) their non-evidential motivation for taking P to be true is of a morally 
acceptable type; 
and 
(iv) P’s being true conforms with correct morality.113 
Clauses (i) and (ii) remain unchanged, while (iii) and (iv) have been added. 
Bishop is very clear in stating that (iv) is to be understood as an external 
requirement. It is not about what one takes to be correct morality. “Condition (iv) 
as stated requires faith-commitments to conform to what correct morality actually 
is.”114 Bishop suggests that one is only permitted to make a doxastic venture 
when that venture is moral. But Bishop's externalist construal of the fourth 
condition raises a significant problem. Ultimately, to require the satisfaction of an 
external condition is to undercut the entitlement thesis that is essential to 
Bishop’s argument. 
Reading (iv) as an external condition, the question of P’s conformance to 
morality is not at all determined by P’s internal relation of P to S’s morality. Nor is 
the relation between P and “correct morality” necessarily accessible to S. 
Condition (iv) can be satisfied regardless of S’s knowledge of or awareness of 
correct morality. Similarly, (iv) can fail to obtain while S has no awareness of that 
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failure. And herein lies the problem, for S may not be entitled to venture P while 
having no capacity to discover that she or he is not so entitled.115 Yet the entire 
rationale for introducing the notion of entitlement is that an agent must have 
internal access to her or his epistemic relation to a belief. Fideism—here spelled 
out in terms of a doxastic venture—is what gives the religious seeker peace of 
mind that she or he may indeed rationally take or hold P. Yet if S is only 
permitted to make doxastic ventures that satisfy the conditions of (J+), and such 
conformance to (J+) is external and possibly inaccessible to S, no peace of mind 
is gained here. One is left uneasy about whether or not (iv) obtains, and hence 
whether one indeed may make a doxastic venture. This is fundamentally 
destructive to Bishop’s fideism. 
It is clear why Bishop wants (iv), and wants it to be externalist. He wants to 
prevent doxastic ventures that are immoral—and admitting the possibility that 
(J+) may lead one to embrace militant and extremist religious views is distasteful 
to say the least. While well-meaning, I think Bishop overreaches. To satisfy the 
goal of building a theory that indicates to an agent when that agent may correctly 
make a doxastic venture, any moral restriction must remain internal. In the first 
chapter, I discussed a model of rationality, and talked about moral justification. 
This may provide a foundation for an alternative to an externalist version of (iv). 
We might sketch a different restriction on doxastic venture that directs focus to 
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coherence with one’s other moral beliefs: S determines P's moral goodness in 
respect to S's other beliefs relevant to S's moral evaluation of P. Perhaps this 
can be best filled out by requiring that S be morally justified in believing (or 
assenting to) P. This formulation I will call (iv’). Recall that S is morally justified in 
holding/taking P if doing so promotes S’s goodness or morality. This is a rough 
sketch—one whose completion is beyond our scope. But it points to the pertinent 
issue: Just as epistemic justification leads one toward truth, so moral justification 
leads one toward goodness. But the move toward goodness is done based on 
one’s internal evaluation. It is worth noting, though, that this requirement is 
essentially taking a hard-line moralist position by requiring moral justification as a 
prerequisite for morally permissible doxastic venture. (This is not to claim that 
nothing is morally permissible without moral justification, but that doxastic 
venture is not morally permissible unless it is morally justified.) This rebuilding of 
the fourth condition as (iv’) seems the best way to save Bishop’s notion of 
entitlement from encroaching externalism. This has the negative side effect that it 
might allow S to make a doxastic venture in favor of a proposition that is in fact 
immoral, but this is no more frightening for us than the fact that S may also be 
epistemically justified in holding a false belief. 
We’ve seen that accepting (iv) undercuts Bishop’s stated goals for 
entitlement. Holding (J+) results in one no longer finding peace of mind that one’s 
doxastic venture is morally acceptable, and hence one must remain uncertain 
about whether one is entitled to make such a doxastic venture. The way to 
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escape this undercutting conclusion is to replace (iv) with (iv’), the requirement 
that P must be morally justified for S. 
Why is it that Bishop does not seem to recognize this problem? In fact, there 
are indications in the text that Bishop does recognize it, and these surface in his 
discussion of the problem of evil. 
Abraham's doxastic ventures 
Once Bishop has offered J+ as the morally strong version of J, he considers 
a few examples of doxastic venture. We will look at Bishop’s analysis of the story 
of Abraham and Isaac, and then see how Bishop addresses the problem of evil. I 
argue that in these accounts, the weaknesses of (J+) come to the forefront. 
Inspired by Kierkegaard’s famous opening discussion in Fear and 
Trembling, Bishop examines the Genesis story of God’s calling Abraham to 
sacrifice his son Isaac. Was Abraham entitled to make the doxastic venture that it 
was indeed God’s command to offer Isaac as a human sacrifice? Explaining, in 
terms of (J+), why Abraham is justified in making this particular faith venture 
leads Bishop into trouble. Initially, he suggests that Abraham is reasonable in 
supposing that he should sacrifice Isaac because as far as Abraham was able to 
judge in his ethno-sociological context, God’s demand to sacrifice Isaac does 
conform to correct morality.116 But Bishop must qualify this according to his 
externalist construal of (iv) by pointing out that we know now that this 
requirement of God’s does not conform to correct morality. 
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This raises a question at the very heart of the account: Was Abraham in fact 
morally permitted to make this particular faith venture? Let’s grant Bishop the 
premise that a deity’s requirement of human sacrifice is indeed non-conforming 
to correct morality. If we grant this, we must conclude that Abraham’s faith 
venture was in fact morally impermissible. But according to Bishop, the best 
possible interpretation of Abraham’s action is that indeed he thought this action 
morally permissible. We seem to have arrived at a case in which Abraham is not 
permitted to believe B, but where by his (Abraham’s) lights he is permitted (even 
obligated) to believe B. As I understand (J+), Bishop’s conclusion must be that 
Abraham was not entitled to make the doxastic venture that led him up the side 
of Mount Moriah. 
This is a noteworthy problem for Bishop’s account, and it illustrates the 
concern I expressed initially with condition (iv). Recall what the goal of Bishop’s 
fideism is: It is to provide an indicator to a reflective believer as to whether she or 
he is morally permitted to make a faith venture. This goal cannot be satisfied if 
(iv) is externalist, for it leads to the Abraham problem: It can be morally 
impermissible for the reflective believer to hold P even when the reflective 
believer has adequately reflected on both the epistemic and moral conditions in 
such a way that the believer has satisfied all of the relevant internalist conditions. 
It seems that a reflective believer must then recognize that, in absence of an 
ability to determine the moral permissibility of a faith venture, the believer does 
not have grounds to make the venture. 
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Bishop desires to retain for moral permissibility the sort of indefeasibility 
epistemologist long sought. But just as epistemology has largely given up on an 
indefeasibility requirement for epistemic justification, in this case we should re-
construe (iv) of (J+) as internal, and recognize that the claim of moral 
permissibility is itself defeasible. 
Interestingly, replacing (iv) with the internalist (iv’) variant best accords with 
Bishop’s Abraham example. On Bishop’s telling, Abraham initially determines 
that God’s demand for the sacrifice of Isaac is morally right.117 Yet when 
Abraham reconsiders his moral position, he recognizes that sacrificing his son 
does not conduce to goodness (and furthermore, he recognizes that a 
benevolent deity would not require a human sacrifice). This causes Abraham to 
revise his beliefs. With (iv), there is no ground to accept Bishop’s claim that 
Abraham’s initial doxastic venture is morally permissible. But with (iv’) Abraham 
meets the requirements of a doxastic venture for both ventures, yet we can see 
clearly that the grounds for making a doxastic venture are defeasible. As 
Abraham’s moral reflections change, so too may his doxastic ventures. 
The problem of the problem of evil 
In the story of Abraham and Isaac, one difficulty for Bishop’s theory arises. 
Bishop identifies another problem in regard to the problem of evil. As a thesis 
essentially about moral rationality, Bishop notes that (J+) is open to a common 
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objection against claims in favor of God’s existence. For the reflective believer to 
rightly make a doxastic venture in regard to P, P must satisfy the two moral 
conditions, (iii) and (iv). If P is claims the existence of a moral God, then one 
must be able to offer an adequate explanation of God’s actions and allowances 
in regard to evil in the world. The so-called problem of evil still presents a 
problem for traditional theists engaging in a doxastic venture according to (J+).118 
The answer Bishop gives to the problem of evil is interesting because he 
sidesteps the externalism issue of (iv) by quietly substituting a new requirement 
in place of (iv). 
As Bishop formulates it, the problem of evil boils down to whether a 
reflective believer can “endorse a moral theory under which all historical evils 
could be such that God has a morally adequate reason for permitting and/or 
causing them.”119 Bishop claims that the problem of evil is not a problem of the 
epistemology of religious belief, but of the morality of belief. The question, as 
Bishop understands it, is whether one ought to make a moral doxastic venture in 
favor of some account of God’s existence in conjunction with the existence of 
evil. But, suggests Bishop, the already offered doxastic venture model can be 
applied here.What are the demands of (J+) when evaluating whether a 
conception of God accords with the requirements in (iii) and (iv) of (J+)?  
First, there is the motivational question in (iii), in which one must ask 
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whether one’s motives for accepting P are morally acceptable. This does not 
seem to pose a particularly troublesome blocker in the case of the problem of 
evil. It requires only that the venturer’s motivations are correct; the morality of the 
actions of God (thus construed) is of no consequence in the context of (iii). 
Condition (iv), though, poses a greater challenge. (iv) requires that one’s 
taking to be true that P (with P in this case being an explanation of how a 
benevolent God can allow evil to occur) accords with actual correct morality. But 
Bishop seems to recognize that this is a stumbling block, for clearly the believer 
has no access to whether a given theory of theodicy is morally correct—it is, after 
all, the question at hand. This renders the permissibility of the faith venture 
indeterminate to the agent—the problem I have noted in the last two sections. 
But Bishop draws a startling conclusion about this: “condition (iv) in such cases 
will then reduce to the requirement that those beliefs [about God’s character and 
the existence of evil] be mutually coherent.”120 No explanation is given as to how 
this external requirement is suddenly “reduced” to internal coherence. 
I find Bishop’s move to coherence perplexing, as it seems so conceptually 
distant from Bishop’s earlier characterization of (iv).  Not only have we moved 
from an externalist condition to an internal one, we have also moved from a 
question of morality to a question of epistemology. There are the problems with 
this. First, the requirement that P coheres with one’s other moral beliefs is 
extraneous to the morality question in the original (iv). Under Bishop’s initial 
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characterization of (iv), there is no need for the agent to have any awareness of 
correct morality. The condition is merely whether taking/holding P does in fact 
accord with correct morality. There does not seem to be any sense in which the 
fact of P reduces to P’s coherence with other propositions held by S. Second, 
coherence seems to have very little to do with the morality of holding a 
proposition. Bishop introduces (iv) as a way to stymie immoral doxastic ventures, 
yet epistemic coherence does nothing to fill the stated goal of (iv). Drawing from 
the original example, the Nazi religion may be both internally coherent and 
coherent with S’s other beliefs. But this does not do anything to ensure morality. 
Consequently, I don’t see how Bishop’s sudden replacement of (iv) with a 
coherence requirement addresses what is of concern. 
Yet I think Bishop is right to be concerned with the problem of evil, and I 
think he is right in construing it as a problem for an account of doxastic venture. 
What comes to light in this example is the inadequacy of (J+)’s condition (iv). 
Bishop’s externalist move is a misstep. Moving to an internal account of moral 
justification, as formulated as (iv’), brings the problem of evil into the proper 
relation with the individual’s doxastic venture. The believer must be morally 
justified in holding beliefs about the existence of God in a world in which evil 
occurs. 
Is Faith a Bad Guide? 
In the last chapter I challenged C. Stephen Evans’s claim that given 
reason’s limitations, faith is a better guide. I challenged this on grounds that there 
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is no evidence that faith is a reliable method of attaining truth. Bishop shares this 
same worry in regard to his own doxastic venture model. Starting from the 
perspective of the hard-line evidentialist, Bishop frames the problem as follows: 
Hard-line evidentialists may… seek to turn the tables by maintaining that 
there is no real possibility that passional doxastic inclinations should 
function as guides to evidentially inaccessible truth. It is irrational, they will 
say, for supra-evidential fideists to accept the guidance of what they 
themselves agree not to be a generally apt indicator of truth just because 
there can be no other sort of guidance. A bad guide does not become a 
good guide through being the only one available.121 
The criticism, as Bishop sees it, is that whatever “passional” elements lead one 
to take a faith venture, they possess no apparent qualifications as guides to truth. 
As Bishop sees it, practical reasoning—even in a strictly epistemic sense—brings 
to bear all of the relevant capacities.122 But how does one determine which 
capacities are relevant? Bishop suggests that the hard-line evidentialist rules out 
any capacity that seems “passional.”  Bishop calls these passional doxastic 
inclinations. Bishop, citing James, characterizes passional inclinations as “any 
cause of [a] belief other than a cause that provides the believer with evidence for 
its truth.”123 This strikes me as an unsatisfactory explanation primarily because of 
its vagueness,124 but at other points Bishop gives indications of what sorts of 
inclinations he views as passional when he suggests that fideists often try to 
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transform “certain kinds of emotional states” into evidence.125 I understand 
Bishop to be targeting that sort of oft-claimed “religious experience” captured with 
phrases like “an awakening of my soul” or “a stirring in my heart.” 
The question that Bishop then asks is whether passional doxastic 
inclinations legitimately play any role in religious doxastic venture. Before 
examining how Bishop addresses the claim of the hard-line evidentialist, it is 
important to note two important differences between Bishop’s doxastic venture 
model and Evans’s responsible fideism. The first is that Bishop offers staunch 
and unwavering requirements about the preconditions for making a faith venture 
(viz. (J+)): ambiguous evidence, a genuine option, moral motivation, and moral 
conformance. As far as I can tell, none of these is required in Evans’s model. The 
second is that while Evans touts the occasional faith commitment “against 
reason,” Bishop rules out counter-evidential fideism. Bishop’s model is not based 
on a strong claim about the inadequacy of sin-entangled reason against a 
stronger (untainted?) divinely-given faith. Because of these, it seems to me that 
Bishop’s fideism is in a much stronger position to address the concerns of the 
“hard-line evidentialist.” 
As Bishop sees it, the traditional arguments over passional doxastic 
inclinations have revolved around a supposed dilemma: “[E]ither treat religious 
doxastic inclinations as basic evidence, or else accept that they are indeed 
                                            
125
 Ibid., 198. 
225 
 
passional and thus never properly treated as guides to truth.”126 As we’ve seen, 
Bishop is opposed to countenancing feelings (qua passional doxastic 
inclinations) as evidence.127 He is opposed to the idea that one’s feelings about 
some proposition be treated as evidence in favor of that proposition. 
Furthermore, Bishop does not want to admit “experiential awareness” as 
legitimate evidence as Evans seeks to do.128 Bishop seems to view such 
awareness as nothing other than a passional experience. Even while he 
maintains that passional doxastic inclinations are not evidential, he also does not 
want to rule them inapplicable to epistemic rationality. He rejects the apparent 
dilemma, suggesting that there is a middle way through.  
The key to the answer, says Bishop, lies in the nature of a doxastic venture 
as a venture that is amenable to later modification. Consider the case where one 
makes a faith venture, and later happens upon conflicting evidence. “Under the 
supra-evidential fideism expressed in (J+), she is then morally obliged to 
withdraw or modify her initial faith-venture….”129 How does this escape the 
dilemma? By the commitment to epistemic rationality expressed in (J+) and the 
understanding of a commitment as subject to revision, Bishop believes that the 
supra-evidential fideist is indeed not only acting (generally) rational, but 
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remaining fully committed to epistemic rationality. And Bishop does not just 
restrict modification of one’s faith-ventures on epistemic grounds, he identifies 
both prudential and moral reasons for modifying a faith-venture.130 
Furthermore, he suggests that even these “passional intuitions” can have 
epistemic restrictions placed on them. He sketches three such conditions, though 
he does not dwell on them. “First, they are subject to the constraint of mutual 
logical coherence.” I understand this to mean coherence between intuitions, as 
the next condition has to do with other beliefs. And this second condition is that 
intuitions must have “evidential fit” with existing “evidentially-based factual 
beliefs.”131 Bishop defers explaining evidential fit, choosing to characterize it only 
as making sure that intuitions are constrained by facts.132 Finally, Bishop 
suggests that there is a sense in which these intuitions need to be checked by 
“critical pressures” from the community.133 By exposing one’s intuitions to others 
in a community (and I take Evans to be referring here to an epistemic 
community—a group of people who share common epistemic commitments), 
one’s judgments about how these intuitions fit with available evidence are open 
to further perspectives and evaluations. 
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With these constraints in place, Bishop suggests that while the intuitions or 
passions do not necessarily themselves gain evidential weight (which, again, is a 
position he seeks to avoid), they do function rationally—that is, they accord with 
an agent’s rational (all things considered) goals.134 They can thus rightly 
influence one’s ventures, but for this to be rational, one must remember that 
one’s doxastic venture is essentially experimental.135 
It is important to note that Bishop is not exactly accomplishing what he 
states. What Bishop is claiming is that passional doxastic inclinations may indeed 
be valid truth indicators. Essentially, Bishop claims that when no strong evidence 
is available, these inclinations may rightly serve an epistemic goal. Evidentialists 
have a name for this sort of indicator: evidence. Even if it is weak and defeasible, 
it remains evidence. What I see Bishop doing here is offering a defense that, 
when strong truth indicators are ambiguous, it is at least epistemically 
permissible to admit passional doxastic inclinations as weak evidence. I don’t see 
this as particularly problematic, subterfuge aside. This seems consistent with 
how humans actually do reason (even in non-religious contexts), and is also 
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consistent with at least some characterizations of evidentialsm.136 
Is Fideism Preferable? 
Bishop’s model of doxastic venture suggests that when certain conditions 
are met, it is morally permissible to make a doxastic venture. But how does this 
tie back to Bishop’s model of rationality? Is hard-line evidentialism defeated? 
More generally, has Bishop shown his variety of fideism to be rationally (all things 
considered) preferable? 
First, there is the question of epistemic rationality. As we have seen already, 
Bishop believes fideism to be epistemically rational, yet he does not think that 
one can conclusively show that his version of fideism is epistemically preferable 
to hard-line evidentialism.137 But Bishop is not particularly troubled by this 
conclusion. Recall that for Bishop, the epistemic goal is not maximizing true 
beliefs while minimizing false ones. Instead, it is to put one in the best position to 
act rightly—and as Bishop construes this, this is a moral goal. For that reason, 
Bishop believes he can make his case in terms of moral rationality. And he does 
think that it is morally rational and morally preferable to accept supra-evidential 
fideism. There seem to be two alternatives: 
Does the highest morality liberate us from enthrallment to all forms of 
religion or quasi-religion that require cognitive commitments in principle 
beyond evidential support, as the hard-line evidentialist maintains? Or is the 
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fideist correct in holding that the highest morality permits us—or perhaps 
even requires us—to trust certain of our passional doxastic inclinations in 
making such faith commitments?138 
Clearly, Bishop enjoins the latter. (Note that here, late in his argument, he 
includes passional doxastic inclinations as a key component.) If moral obligations 
are the most important of all rational obligations—indeed, if all rational obligations 
are (as Bishop suggests) ultimately understood as moral obligations—then, he 
says, we may, and perhaps even must espouse a doxastic venture model. 
He has more to say about why hard-line evidentialism is not the preferable 
model. Bishop offers three reasons why he believes hard-line evidentialism is not 
the most morally rational theory. The reasons are: 
(1) The suggestion that fideism expresses a more balanced and authentic 
self-acceptance than evidentialism; (2) the claim that hard-line evidentialism 
arises from an unwarrantedly dogmatic attachment to a naturalist view of the 
world—and may even count as a failure in love; and (3) the claim that those 
who accept that basic moral values rest on passional commitment will end 
up with a doubtfully coherent overall position if they also (as hard-line 
evidentialists) reject religious-ventures in favour of the claim that the world is 
a moral as well as a natural order.139 
From these objections, Bishop draws the conclusion that supra-evidential fideism 
is in fact morally preferable—and rationally preferable—over hard-line 
evidentialism as an agent’s epistemological toward the world. 
Thus far, I have raised some reservations about this argument. I have 
suggested that Bishop misconstrues epistemic rationality and epistemic goals. 
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Most crucially, I have argued that Bishop conflates moral and epistemic goals. I 
have also claimed that epistemic rationality is not dependent upon moral 
rationality (recall the example of the two nuclear scientists). To what extent do 
these issues impact Bishop’s supra-evidential fideism? This is the topic of the 
final section of the chapter. 
Conclusion 
I have outlined Bishop’s theory of fideism. Along the way I have pointed out 
some of my concerns. In some cases, I have suggested ways to improve 
Bishop’s theory (such as by revising (J+) to avoid moral externalism). In other 
cases, I have left problems unanswered. But I have not claimed to defeat 
Bishop’s theory. The goal of the next chapter is to argue that evidentialism 
presents a better alternative to fideism. Making that argument will require 
clarification of what makes one theory better than another, but I will not claim to 
conclusively show either Bishop’s or Evans’s varieties of fideism to be false. 
At a high level Bishop’s fideism suggests that (a) what the religious seeker 
is (or ought to be) interested in is moral entitlement for holding religious 
beliefs,140 (b) epistemically speaking, justification for important religious beliefs 
cannot be had because the evidence regarding religious propositions is 
ambiguous, and therefore (c) what the religious seeker is left with, as a best 
available course of action, is a doxastic venture model as exemplified in thesis 
(J+). Along the way, Bishop has made some claims that I have argued against. 
                                            
140
 Recall that moral entitlement, for Bishop, requires epistemic entitlement. 
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First, there is Bishop’s model of rationality, in which moral obligation is the only 
form of obligation, and thus meeting one’s rational obligations (regardless of the 
domain) becomes a question of meeting one’s moral obligations. Second, Bishop 
claims that considering the total available evidence for important religious 
propositions (such as “God exists”), the result is evidential ambiguity. Third, when 
certain conditions obtain (as enumerated in thesis (J+)), one may—or perhaps 
ought to—make a doxastic venture regarding faith propositions. Such doxastic 
ventures are, it seems, permanent in the sense that we cannot hope for more 
evidence that will lead from doxastic venture to justified belief. For this reason, 
Bishop calls his theory a type of fideism. 
The positive impact of Bishop’s argument should not be lost in the critique. 
Bishop provides a much-needed theory of doxastic venture. There are cases 
indeed where evidence is ambiguous, yet the situation presents what Bishop 
calls a forced option. Bishop provides a rational alternative to the traditional 
“hard-line evidentialist” answer that would require suspension of judgment. He 
offers an account of how agents can make responsible (rational, all things 
considered) doxastic ventures. And having approached the problem with both 
moral and epistemic rationality in mind, Bishop has kept an eye on the practical 
aspects. Even in religious contexts, there are situations that, for some S at time t, 
involve ambiguous evidence. While I do not think doxastic venture is a broad and 
enduring solution to the problems of religious beliefs and evidence, it seems 
clear to me that sometimes a doxastic venture is a responsible (and perhaps the 
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only responsible) course of action. Sometimes that initial doxastic venture opens 
up the possibility of identifying evidence that might otherwise remain 
inaccessible. And Bishop is right, I think, in criticizing the hard-line evidentialist 
for mis-handling the situations that arise from evidential ambiguity, taking false 
refuge in a demand for suspension of judgment.  
My concern is with the extension of this theory of doxastic venture into a 
version of fideism that claims that in general the doxastic venture is the correct 
approach to addressing religious propositions. Is Bishop’s model the best a 
religious seeker can or should hope for? Is doxastic venture the answer for the 
religious seeker? Or is there a better candidate?141 Much of the question now 
seems to hinge upon whether it has really been shown that there is not sufficient 
unambiguous evidence (or that sufficient evidence cannot be had). 
This evidential critique of Bishop’s, and even the agent-centered critique by 
Evans, should raise another question for us. What do these questions about 
evidential availability and agent reliability say about the character of the God 
these arguments purport to defend? Might we turn the question a different 
direction and ask about what can or ought to be expected (epistemically) from 
such a God? This will be a guiding question in the last chapter. 
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 Again, the very notion of “better” needs clarification, and I will address that in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EVIDENTIALISM AND FAITH 
Introduction 
In the last two chapters, I have explored Evans’s and Bishop’s theories of 
fideism. I have claimed that each has difficulties. In this chapter I offer an 
evidentialist alternative to fideism. Both versions of fideism position themselves 
as answers to evidentialism’s insufficiencies. But neither has conclusively shown 
evidentialism incapable of addressing the supposed problems raised by the 
fideist. In this chapter I wish to make the following claim: Far from being 
defeated, evidentialism provides a better account of how one can hold 
epistemically rational religious beliefs. 
To begin, I will look at fideism’s most troubling aspect: it’s seeming inability 
to address the concerns of the skeptic. Evans builds a theory centered on agent-
based limitations and flaws. While Evans invokes cognitive limitations as an 
argument against evidentialism, ultimately it does damage to the fideist. Bishop’s 
theory is about the permissibility of belief, but it leaves no compelling reason to 
accept religious beliefs in the face of skeptical challenges. When accepting 
evidential ambiguity as a permanent state, one has little hope of answering 
skeptical challenges to religious beliefs. 
If the goal of both forms of fideism is to assuage the critical doubts of the 
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religious seeker, the fact that neither theory can rebuff the skeptic is cause for 
concern. An individual with rational goals is interested in acquiring theories 
resistant to skepticism.1 Evidentialism, I argue, remains a better epistemological 
approach than fideism. Against the formulations of evidentialism in Bishop and 
Evans, I suggest a formulation that is less “hard-line,” and I call this moderate 
evidentialism. 
A theory of evidentialism alone is not enough to adequately answer the 
criticisms of these two fideists. Evans and Bishop raise significant concerns 
about the purported evidence. We must return to the question of whether there is 
non-ambiguous evidence for religious beliefs, and whether that evidence is such 
that an agent can grasp it—even an agent cognitively limited and prone to 
selfishness and pride. Bishop and Evans each claim that the evidence of natural 
theology is insufficient. I examine why, discussing this sort of evidence as 
forensic evidence. But perhaps seeking forensic evidence for God is a less 
fruitful approach than others. Might we look elsewhere for a source of evidence? 
I return to the distinction discussed in the last chapter between public and private 
evidence. I examine the notion of private evidence in its various forms, 
concluding that we often admit private evidence in well-accepted epistemic 
practices. Certain claims about the evidential role of religious experience, though, 
give reason to pause. Ought we really accept these as evidence? Are they the 
best available evidence? And are they sufficient evidence? I briefly address 
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 See the discussion of rationality in the first chapter for more on this. 
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these questions before moving on to another potential source of evidence. 
Both the fideists and the natural theologians may have erred in their 
approach to evidence, in that they have neglected a critical leading question: If 
there is a being worthy of the title God, how would this being be evident to 
humans? A being worthy of the title God would be, among other things, 
relational, perfectly loving, and altogether moral. Based on these characteristics 
we might be able to project how such a being would interact with us. I suggest 
that the answer to the question of evidence is that God’s existence would be 
evident to us through God’s interactions (at a moral level) in our lives. Rather 
than seeking forensic evidence, traces of God, residue of his actions in the world, 
we are better off seeking evidence of God’s person-based interactions. If we are 
to look for evidence of God, we should look for evidence of God’s efforts to non-
coercively motivate moral improvement in individuals. I call this volitional 
evidence, and suggest that we look at moral promptings experienced in 
conscience as a starting point for evidence of God’s acting in our lives. 
Such promptings, should we find them, still may not be sufficient for 
justification. But our response to these promptings may become the basis for 
encountering additional evidence. Thus, I suggest that Bishop’s notion of 
epistemic venture may yet play a substantial, but non-fideistic, role in the 
epistemic journey of the religious seeker. But this venture model is rightly 
sensitive to the skeptic. That is, the venture does not conclude with evidence-
less belief, counter-evidential belief, or even mere acceptance in the face of 
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ambiguity. Rather, it is an epistemically rational strategy for diachronically 
acquiring evidence. 
Doubt and Skepticism 
A mark of a good epistemic theory is its resilience to the skeptic. Theories 
resistant to skepticism lend a higher degree of doxastic (or at least epistemic) 
stability. If there is one problem that troubles fideism in general, it is skepticism. 
By focusing on epistemic entitlement instead of justification, the two varieties of 
fideism presented here have committed to a permissibility thesis. But epistemic 
permissibility, as I claim below, is ill-equipped to rebuff skeptical challenges. 
This claim may strike some as surprising. After all, historically fideism arose 
as an answer to the skeptics. Bayle and Montaigne, both considered fathers of 
fideism, were deeply rooted in Pyrrhonian skepticism.2 They believed, as do 
Evans and Bishop, that traditional epistemic theories failed to answer the 
questions of the skeptic. Yet these early fideists make the claim that one ought to 
have faith (construed primarily in doxastic terms) in the face of epistemic failure. 
Early fideism was situated in a milieu in which certainty was held to be a 
necessary characteristic of knowledge.3 This commitment to certainty opened the 
possibility of seemingly devastating skeptical attacks exemplified by Descartes’ 
evil deceiver. But devotion to the certainty criterion for knowledge did not 
                                            
2
 cf. Penelhum 1983, Popkin 1979, and the first chapter of Maia Neto 1995. 
3
 Popkin (1979) elaborates on the relationship between theology, fideism, skepticism, and 
certainty. 
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diminish, and the epistemic theories (again, best exemplified in Cartesian 
epistemology) seemed to limit what may be known to a small pool of beliefs.4 
Humans can hope to know only a little. And religious beliefs seemed (to many) to 
be outside the scope of what could be known. Early fideism may be understood 
as reactionary—perhaps to the extreme opposite. If certainty is a necessary 
condition for knowledge, then the skeptic is in a strong position to undermine 
many knowledge claims. The solution offered by early fideists is to allow religious 
believers to retain conviction in the face of this radical undercutting doubt. Yet 
fideism accomplishes this by ignoring the skeptic’s concerns. To those historical 
fideists, the precariousness of fideism was no more or less troubling than the 
precariousness of certainty-based knowledge. But when we turn toward the 
contemporary theories of Evans and Bishop the picture is different. 
Contemporary epistemology has changed in at least one notable way: 
certainty has given way to defeasibility and fallibility. It is now rare to find a theory 
of epistemology that insists upon certainty as a criterion for justification or 
knowledge. In so changing, contemporary epistemology displays a marked 
improvement in resilience to the skeptical challenge. No longer can the 
introduction of doubt, however minuscule that doubt may be, undermine a 
knowledge claim. Nor can the mere possibility that not-P undermine justification 
that P. Taken in this light, that classical notion of fideism (as espoused by Bayle, 
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 Popkin calls Descartes’s evil demon the first example of super-Pyrrhonism (1979, 179). 
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Montaigne and others) seems to be a fringe epistemology.5 Instead of being a 
theory in opposition to another equally strong (yet widely accepted) theory, it 
appears to be an outlier that has perhaps fallen into disrepute. 
But might fideism enjoy a re-formulation in kind? Might certain aspects of 
fideism be recalibrated to better address problems faced in contemporary 
religious epistemology? Evans and Bishop find reason to again forward varieties 
of fideism. As we have seen, these two theories of fideism are moderate when 
compared to earlier theories. 
Many (though not all) contemporary epistemic theories fare better against 
the skeptic than the certainty-based theories of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and 
nineteenth centuries. While this is not to say that all succeed in all regards, global 
skepticism may not appear to contemporary eyes to raise quite the specter that it 
was to Descartes.6 But this raises an interesting question: Do the new forms of 
fideism forwarded by Bishop and Evans also display better resilience to the 
skeptic? 
Entitlement and the Skeptic 
Bishop and Evans both purport to develop fideism not as an alternative to 
epistemic justification, but as a form of entitlement for belief. As I have shown in 
the preceding chapters, both Evans and Bishop are developing an account of the 
                                            
5
 It has been suggested by Evans (1998), Bishop (2007) and Moser (2010) that at least some 
versions of epistemic externalism are also forms of fideism. This may be true, but this variety of 
fideist refrains from the forthcoming form of fideism found in classical fideists. 
6
 Notable exceptions include Peter Unger, who defends the notion that certainty is a component 
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permissibility of holding faith beliefs. To what degree is such a permissibility 
thesis resistant to skepticism? Bishop and Evans both state that their claims are 
modest: these two versions of fideism only show that an agent may remain 
(generally) rational in holding qualifying faith beliefs. But even while qualifying the 
argument thus, both acknowledge that religious beliefs are anything but trivial 
details of one’s overall beliefs. The core of the Christian beliefs at issue in both 
accounts is not merely a set of historical propositions, but an entire moral and 
epistemic framework, an outlook on life (and death, and beyond), and even a 
personal relationship between a human agent and God. Bishop expresses the 
importance of some of these core religious beliefs by claiming that these beliefs 
are framing principles: They become the foundation of a framework upon which 
one’s entire view of the world—and one’s acting within the world—is based. 
There is a magnitude to these beliefs that extends far beyond a simple venture 
that some historical fact P obtains. 
Yet even while acknowledging the magnitude of such beliefs, Bishop and 
Evans seem to feel that it is sufficient merely to be permitted to hold these 
beliefs. Justification is not necessary. Here it behooves us to draw attention to a 
detail: Both Evans and Bishop conclude (though for different reasons) that one 
cannot be epistemically justified in holding faith beliefs. Evans believes that our 
epistemic equipment is “fatally flawed.” Bishop believes that the evidence is 
irremediably ambiguous. But both reject the claim that the correct response is 
                                            
of knowledge (2000, 334) and Barry Stroud (2000). 
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suspension of judgment. Bishop goes so far as to claim that the reason 
suspension of judgment is not appropriate is precisely because of the magnitude 
of the beliefs in question.7 Here the skeptic is likely to raise the objection that 
basing one’s overall noetic structure on beliefs that are not only unjustified, but 
perhaps unjustifiable, is epistemically irrational.8 
For Evans, what precludes justification is the chronic malfunction—due to 
sin and cognitive limitations—of one’s epistemic capacities.9 Once we recognize 
this, says Evans, we can overcome this limitation by taking religious propositions 
by faith. The skeptic is unlikely to be swayed by Evans’s admonition to have faith. 
The objection is one I raised in chapter 2: What makes faith less prone to lead 
one into error than epistemic rationality? Faith is at least as likely (if not more 
likely) to mislead one than reasoned decision making.10 When one does not have 
the necessary capacity to reason about P, concludes the skeptic, the appropriate 
                                            
7
 It is not morally appropriate because of the practical implications of such beliefs. But Bishop 
also claims that it is not epistemically appropriate (Bishop 2007, 143-144). Framing principles 
play an important epistemic role for Bishop. Suspending judgment on framing principles way have 
broad epistemic implications for an individual. Further, Bishop argues that because evidential 
ambiguity is unavoidable for religious propositions, one is never entitled to suspend judgment 
based on absence of evidence (143). 
8
 “Overall noetic structure” is Bishop’s term (2007, 139). The skeptic may then challenge Bishop’s 
epistemic claims about framing principles. 
9
 How do we know that there is a malfunction? Evans offers a roundabout argument that boils 
down to the claims that (a) reason is not so damaged so as to fail to see its own problems, and 
(b) some areas (e.g. religious belief) are more prone to failure than others (e.g. beliefs about my 
current physical state) (Evans 1998, 103-106). In chapter 2, I point out several issues with 
Evans’s formulation of knowledge’s limits. The bottom line, I claim, is that reason may be limited 
and flawed, but not “fatally” so. 
10
 Ultimately, Evans is an externalist about knowledge (and thus warrant), but he sees a definite 
role for entitlement. The skeptic needn’t attack Evans’s externalism to raise doubts about his 
fideism. 
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response is not belief, nor disbelief, but suspension of judgment.  
Bishop’s rebuttal to the skeptic is to make the Jamesian claim that in cases 
of forced options, such as faith beliefs, suspension of judgment is (practically 
speaking) the same as disbelief.11 Therefore, to claim that one ought to suspend 
judgment in the face of ambiguous evidence is equivalent to claiming that one 
disbelieve (because of suspension of judgment). Consequently, one is actually 
entitled to select between belief and disbelief. Such an argument has a peculiar 
quality. The claim seems to be that because the outcomes of disbelief and 
suspension of judgment are (in some way) equivalent, the criteria ought to be 
considered equivalent. The criterion for disbelief (stated roughly) is that one have 
sufficient undefeated evidence that not-P. That is, if S has sufficient undefeated 
evidence that not-P, one epistemically ought to hold not-P. On the other hand, if 
S lacks sufficient undefeated evidence either for P or for not-P, S epistemically 
ought to suspend judgment. Bishop’s claim seems to be that suspension of 
judgment regarding (“forced”) religious propositions results in performatively 
similar or identical consequences to holding that these religious propositions are 
false.12 This is not problematic, but what Bishop claims based on this does seem 
problematic: He indicates that because there are really only two outcomes 
(acting as if P, and acting as if not-P), suspension of judgment is the same as 
                                            
11
 Bishop 2003, 129-134. 
12
 As I understand it, what Bishop is claiming is that the agnostic and the atheist may claim to 
have different doxastic states regarding religious propositions, but those doxastic states both lead 
to the same sort of actions. 
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disbelief: “not taking p to be true is in practice equivalent to taking p to be 
false.”13 Hence one is actually faced with a bivalent choice (believe or 
disbelieve). There is no meaningful sense of “suspending judgment” for what 
James calls a forced option. 
The skeptic will point out that this is a troublesome conflation. The 
requirements for suspension of belief were met; therefore one epistemically 
ought to suspend judgment. Even if suspending judgment is not performatively 
different from holding not-P (a claim which itself may be dubious) this does not in 
any way change the fact that the criteria for suspension were met, nor does this 
similarity of conclusions entitle one to re-jigger one’s epistemology to preclude 
suspension of judgment as an option. In a shell game, the token is under only 
one of the three shells. There may be only two possible outcomes to the game 
(find the token or don’t find the token), but this does not mean that there are only 
two choices. 
For the skeptic, neither Evans nor Bishop can deliver a reason why inability 
to gain justification that P (or that not-P) ought to lead one to hold P, even if “by 
doxastic venture” or “by faith.”  When it comes down to it, the skeptic holds the 
epistemic high ground: it is epistemically rational to suspend judgment. When 
faced with irremediable evidential ambiguity or with defeated evidence, one 
(epistemically) is not entitled to hold a belief. 
There is a second aspect of Evans’s and Bishop’s entitlement thesis that 
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 Bishop 2003, 132. 
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encounters skeptical objections. One who adopts fideism will find oneself in a 
precarious doxastic (or at least epistemic) situation. Permissive beliefs are not 
resilient against skeptical attacks. Epistemic permissibility may accomplish a 
purpose. In being permitted to believe, one may claim to be, in some sense, 
rational. But by acquiescing to the claim that sufficient evidence cannot be had 
(either because of agent-based deficiencies, as in Evans, or because of 
evidential ambiguity, as in Bishop), one relinquishes the claim that religious 
beliefs can be justified. One acknowledges the insufficiency of evidence, and yet 
suggests that fideistically held beliefs may still play the part of framing principles. 
This leaves not just a belief, but an entire system of beliefs susceptible to each 
and every novel skeptical attack that an agent encounters. And the skeptic can 
make a simple claim: Without justification, the fideist—even the rational fideist—
is relying on dogmatic assertion. 
The skeptic can raise this simple objection against entitlement-based 
unjustified beliefs by pointing out a result of entitlement for a belief that is not 
epistemically justified. For some held belief B, for what epistemic reasons would 
one hold this belief rather than something other than B (including not-B)? (I call 
such epistemically oriented explanatory questions why-questions.) Why believe 
Christianity rather than Buddhism? Why believe in one God rather than a 
multitude? Why believe in a personal deity rather than a powerful but uninvolved 
one? The permissibility theses found in Evans and Bishop do nothing to show 
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that holding a belief is the best available option.14 This is where skepticism 
outmatches fideism. A fideistically held belief may be rational to believe, but in 
absence of justification, the skeptic may challenge the fideist on the grounds that 
other similarly rational beliefs may be held. Is fideism then cognitively arbitrary? 
Does religious preference come down to non-rational (or at least non-epistemic) 
deciders? The fideist then appears to be the dogmatist—that favorite epithet of 
the skeptic—bluntly asserting P against the relative alternatives. 
The upshot is that fideism does not seem to be an overwhelmingly 
compelling answer to the plight of the religious seeker. Against the claim that one 
ought to believe regardless of evidence, the skeptic will claim that suspension of 
judgment is the epistemically rational stance. And against the claim that 
permissiveness (epistemic entitlement without justification) is sufficient for 
epistemically rationally holding religious beliefs, the skeptic will contend that the 
fideist dogmatically asserting some P without showing it to be the best available 
explanation. 
 But Bishop and Evans suggest that entitlement (without justification) may 
just be the only game in town. Epistemic permissibility may not be ideal, but if 
epistemic justification is not possible, entitlement will have to do. Fideism, at least 
on the two accounts discussed here, is the best explanation only if evidentialism 
is defeated. Unsurprisingly, both Bishop and Evans claim that evidentialism is in 
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 In the next section I will discuss how a critical part of epistemic justification involves addressing 
the question of best available explanations. 
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fact defeated. But is it? Or might it yet show itself to be the better alternative? 
Is Evidentialism Defeated? 
Both Evans and Bishop claim that evidentialism suffers from flaws so severe 
that the rational human agent cannot use evidentialism to answer important 
religious questions. In chapter 2, we encountered Evans’s claims that 
evidentialism’s flaw lies in its conception of the rational agent. In chapter 3, I 
explained Bishop’s notion of evidential ambiguity, along with the strong but 
questionable claims he attributes to the so-called hard-line evidentialism. These 
claims and their bearing on evidentialism must be addressed if we are to 
resuscitate evidentialism. First, though, some characterization of evidentialism is 
in order. While a full defense of evidentialism is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, the sketch I offer will indicate how evidentialism functions in the 
context of religious epistemology.15 I will then address the problems raised by 
Evans and Bishop. 
Moderate Evidentialism 
Bishop has much to say about the “hard-line evidentialist.” Among his 
concerns is the hard-line evidentialist’s privileging of epistemic rationality above 
all other forms of rationality.16 Evans, too, paints a picture of evidentialism that in 
many ways matches Bishop’s portrait of the hard-liner. But hard-line 
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 The account I offer here is strongly influenced by Moser (1985, 1989), Feldman (2004a, 2004b, 
2008), Conee and Feldman (2004a, 2004b), as well as by Foley (1993, 2002) and others. 
16
 Bishop 2007, 62. 
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evidentialism is not the best form of evidentialism, and the characterizations 
found in both Bishop and Evans suffer from deficiencies that, when rectified, will 
show evidentialism more compelling. The theory of evidentialism I defend here 
does not fit the mold of hard-line evidentialism, thus I characterize it as moderate 
evidentialism. It is moderate in that it avoids certain strong claims about both 
evidential practice and an epistemic rationality. 
A theory of rationality has loomed large in this dissertation, as I have 
claimed that questions about religious propositions have not only epistemic 
dimensions, but also (at least) moral and prudential dimensions. For that reason, 
I wish to be clear in framing this theory of moderate evidentialism within the 
larger context of this theory of rationality. Specifically, I claim that at no point 
does epistemic rationality automatically trump other forms of rationality. Human 
agents can and do have different rational goals, and satisfying goals (when 
rational conflict arises) may not necessarily entail accepting only the conclusions 
of epistemic rationality. Moderate evidentialism thus does not overreach 
epistemic authority and dictate moral or prudential (or other) rational obligations 
or goals. 
Justification, as I have characterized it throughout this dissertation, is always 
internal.17 Roughly speaking, epistemic justification serves the role of indicating 
that agent S is epistemically rational in holding belief B at time t. Importantly, 
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 In chapter 2 I use Foley’s distinction between warrant and justification to address the claims of 
the externalist. 
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justification indicates that S is epistemically rational in holding belief in B instead 
of any other contrary belief. The focus of our discussion of evidentialism and the 
fideist critique, given the framing of both Evans and Bishop, is not on religious 
knowledge, but on justification of propositional religious beliefs. In passing, 
though, it may be noted that the evidentialist maintains that knowledge is justified 
true belief (perhaps with an additional Gettier-defeater). 
What is evidentialist justification as it pertains to propositional beliefs? 
Roughly speaking we might characterize it this way: S is justified in holding P just 
in case S has sufficient undefeated evidence supporting P. While a full 
discussion of justification is beyond scope, I will give a sketch of how we are to 
understand “sufficient undefeated evidence supporting P.” I will discuss the 
notion of evidence itself more in the coming pages, for it plays a crucial role in 
the present discussion. But evidence, at is simplest, functions as a truth indicator. 
That is, it points (fallibly and defeasibly) toward the truth of P.18 Evidence may be 
propositional, but it need not be; non-propositional content may also function as 
evidence.19 
Justification requires that one have sufficient evidence. At what point is the 
evidence S possesses sufficient? We can imagine that S may posses some 
piece of evidence E, and that E may indicate P. But at the same time, we may 
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 A truth indicator indicates that P (points toward P), but is not a guarantee that P. It is fallible 
and may be subject to defeat. 
19
 I return to this in the section on private evidence. 
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grant that, all things considered, S may not be justified in believing P. Perhaps S 
has other evidence that indicates something other than (or broader than) P. 
Thus, for S to have sufficient evidence, S must have evidence that makes P 
decisively more epistemologically probable than any competing propositions, 
including not-P.20 That is, for S to be justified in believing that there is an 
individual being worthy of the title God, one’s evidence regarding that proposition 
must not only plausibly answer important questions, but must also render the 
proposition decisively more probable than not just the proposition that there is not 
one being worthy of the title God, but also more than the propositions that there 
is at least one being worthy of the title God, that there are several beings worthy 
of the title God, and so on. Here I am using the terms probable and probability 
not in the statistical  (or strictly logical) sense, but in an epistemological sense as 
shorthand to capture the outcome of a comparison relationship between two or 
more alternatives: roughly, P is decisively more probable than P’ (P’’, P’’’, etc.) 
when (and only when) P provides the best explanation (plausibly answers the 
most why-questions)21 with the least complications and side effects, while still 
exhibiting an adequate level of explanatory parsimony.22 Thus, the evidence 
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 “Competing propositions” here should be understood as propositions that S considers to be 
possible alternatives. For more on epistemological probability, see Moser 1989, Kyberg 1971, 
and Pollock 1993. My usage follows Moser’s. 
21
 We may further adjust this to qualify the why-questions: some why-questions are more 
important (e.g. have more explanatory value) than others. So perhaps this would better be 
characterized as answering the greatest number of important why-questions. 
22
 My characterization of decisive epistemic probability is roughly based on Moser 1989, 99ff. I 
have simplified (I hope not too detrimentally) for brevity. By explanatory parsimony, I am 
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must make P a plausible answer to the questions, but also do so better than the 
competing alternatives P’, P’’, and so on. Decisiveness is not the same as 
certainty. Evidence may be decisive, but a belief may still be defeasible, fallible, 
dubitable, and so on. Certainty carries with it a certain supposition about the 
future. Given that S has undefeated evidence for P at t, certainty is the claim that 
at time t + 1 there cannot be a contravener for P.23 In contrast, decisiveness does 
not necessarily carry with it a certification about the future. Decisiveness 
indicates that at t, the evidence renders P more probable than its competitors to 
the extent that there is no immediate threat to P’s probabilistic advantage.24 I will 
return to the notion of decisiveness later in this chapter, for it plays an interesting 
role in addressing the challenges raised by the fideist. 
Sufficiency, considered this way, is not necessarily a quantitative measure—
it’s not the case that the proposition with the most evidence wins—but a broader 
measure of the degree to which the evidence supports P over possible 
alternatives, while not also introducing undesirable consequences that might 
otherwise be avoided. When S’s total evidence makes P decisively probable for 
S, S has sufficient evidence for holding P. 
                                            
suggesting something in the spirit of Ockham’s razor. 
23
 Goodman’s infamous grue hypothesis may come to mind here: the success of that argument 
hinges on the fact that induction cannot make such a guarantee that S will be blue at t+1, and not 
green (Goodman 1983, 72-76). 
24
 That is, if evidence renders P more probable at t, but there is strong reason to suspect that the 
evidence is about to be overturned, that reason may qualify as a defeater and render holding P 
indecisive, even while more probable at t. 
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In chapter 2, I discussed different kinds of defeaters, and how each defeats 
evidential support. There I discussed both rebutting defeaters and undermining 
defeaters. This same notion of defeaters is what I have in mind in the sketch of 
justification I am offering. Justification requires that no relevant defeater remains 
undefeated.25 When considering epistemic justification of religious beliefs, we 
may interpret both Evans and Bishop as raising defeaters. One may interpret 
Evans’s claims about the sinfulness and corruptness of one’s cognitive faculties 
as being a proposed undermining defeater for any evidence in support of faith 
beliefs (and, for that matter, any evidence supporting beliefs contrary to faith 
beliefs). For any given piece of evidence E, Evans could respond with the 
proposed defeater that the evidence is unreliable for reasons tied to one’s 
cognition. In that way Evans is calling into question the support of E to P. 
Likewise, one may also be inclined to view Bishop’s evidential ambiguity thesis 
as a general claim that there are rebutting defeaters against any piece of 
evidence one might forward in support of a religious belief. In this sense, the idea 
of “evidential ambiguity” is understood as the claim that for every piece of 
evidence E in support of P, there is another piece of evidence, E* that supports 
not-P. As Pollock and Cruz put it: “If M is a defeasible reason for S to believe Q, 
M* is a rebutting defeater for this reason if and only if M* is a defeater (for M as a 
                                            
25
 By qualifying defeaters as being relevant defeaters, I intend to leave open the possibility that 
some far-fetched counterexamples against P may not actually count as defeaters of P in virtue of 
their far-fetchedness. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation, though. 
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reason for S to believe Q) and M* is a reason for S to believe ~Q.”26 Thus one 
(perhaps sloppy) interpretation of evidential ambiguity is to suggest that it is the 
claim that every piece of evidence for a religious belief has an undefeated 
rebutting E*. Applying this characterization to Bishop’s notion of evidential 
ambiguity may be a stretch. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, the 
evidential ambiguity thesis is surprisingly complex. The principal point, though, is 
that it is prima facie plausible to interpret some of Evans’s and Bishop’s 
arguments as proposed (undefeated) defeaters to all evidence regarding 
religious propositions. I will return to these in the following sections, but first I will 
finish this sketch of justification, 
Next there is the matter of evidence being in a support relationship to P. 
Evidence, on my account, has directionality. That is, it functions as a truth 
indicator about some belief B. For some agent S, evidence is not neutral at time 
t. It is the directionality of evidence that qualifies it as evidence, and not merely 
data. So S may have evidence that P, and S may have evidence that not-P, but 
S cannot have a piece of evidence that supports P or not-P.27 Again this brings 
Bishop’s evidential ambiguity thesis to the fore. The evidential ambiguity thesis is 
not necessarily at odds with this characterization of P, but it does draw out a 
                                            
26
 Pollack and Cruz 1999, 196. 
27
 More specifically, one cannot have evidence that supports P v ~P, yet does not support P and 
does not support ~P. 
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salient detail: there is a perspectival element to evidence.28 It is possible that 
there are cases where some piece of evidence E will be held by S1 as support 
for P, while for S2 it may be held as support for not-P. In such cases, the 
difference in interpretation is likely to involve how E interacts with the other 
available evidence for each subject. For example, there is a single mostly-empty 
wineglass on the kitchen counter. S1 may conclude from this that the proprietor 
drank a glass of wine alone, and was thus by herself. But say that S2 has an 
additional piece of evidence available: the proprietor does not drink alcohol. S2 
may conclude that, given that the proprietor does not drink alcohol, she must not 
have been alone. The evidence is directional for both S1 and S2, but the 
combination of the evidence with other evidence may change the interpretation of 
the evidence.29 Thus there might be some sense in which we can interpret 
evidential ambiguity as the case when E supports P for S1 (when E is considered 
as part of a body of evidence), and E supports something other than P (perhaps 
not-P) for S2 (when E is considered to be part of a different body of evidence). 
 In this section I have given a rough characterization of a moderate theory of 
evidentialism. While this characterization is far from exhaustive, this sketch 
should server our immediate purposes. I shall ask how this fares in the face of 
                                            
28
 Accepting that evidence has certain subjective elements does not require that one embrace 
global subjectivism, alethic relativism, and so on. Both the fallibility and the defeasibility of 
justification accommodate stronger notions of truth. cf. Moser 1993. 
29
 This raises a number of questions about evidence as singular or as aggregate. Addressing this 
in any detail is beyond the scope of the dissertation. At present I am suggesting that we can 
meaningfully talk of an individual piece of evidence (a datum with alethic directionality) as well as 
evidence taken together (data with alethic directionality). 
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Evans’s and Bishop’s critiques. In the next two parts I will return to Evans’s and 
Bishop’s (respective) criticisms of evidentialism. 
Evans’s Claims Against Evidentialism 
Evans’s primary argument against the evidentialist isn’t that that there is 
little or no evidence, but that a human agent’s capacity to reason is limited and 
tainted by sin. Even if there is evidence, human agents will display, says Evans, 
the capacity to ignore, misunderstand, or reject the evidence.  This is partially a 
result of cognitive limitations: we may simply be incapable of mustering the 
intellectual wherewithal to appropriately analyze the data and draw the correct 
conclusions. But pride and selfishness may play the bigger role; because of them 
human agents refuse to look for evidence, and (we are to infer) would refuse to 
assent even if possessing evidence. Thus, Evans says that sinfulness corrupts 
one’s epistemic capabilities. 
As Evans frames the problem, epistemic limitations render evidentialism a 
dubious epistemic practice in regard to religious propositions. I understand Evans 
to be claiming that cognitive limitations and sinfulness prevent justification, 
particularly in regard to religious propositions (and therefore religious 
propositional beliefs). At this point, we must ask how epistemic justification is 
thus prevented. 
There are at least three ways in which we can understand Evans’s claim. 
We might understand the claim to be that cognitive limitations and sinfulness 
prevent us from justifiably inferring from evidence to a proposition. Or, as I 
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mentioned in the previous section, we might understand Evans as suggesting 
that cognitive limitations and sinfulness are defeaters to any justification of 
religious propositions. Or we might understand these deficiencies to be operating 
at a higher (meta-epistemic) level, thus preventing epistemic justification from 
functioning properly on the more broad plain of rationality. Ultimately, it seems 
that cognitive limitations may raise one set of problems while selfishness and 
pride raise another. But it is not clear that either renders evidentialism 
implausible or inoperative. 
Cognitive Limitations and Inference 
First there is the matter of whether the deficiencies prevent us from drawing 
justified inferences from the evidence. The crux of the matter here has to do with 
the access conditions for S’s doxastic justification that P. For P to be justified for 
S, S must be have sufficient evidence, and correctly infer from this evidence to 
the belief. Do cognitive limitations and selfishness preclude proper inference? 
Evans does seem to answer this in the affirmative, though in a roundabout way. 
Evans claims that one of the evidentialist’s main limitations in regard to 
supporting religious propositions has to do with our inability to understand. By 
understanding P, Evans seems to have in mind the ability to give a thorough 
explanation of P.30 Thus, for example, to be justified in believing that there is a 
God, one must have thorough understanding of what it means to be God 
                                            
30
 Evans 1988, 83 and 87. Evans’s notion of understanding is tremendously complex, borrowing 
at various times from Aquinas, Kant, Plantinga, and Kierkegaard. I draw this particular 
characterization from his remarks on cognitive limitations. 
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(including, it appears, a complete grasp of omnipotence, omniscience, etc.). 
Understanding, on Evans’s account, does not become a barrier in our day-to-day 
reasoning, largely because we understand the world of our day-to-day reasoning. 
But when it comes to God and other religious matters, we cannot even hope to 
understand such things. 
Elsewhere, Evans acknowledges that the presumption of what we do and do 
not understand may be an oversimplification.31 Problems of understanding are 
not at all unique to religious propositions. We have many other beliefs—scientific, 
relational, and otherwise—that involve matters that we do not understand. Yet 
humans seem to be able to assess what limited evidence they can understand in 
an epistemically rational way.32 Indeed, if we were to require thorough 
understanding of the external world before being justified in believing in the 
existence of the external world, the sort of fideism proposed by Evans would be 
far too modest. But thorough understanding is not required for justification. More 
specifically, for some evidence E to function as evidence for some agent S in 
support of some proposition P, it is not a requirement that S understands (in the 
sense just explained) E in order for S to rely upon E as evidence for P. Thus, an 
absence of understanding does not pose a significant problem to evidentialism. 
This opens a second challenge, though. Perhaps it is not understanding, in 
the strict sense, but argument that is missing. Perhaps it is better to take Evans 
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 Ibid., 20. 
32
 Ibid., 55. 
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as suggesting that we must be able to give argument for our beliefs, and 
because of our cognitive limitations we cannot reliably and consistently produce 
arguments in support of our beliefs.33 
To have evidence, and even to be justified in a belief because of that 
evidence, does not require that one be able to produce an argument.34 The 
skeptic may demand that one produce an (irrefutable) argument for a belief, but 
this is not a reasonable demand, as many of our beliefs—especially empirical 
beliefs based on experiential evidence—are rightly held by the evidence alone. 
As Paul Moser puts it: 
[O]ur having evidence, even evidence that satisfies the justification-condition 
for knowledge, doesn’t necessarily include our having a non-
questionbegging argument, or any argument, against skeptics… Our having 
evidence doesn’t entail our giving an answer or claim of any kind… One’s 
supporting evidence could still be cognitively impeccable, despite one’s 
lacking the kind of argument demanded by a skeptic.35 
While much can be said about the relation between evidence, argument, and 
justification, I will only make three brief points here: First, an argument is not 
required for establishing a relationship between evidence and belief. Second, 
evidence is not made less significant solely because one cannot produce an 
argument; most importantly, evidence can justify a belief B (and S can be 
justified in believing B) without S producing an argument.36 Third, one need not 
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 Ibid., 20. 
34
 Neither does it require a causal explanation. cf. Moser 1989, 49. 
35
 Moser 2008, 63. 
36
 It may indeed be the case that not all evidence has propositional content. cf. Moser 1985, 
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be able to produce a genealogy of evidence. That is, one needn’t provide an 
argument identifying the source and reliability of one’s evidence. While this is not 
to say that argument is useless (there are indeed many cases where it is useful), 
the skeptic is making a misstep when claiming that one must be capable of 
producing arguments before one can believe in an epistemically rational way.37 
Consequently, Evans’s claim that an agent’s inability to understand or provide an 
argument for belief undermines one’s justification is based on a 
misunderstanding of the roles of understanding and argument in justification.38 
Cognitive limitations do have an impact on epistemic rationality. Because 
human agents sometimes forget evidence, or fail to acquire evidence, or 
misinterpret evidence, there are numerous occasions in which we hold beliefs 
that are not true. However, this does not mean that those beliefs are not justified. 
Empirical justification is defeasible and fallible: we can meaningfully talk of 
holding justified false beliefs.39 Admitting as much is not tantamount to granting 
the defeat of internalist justification.  
                                            
chapter 5. 
37
 By not requiring an argument, I am not claiming that one can be (doxastically) justified without 
any awareness of the evidence. For more, see Moser 1989, esp. chapter 3. 
38
 For propositional beliefs, one must still be able to infer from the evidence to the proposition. 
That is, there must be a connection for S between the evidence and the propositional belief. But 
this inference may not be accompanied by an argument. 
39
 There is the question of whether or not a priori justification is defeasible and falsifiable. But this 
is beyond the present scope, since we are focused on empirical evidence. 
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Cognitive Limitations and Sinfulness as Defeaters 
A second way of understanding Evans’s cognitive limitations/selfishness 
argument is as the claim that these deficiencies become defeaters for any 
evidence about religious propositions. Thus, one cannot hold justified beliefs 
about religious propositions because one’s evidence is always defeated. I 
suggested earlier that Evans may be understood as offering an undermining 
defeater for religious beliefs. If evidence E supports P, E* is the claim that 
cognitive limitations and selfishness have tainted E, and E is hence unreliable. It 
is possible, therefore, that E does not actually support P.  
This concern does not necessarily defeat justification, for the claim it makes 
is too general. That is, for some specific evidence E, simply raising the doubt that 
E is tainted by selfishness or cognitive limitations does not raise a specific 
challenge to the relationship between E and P. Further, it is unclear how the 
evidence may be tainted in a way that disqualifies it from being a truth indicator. 
The moderate evidentialist would accept the possibility that an agent makes 
cognitive mistakes and does not have unblemished evidential capacities. For the 
evidentialist, the possibility that the evidence available to S at t is not the most 
accurate representation of reality (however such a claim might be spelled out) is 
not a defeater.40 Nor is the claim that E may be tainted by selfishness. Evidence 
is fallible and may be wrong; it is defeasible too. But one would be remiss to 
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 My master’s thesis explored the possibility that various psychological biases might undermine 
evidentialism. My analysis there suffered from the same oversight made here. 
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jettison evidence on the grounds that it may be tainted by sin or cognitive 
limitations. 
This is not to discount the possibility that a specific defeater may arise 
whose origin is best be explained by cognitive limitations or selfishness. Such a 
defeater (whether undercutting or rebutting) would need to be defeated. Given 
this, Evans may be right to raise the concern that such defeaters may arise. It 
just is not the case that the general claim (fact?) that we have cognitive 
limitations and act selfishly is itself a defeater of all evidence for religious belief. 
Rational Conflict, Selfishness, and Cognitive Limitations 
A better explanatory model for selfishness operates not at the epistemic 
level, but at the level of rational conflict. 
Instead of understanding selfishness as a factor in epistemic justification, it 
is better to understand them as leading one to adopt a (rationally) prudential goal 
of doing what is best for oneself. We may understand selfishness as the 
condition that occurs when one favors one’s own wellbeing (prudential rational 
obligations) in violation of one’s moral obligations.41 That is, it is a state that 
comes about when one is prudentially justified that P, but morally (and perhaps 
epistemically) justified that not-P, and one opts to act on prudential goals to the 
detriment of moral goals. As I stated in the first chapter, one need not be 
conscious of one’s opting to act selfishly. Given this characterization, we can see 
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 Note that this may include acting in violation of one’s epistemic obligations as well, but this is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for selfishness. 
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how selfishly selecting P when it is epistemically rational to select not-P does not, 
per se, indicate that one has failed to reason epistemically, but rather that one 
has opted to act selfishly by privileging prudential goals over moral and epistemic 
goals. 
If selfishness is a threat at the (all things considered) rational level, and not 
at the level of epistemic rationality, perhaps it does not threaten evidentialism in 
the way Evans suggests. That is, at this level, Evans’s argument does not 
question the status of evidence as a truth indicator. But there is a seemingly 
plausible further argument that might be raised. 
Humans make mistakes when setting rational preferences. On the present 
account of rationality, setting one’s superior rational (all things considered) 
preference involves determining which rational preferences are most important, 
and this has epistemic aspects.42 Might it be the case that it is here, at this stage 
of rationality, that selfishness produces faulty evidence about how best to satisfy 
a rational preference? There is something about this suggestion that makes it 
compelling. Perhaps we sometimes act selfishly not because we intentionally 
selected prudential obligations over moral ones, but because our epistemic 
faculties taint our epistemic judgment. Thus, one cries foul: “It tricked me! I didn’t 
mean to act against my moral obligation.” But the problem with this account is 
that, at this level, it runs into definitional problems. If selfishness is the selection 
of prudential goals against moral goals, then it is an agent-invoked behavior, not 
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 Moser 1985, 229-234. 
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a “faculty.” True, the decision to act selfishly may be unconscious—it may even 
be true that some or all people have a default disposition to act selfishly—but this 
does not entail that selfishness is an evidence-producing faculty run amok. Nor 
does it show that the evidence is not a truth indicator. 
In the end, I do not see a successful argument that evidentialism fails 
because of the epistemic insufficiency on the part of the reasoner. Evidentialism 
is not fatally damaged by the fact that humans suffer from cognitive limitations, or 
even by the fact that humans do sometimes make wrong (and sinfully so) 
choices. It remains possible for S to be evidentially justified in holding P, provided 
S has sufficient undefeated evidence. S may occasionally be wrong. Or S may 
decide to act as if not-P to satisfy other goals. But deficiencies in S’s evidence or 
behavior do not indicate that evidentialism as a theory is a failure. Nor does it 
indicate a pervasive fault in evidential justification of propositional religious 
beliefs. 
Ultimately, Evans’s agent-focused critique of evidentialism does not 
succeed. Bishop’s argument, in contrast to Evans’, suggests that it is the 
evidence, not the agent, that poses the problem. While Evans is focused on the 
defectiveness of the agent, Bishop focuses on the evidence itself, claiming that 
the evidence (not the evaluator) is defective. 
Bishop's Claims Against Evidentialism 
Bishop suggests that, when the total available evidence for religious 
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propositions is examined, what ‘we’ find is that the evidence is ambiguous.43 The 
same evidence can be interpreted (presumably correctly) as confirming or as 
disconfirming. Its ambiguity means it cannot support belief, which means 
justification cannot be achieved. Furthermore, Bishop believes that the ambiguity 
of evidence may even be necessarily so: there may be no possibility for it to be 
otherwise.44 If this is so, propositional religious beliefs are resistant to 
justification, and the hard-line evidentialist must suspend judgment. 
Already in this chapter I have suggested that evidence has directionality. 
That is, evidence qua evidence points toward the truth of a proposition. Were it to 
have no such directionality, it would not, by definition, be evidence. But this 
directionality also has a subjective aspect. I have given the wine-glass example 
of how S1 may view E as supporting P, while S2 may view that same E as 
supporting not-P. This shift in the interpretation of E has to do with the larger 
body of evidence in which the particular evidence is evaluated (that is, the total 
evidence available to  S1 at time t and the total evidence available to S2 at time 
t). This “ambiguity” is not a problem for the evidentialist, for it is the directionality 
of an agent’s total evidence that matters for justification of a propositional belief. 
And it is possible that the total evidence recommends suspension of judgment 
just as it is possible that summing a series of positive and negative numbers may 
equal zero. So for some agent S at time t, the total evidence available to S may 
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 Bishop 2007, 67. I discussed Bishop’s ‘we’ in the previous chapter. 
44
 Ibid., 140-143. 
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support P, something other than P (say Q or ~P), or may require suspension of 
judgment. 
As I claimed in the previous chapter, Bishop’s move from a notion of “total 
available evidence” to the evidential ambiguity thesis has a difficulty that can be 
located in a misconstrual of the individual’s available evidence. Bishop seems to 
be suggesting that if we gathered the evidence available to all people, we would 
be able to infer nothing other than that the evidence is ambiguous, and thus we 
would suspend judgment. Therefore, we should suspend judgment. But this is 
not how (moderate) evidentialism works. Evidentialism asks whether the 
evidence possessed by some particular S (at some particular time t) is sufficient 
for S to be justified in believing P.45 Moreover, as our focus has been on whether 
P is justified for S, we are asking whether S evaluates the evidence available and 
is aware that it supports P. It is not a requirement that all possible evidence be 
brought to bear, but only the evidence S has.46 To move from this understanding 
of evidence to the claim that evidential ambiguity is a universal (or nearly 
universal) experience is to make a tremendous leap—a leap made all the more 
tendentious by the fact that both ardent believers and ardent disbelievers alike 
will claim that they do indeed have evidence supporting their beliefs.47 
                                            
45
 Conee 2004, 261. 
46
 There is considerable debate about what it means to have evidence (cf. Feldman 2004b and 
also Moser 1989). Ironing out that technicalities of this is not critical for the argument here. In the 
present context, I gloss that debate by suggesting that for S to have evidence E, S must have 
cognitive access at time t to E. 
47
 In the previous chapter I examined a few other possible interpretations of evidential ambiguity 
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Some people at some times may find themselves in the position where their 
total available evidence recommends suspension of judgment. In such cases, as 
I will discuss later, there may in fact be rationale for making certain epistemic 
ventures (on the grounds that a venture may turn up additional evidence). But I 
do not see grounds to move from this possibility to the broader claims that (a) 
evidential ambiguity is a universal phenomenon, and (b) it represents a flaw in 
evidentialism. 
Evidential ambiguity is not the only reason Bishop gives for rejecting hard-
line evidentialism. A second issue Bishop raises has to do with the model of 
rationality espoused by the hard-line evidentialist. The hard-line evidentialist 
claims that S is only morally justified in holding P if S is epistemically justified in 
holding P.48 This, in effect, places epistemic rationality over moral rationality in 
the context of resolving rational conflict. I have already claimed that this is not the 
case for the moderate evidentialist. For the moderate evidentialist, it is prima 
facie desirable to hold beliefs that are both epistemically and morally justified 
(assuming that one desires fewer rational conflicts, and this is certainly not a 
dictate of the system, but only a hypothesis). But this need not lead the moderate 
evidentialist to claim that one must be epistemically justified in order to be 
morally justified. On the present account, the moderate evidentialist may find 
oneself confronted with a situation in which it is morally rational to hold P, and 
                                            
and found them equally problematic. 
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 Bishop 2007, 62. This is what Bishop calls the moral-epistemic link principle. 
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epistemically rational to hold not-P. The resolution of this conflict does not 
automatically fall on the side of epistemic rationality, but is resolved according to 
one’s rational (all things considered) preferences. 
Finally, Bishop suggests a problem that must be addressed carefully, and 
this has to do with what counts as evidence. Bishop talks about passional 
attributes as pertaining to one’s evidential base. To what extent are so-called 
passional attributes (emotions) admissible as evidence? Bishop is careful when 
making claims of how “passional” attributes can count as evidence.49 He thinks 
they can be allowable only under certain circumstances. 
Feelings that involve intuitions of the truth of propositions will count as 
evidence… only when they can be brought within an applicable normative 
evidential practice. That will require, at a minimum, that the veridicality and 
defeasibility conditions of such intuitions be open to wide intersubjective 
agreement within the relevant community. Where subsumption under and 
evidential practice is not possible, however, ‘feelings’ as to truths, however 
subjectively compelling, will not count as evidence, and will rightly be 
classified as passional doxastic inclinations.50 
Bishop sees it as a requirement that evidence, even when non-public, be 
governed by public evidential practice, namely veridicality and defeasiblity 
conditions. How are we to understand this? First, Bishop gives an example of an 
emotion that is properly considered evidence: One feels fearful and threatened in 
the presence of another person.51 This feeling, says Bishop, is appropriately 
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 Bishop 2007, 198-199. 
50
 Bishop 2007, 199. Italics in original. 
51
 Note that Bishop does not distinguish between the feeling (passion), the intuition (see the 
quote), and the means of reception. 
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considered evidence that this other person is hostile. Why? Because this sort of 
emotional response is widely regarded as an “intuition of basically evident 
truths.”52 But what about the feeling of the presence of God? Is this also 
evidence? Here Bishop’s story becomes complex. On the one hand, Bishop is 
reluctant to claim such feelings are evidence, yet we do make decisions on the 
basis of “passions.” Does that make us epistemically irrational (or worse, 
generally irrational)? 
First, there is the question of whether the rationality of a passion can be 
determined. To this, Bishop requires that for passions to be rational, they must at 
least meet two conditions: they must not conflict with “evidence-based factual 
belief” and they must be logically coherent.53 But Bishop further suggests that 
any beliefs we hold “based on passion” be “subject to critical pressures from 
others.”54 As I understand these claims, Bishop is suggesting that passions may 
be treated as evidence that P only if they meet all three of the conditions above. 
Here, though, Evans is careful to never suggest that such evidence is justifying. 
Instead, he only claims that one may be rational when holding beliefs based on 
passions.55 As Bishop continues to spell this out, passions become the basis for 
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 Ibid., 200. 
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 Ibid., 201. 
55
 Ibid., 201-202. 
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doxastic venture, rather than for justified beliefs.56 When it comes down to it, for 
Bishop the passions become the guide to if and when one ought to make a 
doxastic (or sub-doxastic) venture in the face of evidential ambiguity.57 
It is not clear to me what is gained by taking this route of argument instead 
of claiming that passions serve as truth indicators but only weak evidence—
evidence whose explanatory value is limited and unlikely to (on its own) be 
sufficient. 
Bishop sees his advancement of the argument in favor of passions as a 
counter to the hard-line evidentialist. Bishop’s hard-line evidentialist accepts only 
“incorrigible and self-evident truths and truths evident in sensory perceptual 
experience under ‘normal’ conditions.”58 This, thinks Bishop, forecloses on 
passional truth-indicators that suggest anything about the supernatural.59 That is, 
as Bishop understands it, by admitting passions in even this minor capacity, 
Bishop’s fideism is open to truth-indicators that hard-line evidentialism is not. To 
what extent does this view conflict with the moderate evidentialism proposed thus 
far? 
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 It is unclear to me how evidence could be evidence, yet not have any potential to be part of a 
justifying body of evidence. 
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 Ibid., 203. 
58
 Ibid., 24. cf. 65-76. 
59
 It is unclear how this link is forged, but I believe that Bishop assumes a presumption in favor of 
philosophical naturalism among hard-line evidentialists (Ibid., 65-76). Another possible 
explanation may be found in Bishop’s requirement that evidence must pass evaluation of a 
relevant epistemic community, where such a community may rule out supernatural experience 
(199-200). 
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The heart of the matter seems to be whether or not passions—emotions—
qualify as evidence. Bishop has pointed to cases where an emotional response 
may rightly be considered evidential. One may feel fearful in the presence of 
another person, and this emotion may well be evidence that the person is hostile. 
Bishop continues from there to suggest that many other emotions may not be 
evidence, but may yet be indicators suggestive of a particular doxastic venture. 
But if some emotion E is an indicator that P, what more must E have before it can 
be considered evidence? Bishop suggests three additional criteria: consistency 
with other evidence, logical coherence, and the nebulous criterion of being 
acceptable to the greater epistemic community.60 
The first two are, I suggest, not qualifiers for evidence at all. Evidence, in the 
atomic sense, need not meet criteria of coherence with other evidence before it 
can be evidence. Such a requirement would have the stilted effect of 
exacerbating a confirmation bias. The first piece of evidence would in many 
cases become the deciding piece of evidence. Contrary evidence would be 
discarded for failing the coherence test. Furthermore, in the atomic sense it is 
difficult to see what logical coherence affords. It may indeed be the case that two 
individual pieces of evidence display a superficial logical incoherence. This does 
not serve as grounds for rejecting one or the other ipso facto. Rather, the 
resolution of such evidential difficulties is part of an agent’s resolution process in 
meeting the sufficiency and support conditions for justification. 
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However, admitting evidence without these qualifiers does not automatically 
endow such evidence with justifying power. It must still be shown, along with 
other available evidence, to be sufficient. And evidence must weather defeaters 
as well. Consequently, admitting emotional evidence does not, by that fact alone, 
transform evidentialism into a soft emotivist theory of knowledge. 
But there is Bishop’s third qualification: that for any emotion to qualify as 
evidence, it must accord with existing epistemic practices of the community. By 
this rule, Bishop suggests that we may accept the evidence of fear in the case 
just cited (because “we all” agree that that emotion is evidential) while still 
resisting the claim that one’s feeling that God exists be taken as evidence that 
God exists. In the previous chapter I objected to the vagueness of such 
“community scoped” conditions. And this remains a problem in the present 
context. Such an emotion, considered in the epistemic context of a charismatic 
Christian church on Pentecost may be perfectly acceptable, while invoking this 
same claim at the anthropology department’s holiday party may be met with 
derision. That said, again I would step back to the claim that while acceptance by 
the relevant epistemic community might not be a criterion for an emotion’s status 
as evidence, it may play another role in justification—be it as evidence or as 
perhaps as part of a potential defeater. That is, if S becomes aware that such an 
emotion is widely considered to be unreliable, S has just obtained a potential 
defeater for evidence that has as its content that emotion. 
In the end, it seems to me that Bishop simply mischaracterizes the problem: 
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emotions are not to be tested as to whether or not they qualify as evidence. 
Instead, we can accept them as evidential (assuming they act as truth-indicators) 
and subject to the same sorts of evaluation that all other evidence is subjected.61 
Emotional evidence may be defeated—and perhaps it is more susceptible to 
defeat than other evidence. Perhaps logical incoherence, consistency, and 
accepted epistemic norms may play a role in the defeat of some piece of 
emotional evidence, but that does not entail that the emotion is non-evidential in 
the first place. 
Bishop’s criticisms of hard-line evidentialism are less problematic for the 
moderate evidentialism I am defending here. And Bishop’s observations about 
emotions, ambiguity, and moral and epistemic rationality are well accommodated 
within moderate evidentialism without requiring a wholesale rejection of the 
possibility of justification of religious beliefs. 
Bishop has suggested that against the hard-line evidentialist, the most 
plausible theory is a doxastic venture-based fideism. In contrast, I am suggesting 
that moderate evidentialism does not suffer from the problems of hard-line 
evidentialism, yet has attributes that make it more compelling than fideism. The 
first step in consideration of this claim is to begin with a fundamental (yet 
underdeveloped) notion central to the debate: What do we mean by God? 
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 A fruitful epistemological exploration of emotions might separate between the emotion itself that 
the accompanying intuition. E.g. the fear response may be parsed into the emotion (fear) and the 
intuition that the fear is a response to a threatening individual. Such a discussion is beyond the 
present scope, though. 
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The Fideist's God 
Fideism, in the forms we have examined, is largely a theory about the 
rational status of religious beliefs. Both Evans and Bishop are focused on 
religious epistemology. Both also have constrained their discussion to 
Christianity. But neither spends much time developing a notion of God. In some 
regards, this might strike one as almost superfluous or unquestionably 
unnecessary. After all, if we are talking about the God of the Christian Bible, do 
we not already have suitable background knowledge to answer even non-trivial 
questions? Perhaps we do. But answering one specific question may cast 
fideism in a new light, and may redirect the inquiry along a fruitful path. Here is 
the question: If there is a God, how might we expect to encounter evidence of his 
existence? 
At first blush, it may seem that this question is irrelevant for some forms of 
fideism, with Evans’s being an example. Evans may re-iterate that the presence 
of evidence is not an issue if indeed our faculty of epistemic reasoning cannot or 
will not accept the evidence. But in fact the question does remain relevant. Here 
is why. 
Natural theology is rooted in the idea that we, as philosophers, ought to look 
for evidence of God in the natural world. But the kind of evidence the natural 
theologian has in mind is what we might call forensic evidence: traces left as a 
side effect or consequence of some attribute, manifestation, or action of God. 
Intricately functioning systems are a result of God’s design. Our moral rationality 
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is a result of God’s imbuing creation with a sense of morality. Even the 
ontological argument locates the proof in notions of perfection or necessity, 
tracing from the concept back to the being. Thus the natural theologian plays 
Sherlock Homes, weaving evidence that might otherwise seem circumstantial 
into a compelling and (hopefully) cohesive body of evidence in support of belief in 
God’s existence. 
If we were to stop here, then perhaps Evans would be able to rightly claim 
that the limits of our cognitive abilities do indeed become an intractable 
hindrance. It may indeed be the case that we are not Sherlock Homes, but 
Inspector Clouseau, and our perpetual bumbling and ineptitude prevents us from 
seeing and properly assessing the evidence. But the very characterization of 
evidence offered by the natural theologian neglects a crucial aspect to the 
question at hand: namely, the character and personality of the very being for 
whom we seek evidence. Here we must step back and ask that important 
question: What do we mean by God. 
I use the term God as a maximally honorific title, not a name.62 The term 
means one who is worthy of worship. Worship is not the cowering in fear or the 
heaping of empty praise, but the earnest reverence and adoration that expresses 
one’s genuine feelings of devotion and love toward a deserving authority. Only a 
being who is worthy of that sort of adoration and reverence is deserving of the 
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 cf. Moser 2008, summarized in 2012, 264-266. Given that a title does not imply a title holder, 
no question-begging is going on here. 
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title God. Moral perfection, self-sufficiency, and perfect lovingness is what 
warrants this adoration and reverence, and thus a being deserving of the title 
must also be morally perfect, self sufficient, and entirely benevolent. “Since God 
must be inherently worthy of worship and full trust, God must be altogether 
morally good, a God of unflagging righteousness and perfect love.”63 Such a God 
would desire that we, too, strive toward moral perfection. And to this end, God 
would actively and lovingly promote our own moral development.64 Thus we can 
expect two things of such a God: this God would act personally, and this God 
would act with the intent of provoking moral growth. To this list we can add a 
third: a morally perfect God would act non-coercively.65  
Considering natural theology in light of this rough sketch of God, a curious 
detail emerges: The natural theologian expects and looks for forensic evidence—
residue or traces of God. A footprint on the beach. But this is done with the 
assumption that God does not necessarily intentionally leave this evidence. The 
natural theologian does not ask the question if there were a being worthy of the 
title God where might he choose to leave me evidence? The personality of the 
God they seek is not taken into account. 
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 Moser 2008, 86. 
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 That is, if God is omni-benevolent and morally perfect, God would seek to instill in us moral 
perfection. By my lights, love is quintessentially relational, and for that reason, it follows from the 
definition of God that God would want a relationship with us. 
65
 A being worthy of the title God desires to be worshiped out of love. Love cannot be coerced out 
of one, though. An objection grounded in paternalism does not necessarily apply here: Some S 
may act coercively out of love (and thus be paternalistic). But to attempt to coerce another into 
loving one is neither paternalistic, nor (by my lights) morally laudable. 
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It is not just the natural theologians who make this mistake, but the fideists 
we have looked at do as well. Bishop claims that the evidence for God is 
ambiguous. In the last section I treated this as an epistemic question—a question 
about how evidence is and what evidence does. But there is another way of 
looking at evidential ambiguity. We can ask what Bishop is saying about a God 
who would offer (only) ambiguous evidence. While Bishop frequently talks about 
the possibility of the existence of God, he says very little about the character of 
God. His conception comes largely from traditional Christianity. But what scant 
characterization he does give of God—the view he finds in natural theology—he 
questions as perhaps failing to capture the notion of God with which he is 
concerned:  
Classical philosophical theism specifies the nature of God as the 
omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, supernatural personal Creator ex 
nihilo of all that exists. It is an interesting question—though a question I shall 
not here directly pursue—whether that classical theistic conception of God is 
in fact adequate to the God who is worshipped in theistic religious 
tradition.66 
It is unclear whether Bishop is claiming here that the natural theologian has 
overreached, or underdeveloped, or perhaps both. But there is the suggestion 
that answering the question has no relevance to the task at hand—the task of 
finding God. Still, Bishop may be suggesting the same thing I did above: that if 
we are to start with a description of God, listing the omnis might not be the best 
starting point. Throughout his book, Bishop implicitly treats God as I have 
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 Bishop 2007, 7. 
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suggested above: as a title fit only for one deserving of sincere praise, where 
such deserving entails absolute moral perfection. But even while this is implied, 
he does not make the epistemic connection. The lacuna he leaves may have a 
surprising consequence. 
On the face if it, Bishop provides a compelling case for fideism without 
addressing his notion of God. I suggested in the last chapter that there are a few 
problems that arise when there is no clear characterization of God. The first has 
to do with faith (and doxastic venture). The second has to do with evidential 
ambiguity. We can treat both generically here by asking this question: What sort 
of God does Bishop expect to find? If the God Bishop seeks is indeed 
characterized in line with what I have already said, then it seems Bishop may 
have made a misstep. Evidential ambiguity as construed under natural theology 
is a red herring. What we ought to ask is where we might expect to find evidence 
for a being worthy of the title God. In what way might a divine moral being 
present himself to us? This question is applicable to both Evans’s fideism and 
Bishop’s, for the answer addresses the worries of each. 
If God is intentionally acting, an assumption that seems well grounded in our 
notion of God, then to what extent ought we worry about Evans’s cognitive 
limitations argument? In the characterization of God that I gave above, I claimed 
that God desires that we progress toward moral excellence. With this reason, 
God would work actively (but non-coercively) to bring this about in our lives.67 So 
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 Coercion is incompatible with love. Forcing us, tricking us, or even revealing himself directly 
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we can expect God, should God exist, to act in subtle ways to promote our moral 
growth. There is a second trivial point to be made. God has knowledge about our 
cognitive limitations and selfish proclivities. This sort of knowledge does not even 
require omnipotence—it is a readily observable trait of humanity. Combining this 
trivial point with the claim about God’s acts of moral promotion, we can ask a 
simple question of Evans: Would a God who is well aware of our cognitive 
limitations rightly set the evidence so far beyond our abilities as to obscure 
himself, only to demand thereafter a (cognitively negligent) leap of faith? More 
specifically, if God were to work toward our moral good, would he do so in a way 
so obscure that were unable to detect it? For the sake of argument, let’s answer 
this with a tentative yes. Let’s say that God acted in such a way that his actions 
were undetectable to us. This would raise two concerns. First, one may assert 
that for an agent to act in undetectable ways to us is coercive. As enticing as this 
option is, it does not hold water. Only if one acted in undetectable ways against 
which we could not resist would this be coercion. But the second concern in 
answering this question in the affirmative is that it seems to go against both the 
characterization of God as one who seeks a relationship with us, and also 
against Evans’s own characterization of the Christian God as one who demands 
overt faith as a prerequisite for salvation.68 If God deliberately obscures the 
                                            
and then commanding us would all be coercive, and thus contrary to the character of God. This is 
not to claim that all revealing is coercive—revelations may be non-coercive. Doing so in a way 
that demanded worship, though, is coercive. 
68
 Evans 1996a. 
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evidence to extent to which he gives no indications at all of his presence, it 
seems that God’s method is at odds with God’s own goals. To obscure in this 
way—and then to demand (on Evans’s account) evidence-less faith—does not 
seem to be consistent with God’s character. I think this disqualifies such a being 
as worthy of worship. Note that this is not to say that at some times, and for 
some people God may not provide evidence. It may be the case that it is 
sometimes in line with God’s own goals for God to not provide evidence. 
However, if divine hiding were a global permanent state, one might question the 
morality of such a God for thus also demanding evidence-less faith on the part of 
humans. 
What about Bishop’s evidential ambiguity? Would a God who desires a 
relationship with us, a God who acts personally, somehow be either incapable or 
unwilling to provide evidence that does not suffer from the sort of fatal ambiguity 
Bishop posits? Bishop’s evidential ambiguity is based largely on the evidence of 
natural theology. To answer the question as presented here, we could make a 
simple concession: the evidence of natural theology is ambiguous. This leaves 
us on level ground when asking whether evidence in the form of a volitional 
challenge is in fact also ambiguous. 
A Robust Notion of Evidence 
In the previous section, I claim that Bishop and Evans have neglected a 
question that, when answered, would change the discussion. What kind of 
evidence would we expect from a God who is worthy of worship? The common 
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approach of the natural theologian is to take a forensic view of evidence 
gathering, looking for trace evidence—footprints—of God in the world. But this 
approach does not take into account the purported personhood of God. If God is 
a personal being, we should expect evidence of a personal nature—evidence of 
communication. And since a God who is worthy of worship would also desire our 
moral improvement, we can expect this communication to promote morality, yet 
be without coerciveness. Thus we might expect God to challenge an individual 
volitionally, challenging the individual to make the decision to act morally. If this is 
the case, then we ought to seek evidence of God’s volitional challenges. 
If a God worthy of worship exists, we would expect such morally challenging 
but non-coercive communications to have some of the following characteristics. 
First, the message would be specific to an individual. Second, to be non-
coercive, the message must be such that an individual can choose to ignore it.  
Third, the message would (try to) promote our moral goodness. We should not 
expect such evidence to necessarily be public, for public evidence (and forensic 
evidence in particular) may not be aligned with God’s moral and redemptive 
purposes. Some sorts of public evidence may in fact be coercive.69 Here I agree 
with Evans’s suggestion that some types of public evidence (historical evidence, 
for example) are irrelevant to the relational aspect of God’s character while other 
types of public evidence—“Miracles or other evidence”—may in fact alienate 
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 For elaboration on both of these arguments, see Moser 2008, chapters 2 and 3. 
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people from God.70 
Public evidence is the type of evidence that is available intersubjectively. 
That is, for evidence E to be public, it must be the case that if S1 has access to 
E, it is possible (in principle) for S2 to also have the same evidence. Often, public 
evidence can be intentionally transferred from one agent to another. 
Transferring evidence—revealing it—can be done either directly or 
indirectly. By suggesting direct and indirect forms of revealing, I intend to capture 
the cases where (a) S1 can give S2 evidence, and (b) S1 can direct S2’s 
attention to evidence. For example, directly revealing evidence may entail 
physically or verbally transferring something, while to direct one’s attention may 
be the suggestion that one look over there or listen to that. Notice that there is no 
requirement that S1 does transfer evidence, but only that it is possible that S1 
transfer evidence. If I find an object and proceed to hide the object, not showing it 
to anyone, this does not (by that fact) make the object my private evidence. 
Likewise, if Fermat did indeed prove his last theorem, yet failed to transfer it, this 
does not mean that the proof is private evidence. It is only public evidence that 
has not been transferred.71 
Above I suggested that indirect sharing of evidence may come in the form of 
a directive to adjust one’s attention (look over there!). But this is a more 
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 Evans 1998, 140-142. 
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 Note also that this definition of public evidence allows that an incorrect proof is also public, as 
the derivability of the proof does not influence the proof’s publicness or privateness. 
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complicated matter than it initially appears, for what evidence is shared? There is 
a sense in which two individuals in the same place at the same time with their 
attentions directed in the same way experience the same thing.72 When the 
whistle in the distances draws attention to the oncoming train, in a very real way 
the train (and the whistling noise) are public evidence. This is largely because the 
individuals share common notions (though perhaps not identical notions) of 
“train,” “whistle,” and so on. 
But included in the experience is, for each person, the phenomenological 
content of the experience to which attention is attracted.73 I feel the ground 
vibrate. I hear whistle in the distance. I see a puff of smoke. (Or, following the 
adverbial form, I am being appeared to thusly.) In the first chapter I mentioned 
beliefs whose content is non-propositional, and the question arises here whether 
the contents of these beliefs are public or private. In each experience, the 
phenomenological content is, so to speak, dependent on the agent. That is, the 
experience does not appear independently of the agent.74 While I may be able to 
direct others toward the smoke, or to listen to the whistle, I cannot share the 
phenomenological content of my experience. I can anticipate (based on other 
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 Maybe we need to add “with the same socio-ethnographic backgrounds” to eliminate cases of 
Quinean radical notional differences. Also note that I am not claiming that the fact that two people 
share this public evidence has anything to do with answering metaphysical questions about 
reality and the world. 
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 One might suggest a token/type distinction here. The train-whistle-blowing type may be had by 
many individuals. But the individual token is private to an individual. 
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 cf. Moser 1989, 89-90. 
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evidence I possess) that others may have similar experiences with similar 
phenomenological content. But my evidence for the proposition “there is a puff of 
smoke” depends on many individual pieces of evidence. And some of that 
evidence (foremost the phenomenological content) cannot be transferred. Thus, 
a common type of private evidence is phenomenological evidence. 
Evidence is private just in case when S1 has access to E, it is not possible 
for some other agent (S2) to also have that same piece of evidence. This 
suggests that evidence such as memories, dreams, pain, and emotive states 
(elation, depression, sadness, etc.) are among those pieces of evidence that are 
rightly classified as private evidence. In these cases, at least some non-
propositional content of the evidence is available only to the given individual.75 To 
share this evidence, we may offer a propositional formulation of the experience in 
hopes that the listener may also have similar enough experiences to fill in the 
gaps incommunicable propositionally. (Consider the doctor’s frustration with the 
patient attempting to describe “where and how it hurts.”)76 
Private Evidence 
It should be clear from the characterization above that private evidence 
plays an important role for evidentialism. If nothing else, it prevents the sort of 
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 It is not clear to me that there could ever be a case in which propositional content could not, in 
principle, be shared. 
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 Thus, one’s given experience of pain is an individual token, and the phenomenological aspects 
of that token are private. But the type of pain—while also non-propositional—is in a sense shared. 
That is, others may experience (tokens of) the same type of pain. 
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infinite regress argument that Evans worries over.77 Beliefs with non-
propositional content do not rely upon other propositional beliefs, and contain as 
their content something that does not necessarily need the support of other 
evidence or argument.78 
The characterization I have given has steered well clear of the traditional 
conflation in religious epistemology of private evidence and religious experience. 
But religious experience is a question that must be addressed in the context of 
evidence generally, and private evidence specifically. 
Given my sketch of the distinction between public and private evidence, it 
seems evident that most experiences that fall under the rubric of religious 
experience are indeed private. The non-propositional content of such 
experiences remain solely in possession of the one who experiences them. In 
fact, this is often the complaint lodged against such experiences. When such 
experience cannot be examined by others, and when such experience seems so 
intensely personal, we raise an eyebrow about whether it is legitimate evidence. 
By addressing headlong the questions about religious experience and evidence, 
we may better understand Bishop’s complaint about evidential ambiguity. And we 
may gain new clarity on how to judge evidence. 
There are two questions we may ask about religious experience and 
evidence. The first is whether or not religious experience is evidence at all. The 
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 See Moser 1989, chapter 4. Evans (1998) raises his infinite regress problem in chapter 3. 
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 cf. Moser 1985, chapter 5. 
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second question is whether this evidence (if it is evidence) is sufficient evidence 
for justification. 
Given what has been said above, I characterize religious experience as the 
broad category of private evidence in which a human agent experiences God or 
has an inner state or event that, to the agent, indicates the presence (or, 
perhaps, the absence) of divineness. I have intentionally kept the notion broad. 
Mystical experience, in which one experiences a vivid mental event (perhaps 
coinciding with a physical event) that is inexplicable yet suggestive of divinity, 
may indeed be a kind of religious experience. But so also may be deeply moving 
feelings. Are religious experiences truth indicators? Religious experiences may 
have directionality just as do many of the previous examples of evidence. 
But in regard to the second question I raised above, we must ask whether 
religious experience is good evidence. Is it easy to defeat? Does it answer why-
questions? This is where many forms of religious experience show weakness. 
Take the inexplicable mystical experience. An earmark of the mystical 
experience is its singularity and non-repeatability. There is generally no way to 
authenticate such an experience, nor is there a substantial body of additional 
evidence that bolsters the trustworthiness of a mystical experiences.  Mystical 
experience is not particularly resistant to defeaters. For any given experience, it 
seems that one may raise defeaters as to the cause of the experience: was it 
God’s voice, or just bad sushi? Because of the aforementioned problem of 
authentication, there seems to be no general response to such defeaters. 
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Mystical experience may be evidential, but it is also of dubious value.  
On the other end of the spectrum are the more innocuous religious 
experiences—those explained as (sometimes strong) emotional responses, or 
feelings of conviction. Where the mystical experience presents a difficulty in its 
uniqueness, the emotional response presents difficulty in its ubiquity. Emotional 
experiences, even strong ones, are by no means unique to religious experience. 
We experience these in many areas of our lives. Conversations trigger them. Life 
experiences trigger them. And common wisdom dictates that we ought not 
immediately take such feelings as reliable truth indicators. In fact, we attempt to 
safeguard ourselves from emotional decision making by invoking mediating 
strategies. Take a deep breath. Wait a day. Have a cup of tea. Sleep on it. In 
short, we often mistrust our own emotions. As Bishop points out in his fear 
example discussed previously, sometimes our emotions are trustworthy. Yet it 
seems that we are incapable of offering a simple rule to distinguish the 
trustworthy from the spurious or overwrought. The consequence seems to be 
that religious experiences of a wide variety are evidential, but we treat them as 
easily defeasible and on their own they are not likely to be sufficient evidence to 
justify belief. 
Religious experience may be of value, then. But perhaps there is yet a 
better sort of evidence that we might look to. 
Evidence and God 
If there is a God, where “God” is a title indicating a being who is absolutely 
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worthy of worship, then how might such a God reveal himself? I have suggested 
that we should expect such a God to reveal himself in a way that would promote 
moral improvement. That is, such a God would be interested in changing the 
motivational core of the believer, giving that believer a disposition toward the 
good. Because this evidence is directed toward an individual’s will, challenging 
the receiver to willfully choose to act, this evidence may be called volitional 
evidence.79 
If this is the sort of evidence we are to expect, then one ought to look for 
such evidence by looking for instances where one’s will has been challenged to 
act, and act for good. Where might one look for such challenges? We often talk 
about conscience as a locus of moral promptings. So might we look to 
conscience as a source of divine moral promptings? First we can talk briefly 
about what is meant by promptings of conscience. Initially we may interpret the 
notion of “promptings of conscious” as being a reflective and conscious 
rumination on what action is morally best in a given situation. This is not what I 
have in mind—indeed, that would not be a prompting at all. It is better to 
understand conscience as working analogously to our senses. When I hear the 
whistle of the train or feel the ground shake with the incoming engine, at the 
phenomenological level something attracts my attention. The whistle sound. The 
quaking sensation. Conscience, too, works by attention attraction. To phrase it 
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 Paul K. Moser provides a richer development of this idea in The Elusive God (2008), especially 
in chapter 3. The description of evidence that follows here is largely my take on Moser’s claims. 
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adverbially, I am appealed to conscientiously. My attention is attracted to a moral 
prompting. 
There are many cases of simple moral promptings—help the poor, do not 
steal that book, take care of your family, do not strike that person. There are also 
extraordinary moral promptings. We are familiar with stories of individuals who 
have given up comfort, wealth, and even a livelihood to become agents of 
positive moral change. Cases are not limited to the likes of Mother Theresa, but 
to those who make short term commitments (to become a temporary aid worker) 
or even momentary commitments (to take a single decisive and morally 
outstanding action). The promptings that lead individuals to act in such moral 
ways are the sort of prompting that we would expect from God. As Paul Moser 
explains this sort of evidence: 
It would include the perfectly authoritative divine call, via human conscience, 
to relinquish our own selfish willfulness for the sake of living for the unselfish 
perfectly loving will of God. This elusive wake-up call would aim to work, if 
painfully, through human conscience in order to reach us at our internal 
moral center, where one could ‘know reality together’ with God, as the 
etymology of ‘conscience’ suggests. It wouldn’t be reducible to spectator 
evidence, but would come instead with a moral challenge to us to be 
awakened from our selfishness to the moral primacy of divine love, even if 
we dislike and dismiss the challenge.80 
What Moser points out is that one avenue by which God may provide evidence is 
through moral promptings, which we receive via conscience.81 Given an 
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 Moser 2008, 50. 
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 This is not to claim that all promptings of conscience are morally good. This may or may not be 
the case. But (a) moral promptings are received via conscience, and (b) agents can test the 
morality of these promptings. The operative claim here is that conscience is the avenue by which 
we might expect God to prompt us morally. 
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understanding of these moral challenges as degrees of the same sort of 
prompting, from mundane to extraordinary, to what extent might we consider 
such promptings evidential? 
Consider the following case: S identifies a prompting of conscience E. A 
characteristic of this prompting is its attention attraction. That is, an agent’s 
attention is drawn to the event. For the sake of argument, E has neither any 
mystical attributes, nor is E an extraordinary demand (e.g. “fix world poverty”). E, 
for S, indicates the existence of a morally perfect being—a being worthy of the 
title God.82 Ought S immediately believe in God on the basis of E? Most 
evidentialists would express restraint. While E may be evidence, it is unclear that 
E would (or could) be sufficient evidence on its own. Many evidentialists would 
advocate seeking more evidence. But this particular example presents a unique 
characteristic in regard to obtaining more confirming evidence: The best way to 
gather additional evidence (either for or against) is to submit to the prompting. 
That is, if one is interested in gathering more supporting evidence that a 
prompting of conscience is indeed an indication of the existence of God, one 
ought to follow the prompting, for doing so is the most likely route to encountering 
additional evidence.83 So S may then follow the prompting (E) in S’s actions. We 
might say that in doing so, S has conformed S’s will to the prompting (and thus, if 
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 cf. Moser 2012, in which this encounter with a volitional prompting becomes a “Gethsemane 
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 This is, I think, roughly the idea of diachronic evidence Moser (2008, 69) suggests. 
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God exists, to God’s will). Our characterization of God as a being worthy of 
worship suggests that God is interested in the continual moral development of 
each individual. S might then expect to encounter additional evidence in the 
following forms: (1) experiencing other similar promptings of conscience, and (2) 
experiencing a genuine change in S’s motivational core, gaining a stronger 
disposition toward acting unselfishly moral and following moral promptings.84 
Regarding (1), I am suggesting that if there is a God (as defined above), a being 
whose interests include the moral betterment of any willing individual, then God 
would (joyfully) meet one’s obedience in regard to E1 with another challenge E2, 
and so on. Regarding (2), again our definition of God suggests that it is in God’s 
interest to transform individuals morally. “[A] perfectly loving God would 
noncoercively seek perfectly loving human submission to the degree that God’s 
moral character is perfectly represented in willing humans.”85 And thus such a 
God would well be likely to invest in the individual with a transformation of the 
individuals motivational core—but only in a way that leaves the receiver free to 
reject the offer of transformation.86 When one becomes willing to be transformed 
morally, one may expect to encounter God’s offer of transformation. This is the 
idea Christians sometimes try to express with the phrase “having Jesus in one’s 
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heart” (though sometimes this notion is confused with other notions). A 
substantial body of this evidence from conscience may indeed be sufficient for 
justifying one’s belief in God, given that the inference made is that God’s moral 
actions via consciousness is indeed the best available explanation. 
But lest we get ahead of ourselves, there remains the initial problem: That 
second level of evidence is not accessible based solely on an initial prompting of 
conscience. While I have suggested that more evidence might be had, that 
second level requires that S act on E. But is it not the case that for S to 
(epistemically) rationally act, S must already believe (or at least assent to) the 
claim that E is a prompting? Such belief/assent would not be justified—it has 
already been stated that the evidence is insufficient. On what grounds, then, 
might one act on this belief (or instance of assent)? 
The skeptic might here recommend suspension of judgment. But this may 
not be the appropriate course of action, for there is some evidence, and the 
outlook for garnering additional evidence is promising. In this situation, one may 
rationally assent to E (even in one’s practical commitment) in hopes of obtaining 
further evidence. We already have a term for this sort of following of evidence: an 
epistemic venture. But the notion of venture that I employ differs from Bishop’s. 
Bishop distinguishes between doxastic and sub-doxastic ventures. Either will do 
for us—one’s disposition is not at issue. There is indeed a place for venture in 
epistemically rational reasoning, but this venture does not lead to fideism of any 
sort. Further, we do not need a thesis of evidential ambiguity as an initial prompt 
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for the making of this venture. Evidential ambiguity suggests (at least on some 
interpretations) that the evidence lacks directionality for us, and because of this 
we may need to venture. Yet the evidence in question does have directionality. 
Finally, contrary to Bishop’s account, venture and justification do not stand as 
mutual exclusives. 
Earlier I pointed out that most contemporary epistemologists, including most 
evidentialists, no longer require certainty as a condition for knowledge. In 
absence of certainty, believing (or merely assenting) based on evidence is 
venturesome. Even a justified belief may then be venturesome. That is, one may 
acknowledge that one has conclusive evidence for P at t, while still 
acknowledging that disconfirming evidence or defeaters may arise at t + 1; yet 
one may venture (for the future) that P. 
Given this notion of venture, one might venture that some volitional 
prompting E is indeed a divine prompting—evidence of God’s interaction in the 
agent’s life. One may act in accordance with E, with hopes that doing so will lead 
to the availability of more evidence (in the form of promptings or transformation of 
one’s motivational core).87 
This notion of venture is compatible with the characterization of sufficiency 
and decisiveness introduced earlier in the chapter. If decisiveness does not 
require an assurance about the future (as certainty does) then justified but 
uncertain beliefs carry with them an element of venture. In accepting an 
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 The notion of venture explained here does not necessarily entail that S is justified that P. 
291 
 
uncertain belief P, S ventures that at time t + 1, S’s total available evidence will 
continue to suggest P. S’s holding P (and acting on P) is not because S is acting 
out a hypothesis for the sake of experiment, but because the evidence is 
sufficient for S to decide that P. Venture, as I am describing it, does not carry 
with it an additional caveat about how one assents or believes. Rather, it 
describes one’s epistemic disposition toward P in light of an absence of 
certainty.88 
Is this sort of venture a type of fideism? I do not think it can be so called. 
Fideism suggests a long-term commitment to faith without regard for an 
evidential base. Evans, for example, treats faith as dispositional: One believes by 
faith and no longer relies upon epistemic rationality. Bishop invokes permanent 
evidential ambiguity, claiming that there is no reason to hope that one’s evidential 
base will ever disambiguate. Both treat this step of venture as replacing 
justification. In contrast, I am claiming that venture is appropriate solely on the 
epistemic grounds that it is the most likely course of fulfilling one’s epistemically 
rational goals. The epistemic goal of holding a maximal number of (important) 
true beliefs while minimizing false beliefs is still the goal, and epistemic 
justification remains the best way of attaining that goal.89 But even in absence of 
justification, epistemic venture can  (at time t), play a role (assuming S has 
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 One might draw parallels between the dispositonal component of belief and the dispositional 
nature of epistemic venture. Venture, though, is related to justification. Not belief. 
89
 As I pointed out in the first chapter, not all beliefs are equally important. There are many 
possible beliefs that are for most people at most times unimportant. Determining, for example, 
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evidence, though inconclusive, for P). The strategy for epistemic venture here is 
diachronic: venture today in order to be justified tomorrow. 
Disconfirming Evidence 
One may read the argument thus far as suggesting that if S follows 
prompting E, S will obtain evidence. That is, one may see, or hope for, a 
necessary connection between accepting and acting upon E, and immediately 
gaining further evidence. (Or one may hope that if acting is not immediately met 
with further evidence, one is now justified in disbelief.) I am not claiming this, 
though. I am suggesting that if S is interested in gaining more evidence, the most 
likely route to obtaining evidence is to follow E. Given a God who is a person, not 
a mechanism, one must keep in mind that providing volitional evidence (that is, 
promptings) may well be a volitional act on God’s part. That is, God would decide 
when to prompt us. To expect that immediately upon completion of acting upon 
E1, I ought to be prompted with E2 is to neglect the point that another willful 
being may choose not to communicate at time t. 
Initially this may smack of a falsifiability violation, but what I am claiming is 
that the model to be applied to moral promptings must be the same model we 
apply to our interactions with human agents: we must assume that each party 
has a will, and that because of this the communication will be asynchronous.90 In 
                                            
how many blades of grass are in the front lawn, is not likely to best fit one’s epistemic goals. 
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 I am borrowing this terminology from computer science, in which network communications are 
described as synchronous or asynchronous. A synchronous communication channel is one in 
which communication is expected to occur with immediacy. The sender thus expects the receiver 
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fact, it is the asynchronous nature of the communication that most aptly indicates 
the existence of a being who meets our definition of God. Consider the case of 
an email exchange with an unknown sender. I may receive an initial email from 
an unknown sender. The email may have been intentionally sent by an individual. 
Or it could have been sent by an automaton—perhaps it is a built-in feature of 
the email server. Indeed, the message may just be a cosmic fluke caused by 
wayward electrons. My initial reception of the email message is not sufficient to 
indicate which of these is the case. I have the option of ignoring the email; I also 
have the option of responding. The later option may provide me the best route for 
learning more about the sender. If I send a reply and hope for an immediate 
returned response, my hopes are more likely to be fulfilled if the sender is an 
automaton than if the sender is a willful agent. (Email auto-responders are 
synchronous and automatic: They re-act immediately to a prompting.) An agent 
responds willfully—when the time is right for the agent. A response may be 
immediate; or it may be delayed, unsent until the agent deems it appropriate. The 
relationship with an agent is asynchronous and not automatic. 
But does failure to receive additional evidence constitute disconfirming 
evidence? If the process of receiving a prompting and then acting on the 
prompting does not result in additional promptings and changes (in a reasonable 
                                            
to act upon message reception with an immediate response. An asynchronous communication 
channel is one in which the sender is not entitled to expect that the response will follow 
immediately. A synchronous process sends a message and waits (blocks) for a response. An 
asynchronous process sends a message and then continues work, checking back periodically for 
a response. 
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amount of time), then the initial evidence is not strengthened. It is not defeated, 
perhaps, but it is not strengthened. What I mean by “strengthened” is nothing 
mysterious. We talk about our total evidence in support of some belief, B. 
According to the venture model I have suggested, accepting and obeying E is a 
venture intended to unearth additional evidence, which would in turn lead to 
greater total evidence. But if additional evidence is not encountered, the total 
evidence remains unaltered. Again drawing from the email analogy, if I send a 
reply and hear nothing, I gain no further evidence about the nature of the sender 
(other than that the sender has not yet replied). But this does not constitute 
disconfirming evidence of the agent-ness of the sender, either. 
A Further Challenge from Bishop 
Does this theory adequately address Bishop’s concerns over evidential 
ambiguity? Evidential ambiguity no longer looks like the global and pervasive 
problem Bishop claims. Yet Bishop may here borrow from Evan’s playbook and 
suggest that evidential ambiguity is not a result of the actual evidence, but of our 
unwillingness to take the evidence as it is. That is, Bishop may argue that 
evidential ambiguity may turn out (at least in this case) to be a result of 
selfishness and pride on the part of the human agent. And such a point is well-
made. Receiving, recognizing, and acting upon a volitional challenge is subject to 
the will of the individual. Pride and selfishness could indeed interfere when one 
refuses to submit. 
Volitional evidence is to be found, I have suggested, in conscience. 
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Promptings for non-selfish moral actions, promptings to conform to the will of a 
morally perfect God—these are non-coercive. They can be rejected, and they 
can be ignored. Thus, the willingness of the agent to receive (and consequently 
act upon) volitional evidence is, in a very real way, a determinant for the 
evidence.91 One who ignores or rejects simply will not have the evidence. For this 
reason, if we are to fall back on a notion of evidence as forensic in nature—if we 
are determined to look only for traces of God without becoming engaged at a 
relational level—the evidence may well appear “ambiguous”—or, more 
accurately, vague and unreliable.92 
But such an objection illuminates a crucial facet of this sort of evidential 
approach: The religious seeker must be genuinely receptive and willing to act. A 
relationship is not built by abstaining from commitments. And when searching for 
a being who is by definition both morally perfect and totally loving, it would be 
foolish to expect that we might keep aloof while still knowing God. 
Moderate evidentialism remains a plausible—the most plausible, I argue—
epistemological approach for addressing religious belief. But the success of the 
method is contingent to a large degree on our ability to look for the appropriate 
kind of evidence. Natural theology—as both Evans and Bishop argue—has not 
provided compelling evidence. But that may well be because we have asked the 
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wrong questions and looked in the wrong places.93 By first asking how a being 
worthy of the title God might reveal evidence, we may recognize a better 
approach to gaining evidence. Though this approach requires a degree of 
venture by the religious seeker (an issue unremarkable given that much truth-
seeking involves venture), it is the best method for acquiring sufficient evidence 
to justify religious belief. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that a variety of moderate evidentialism is 
preferable to fideism. I began by pointing out that ultimately fideism cannot help 
the religious seeker ward off skepticism. From there, I moved on to an 
examination of Evans’s and Bishop’s critiques of evidentialism. Through that 
discussion, I developed what I have called “moderate evidentialism”—an 
alternative to Bishop’s hard-line evidentialism. This moderate evidentialism 
comes with a robust notion of evidence that includes both public and private 
evidence. Focusing on varieties of private evidence, I have suggested that there 
are in fact forms of evidence that may rightly indicate religious truths. In particular 
I have focused on volitional evidence. Two important lessons emerge from 
fideism: First, Bishop points out the value of epistemic venture, which I have 
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 Note that I am not claiming that God cannot provide forensic evidence, but that it is not aligned 
(it appears) with God’s goals. “Thus, we should not expect it. For redemptive purposes, God 
wants people to know God directly, in an I-Thou acquaintance-relationship, without the dilution or 
the distraction of philosophical arguments. Accordingly, God wants the self-commitment of a 
human agent to God, not (in this context) to an inference or a conclusion of an argument. God 
wants to be one's sole evidential foundation for believing in God and for believing that God exists, 
and hence does not want an argument to assume this role” (Moser 2013, 11). 
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developed (in a non-fideistic way) as part of moderate evidentialism. In absence 
of certainty, one may venture upon one’s evidence, and in so doing may obtain 
additional confirming evidence. Such a venture, when made without justification, 
is not the basis of continued faith, nor a staple condition for faith, but a temporary 
epistemic move designed to pragmatically address our cognitive and situational 
limitations and open the possibility of diachronically receiving additional 
evidence. Secondly, from fideism we have seen how the challenge of cognitive 
limitations identifies the role of the receiving agent in regard to volitional 
evidence. One must be willing to receive evidence. One must be willing to forgo 
selfish motivations to act upon volitional moral promptings. And in this 
willingness, one may open oneself to gaining evidence otherwise blockaded by 
selfishness and cognitive limitations. This is where evidence disambiguates. 
In the first chapter of the dissertation I developed an account of rationality, 
focusing on epistemic rationality. I began with this because doing so grants a 
higher degree of clarity to the sometimes murky relationship between epistemic 
reasoning and rationality in general. In particular, it provides a framework for 
asking meaningful questions about what the fideist means when claiming that 
fideism is rational. Bishop and Evans each claim to provide rational accounts of 
fideism, and as we have seen, these two theories can be understood as such. 
But for each theory I have pointed out what I take to be substantial flaws—flaws 
that indicate that fideism is an impoverished epistemic standpoint. Most troubling, 
as I have indicated in this chapter, is that fideism does not resist skepticism. 
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There is a detail common to both Evans’s and Bishop’s fideism: the success of 
each theory is contingent upon the failure of evidentialism. Fideism only gains 
traction if epistemic justification is out of reach. I have shown in the present 
chapter that evidentialism can indeed address the epistemic questions of the 
religious seeker. And if this is so, then evidentialism is the best available 
explanation for how one can hold epistemically rational religious beliefs. 
Future Directions 
The original topic for this dissertation was volitional evidence. I had intended 
on examining what volitional evidence is, and how diachronic evidentialism might 
function in light of this. Yet my initial encounters with fideism suggested that 
before I could embark on that topic, I must first ensure that such a theory does 
not devolve into fideism. (I am indebted to Fr. James Murphy for raising this 
objection to my dissertation proposal.) Thus, my original starting point—a rough 
sketch of how initial volitional evidence might open one to additional evidence—
has become the conclusion for this dissertation. I fear that once again where I 
hoped to plumb the depths of this topic, I have given an unsatisfactorily cursory 
treatment. 
In other places I have had to bracket important topics. First, in appropriately 
scoping this dissertation, I found it necessary to eliminate an historical 
examination of fideism. Bayle, Montaigne, Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Kant have 
all been grouped into the fideist camp (for better or worse). Pascal in particular is 
interesting because he may better be understood as suggesting short-term 
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epistemic ventures rather than the full-fledged fideism sometimes attributed to 
him because of his wager argument. With its close associations with skepticism 
of both Academic and Pyrrhonian varieties, fideism has a rich heritage.94 Yet in 
this dissertation I have made scant reference to the historical heritage of 
contemporary fideists such as Evans and Bishop. 
Second, there are three classes of fideism that have received only faint 
attention. Irrationalism, the first of the three, is one I find less interesting. But 
Wittgensteinian fideism (sometimes called language-game fideism) and religious 
anti-realism present problems of interest for future investigation. 
As a work of religious epistemology, I have opened many epistemological 
topics again addressing them only briefly. One is the epistemological 
perspectives relied upon by various forms of natural theology. Also, I have 
offered a rough characterization of evidentialism, one that I consider to be a more 
moderate form than the characterizations offered by Bishop and Evans. My own 
characterization is in need of careful elaboration, especially in regard to 
sufficiency and the notion of best explanation. 
Finally, there is the issue of rationality and resolving rational conflicts. Any 
moral philosopher will rightly recognize that my sketches of rationality were 
somewhat lopsided, as I have given more detailed descriptions of epistemic 
rationality than of moral or prudential rationality (and I have not even considered 
other forms of rationality). This is largely due to the fact that I feel better equipped 
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to offer an explanation of epistemic rationality than to offer one for, say, moral 
rationality. This is an oversight that I would like to rectify in future work. 
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